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A B S T i l A O Y 
fhe Great Depression of 1930s| that started towards 
the close of 1920s originated In the United States with the 
crash of the Hew York Stock Exchange, The collapse of the 
stock exchange vas, however, in Itself not the cause of 
the depresslcm, but was, aeraly an event %rhioh set It In 
motion* The crisis soon spread to other countries to become 
a world-wide phenomenon; ^dla also fell a vtotlm to the 
depression through her international relations* 
While initially the depression was toported from 
the United States, the events leading to a fall of prices 
and business activity wore of differing nature in different 
countries. In^ ^ for Instance^ common with other agricultural 
countries the important factor in the deepening of depression 
was a relatively heavier fall in the prices of her exports 
in the world market. India, on average being a net exporter 
of agricultural goods and importer of mo^ufaotured commodities 
suffered both as a seller and buyer in the world market. The 
another factor that tended to accentuate the devline of prices 
in this country was the deflationary monetary course followed 
by the Qovemment of India In their attempt to stabilise rupee 
at a high rate of exchange. After the suspension of the gold > 
standard in September 1931 there, no doubt, oame some relief 
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to our falling prices and trade, but we could not get its 
* 
full advantage because of our deflationary monetary and 
fiscal actions* 
Thus for a study of the Indian monetary policyj we 
may note two distinct phases - (1). the trend of monetary 
management between 19^ 9 and September 1931, when India 
was on the gold standard, and (2) the developments following 
the suspension of the gold standard. During the months 
extending over 1929 and September 1931, the Indian monetary 
authorities, In common, with Great Britain, strictly 
adhered to the stabilization of the exchange value of rupee 
at a higher parity, thereby enforcing a deflationary monetary 
policy to bring down the internal price level In confirmlty 
the rate of exchange. They did not make.a slight considera-
tion to the exigencies of the depression and strictly 
remained wedded with the objective of exchange stabilization. 
After the suspension of the gold standard, there emerged an 
opportunity for an expansionist monetary action, but our 
authorities declined to follow any deliberate policy of 
monetary expansion due to the fear of an Inflationary rise 
of prices. This was In clear contrast with theory and 
practice of that period. Almost all the Important writers 
such as Hawtrey, Keynes and Cassel, of that period made 
strong recommendations for an expansionist monetary devices 
to fight the depression. A number of countries, Australia, 
Sweden and Japan, that were similarly situatedCfaced the same 
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IHTHODtlCriO!! 
At Is vail known a a&rwe oeonoale depresfion aprtad 
over the vorld tirade and Industi^ y towards the end monttis of 
1929* It graduall/ dml^poA Into a violent crisis vhioh auxpasaed 
alnost all the preoeeding novesents of a similar nature tx>th in 
nagnittide and intensity. Production in the chief laanufitiB r^ing 
countries of the world shrank by SO to and the value of 
world trade in 1930 stood at one-tt^rd of its 19^ level. Again 
according to the estinates of the International liahour Office» 
in various countries of the world something like 30 esiUion 
perrons were thrown out of work* fhe degree and vay in which the 
crisis developedi however» differed f ^ country to country 
according to their stage of econottic development and nature of 
econoaiy* While the industrial countries suffered a severe decline 
in production and esQ l^oyiaent, the laain problm of agricultural 
countries reaained a heavy loss on forei^ trade account. 
Although the econoaic crisis affected in one way or the 
other most of the countriesf few of thea had an idea of the eicact 
causes of their troubles* the econoaists and writers of that 
period gave their own favourite eacplanations which in certain oases 
largely differ frtm each other, we are, Ibr Instance, told by 
soae that the source of all troubles was that people had spent 
too auch while others believed thit the crisis vas aggravated by 
inadequate spending! soae inciters blaned the Hew York stock crash 
while others regarded it as an ordinary event. Thus, over-invest-
aent, gold shortage, aonet-^ ry end fiscal policies and all sorts of 
trade restrictions were held responsible by one or other for all 
the troubles. A large variety of explanations naturally raises 
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the ourlosltjr to knov txaot^y what It lc« 
Ihdia bttlng a oountxy who69 prosperity for tho larger 
part depended on the world demand for her eiports of prlaayj 
goods had itf flilX share In the vorXd troubles* We would see 
that our oeonoal© systea reflected a olear posture of the world 
troubles during the depression years* Although our orop conditions 
were satlsfaotoiy the burden of trade depresslCHfi was sever."iaiy 
felt on our Ineoaes and prices. Our balance of trade drastically 
fell down and the vrhole econaqy was put to a severe strain. 
As elsewhere, In India also the probleas of the Depression 
may be approached froa various angles. It Is however» not possible 
tor us to deal with aH the aspects slault^eously and such an 
attempt would only result In sheer confusion. Thus the object of 
the present study Is to deal only vlth the monetary aspects of 
the ecoRoalc crisis. This would Halt the scope of the enquiry 
to the survey and analysis of the bearing of monetaiy and fiscal 
policies on the course of Depression In this country and to 
examine the various suggestions for controlling that situation. 
It Is clear that monet^ary f^lscal questions cannot be 
Isolated from other factors and are to be studied In a broad 
perspective. Yheni again, the monetair problems Itself present 
so many aspects and touch ov\ so many Important questions that 
they cannot quickly and readily be haAdled. Broadly speaking 
they Involve the questions of technique and objectlfes, of social 
policy, of political Implications and even of moral outlook. Some 
of these aspects, however, l ie outside the scope of this enquiry 
and would take us too far afield. The thesis will only be limited 
to the theoretical discussion of certain f\indamentftls of monetary 
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th9027 and policy and v i l l go on ao70 speoifically to exasine the 
Influence of the aonotary and fiioaX aaasuret on th^ oourse of 
dconoaio aotivlty in India and abroad during those years. This vouXd 
lie foXloved by a discussion on the possible alternatimi policies 
in this field which oight have helped India towards recovery. 
fhe lines on which our en(|uiry will be conducted in the 
following chaptei^ may now briefly be indicuted* The study will 
open with a brief review of the accepted business cycle theories 
in those years, fhis would help us to give a theoretical 
interpretation of the facts of the Depression, the second part of 
this chapter will be devoted to a statistical account of the 
business fluctuations in different countries and in India during 
that period* fhe subject would be approached through a review 
and exasiination of various forces at work which prepared the way 
for the Depression and also influenced its character later on. 
fhe second chapter would deal with the salient features and phases 
of the Depression in India* Since econoaic developaents in this 
country wore greatly influenced by international conditions it 
is necessary to include an outline of the course of Depression in 
certain other countries also* It would be seen that in aost of 
the industrially advanced countries a heavy decline in production 
end employment were the outstanding features of the Depression 
while in India it mainly manifested in a severe fall of prices and 
foreign trade* the implications of this phenomenon would be 
considered in details. Simulteneously it would also be examined 
how the depression developed from one stage to another and the 
factors working for this transiticai would be underlined at 
appropriate places. 
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In th9 third Qbapter we shalX diseuM the aonetaiy 
pollol«9 followed In Xhdlft In th« light of the expex>l^oe of 
oertain other eoontries where the oaueei and effeots of the 
depression were nore or less the same as in this coontry. It 
would mainlar Include a dtseusslon of currency and credit nanageraent 
^d quest ions of foreign exchange* The theoretical and practical 
aspects of these measures would he considered against the background 
of the understanding of aonetary questions in those years* this 
will show the exact relationship between the actual measures pursued 
by our monetary authorities and the relevant monetary theory* The 
next chapter will similarly be devoted to an examination of the 
financial oporatlons of the then Oowrnment of India* Here we shall 
mainly concemtrate mi the ttixation and expenditure policy and 
debt management* She total effect of these irarious aspects of nation-
al finances would be indicated on our money conditions as compared 
with certain other countries* 
The sub;}eat matter of the last chapter would be to give 
an appraisal of the above monetary and fiscal measures - to 
consider its total effect on the course of Depression in this 
country* C^ r conclusions will be based on the outcome of the 
discussions around two significant pointss (1) whether our 
•onetaiy and fiscal policies were primarily responsible for 
depression in India, were only an aggravating factort were neutral 
or positively helplUl in the recovery and (2) could alternative 
monetary and fiscal measures have helped jndia out of the Depressipn* 
mmm^. I, 
tm G^BSIS OF TB8 QRSAf DSPRBSSICm 
Tl ie Sreat Depr«salcn started in tt&« t^nlted States, irbsr* 
alt#r tevaral months of enormous spaoulation in stocks aii4 
stiarss tHore follovedi In October 1929» a violent drop In 
the prioes of securities on the Nev tofk Stock Bxchange* fhls 
vat SDon followed by further shocks and semintjr quotations on 
eTery exchange slunped heavily^ the slunp of security prices 
spread to the comnodltles nai^et and tbe decline of prices here 
was the signal for a world-vide drop in prices of cowaodltles. 
shall atteiapt ^ this chaptert in the first place to discuss 
why mid hov the big collapse ca«<l in the 0nited States} and 
secondlyi how it spread abroad, particular to India* fbr this 
it is necessaxr to preface this discussion with a brief sketch 
of the oechanisa of "boons" and '•depressions" to provide a 
working background for an understanding of the sequence of the 
events of the thirties. 
The hypothesis that trade c^des are recurring alterations 
of expansion and contraction, each stage of tbs business 
situation energlng from the proceeding stage and aerglng Into 
the next in a cyclical pattern preseists two aspects for study* 
Bow does 4 certain stage of trade cycle originate? and by whrtt 
process does It develop into the next? Broadly speaking we can 
distinguish two explanations of these phenomena that held sway 
during the twenties and early thirties* m the first place, 
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Havfcrey^  ea^lalned oyoloiby irariotlons In tbe disooitnt ratt 
an4 bank ox^dit and oalXod them a purely ttonetary phtnoatnon*** 
Asoording to hia th«sl8 the tendtnoy on the part of the banlcifig 
syatea is to ke&p the interest rate obangingt bo thnt it svinge 
like a pendulua from one axtreae to the other. This is the aouree 
of disturbance* A deeline in the interest rate enoouragei borrowing, 
vhioh raises demandi prices rise lending to an inoreaae in 
prodi^tion} then incomes rise giving an additional push to the 
rising prices and production and ve get a credit initiation, 
lowevort sooner or later the banks are forced to take steps to 
protect their reservesi they increase the rate of interest to 
discourage borrowing and this brings about the crisis and 
depression, 
Another explanation kno^ m as the **overinve8taient theory 
of the frade Gyol0% attes^ts to eiplain the fluctuations in terns 
of aaladjustment in the structure of production an overimrestaient 
in the higher than in the lower stages of production* The 
proponents of this theory believe thatf for one reason or 
anothert the appropriate proportion of productive resources 
devoted to different branches of industry coaes to be disturbed ^ 
the producers*Jsoodf industries get overdeveloped as compared 
to the consuaer goods industries* This leads to higher prices 
and nrofits inducing a further lengthening of the process of 
production and so on* Hovevsri sooner or laterf • reaction is 
inevitably produced setting off a reaex^ process; the new 
investnents are no longer profitable, and the scale of 
production in the higher stages is curtailed asking for a shift 
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resources fr&a th9 higher to tbe lower stages of produotion* 
The eollapse of the investoent industriea r«looae« factors of 
produotion on such a large seale, vbioh it Is not possible for 
the coGsuzaption goods lildiistries to absorb tliesi* Thas^  there 
spreads an oneiaployaetit leading to fall of incomes^  deeaand and 
prices and the whole eoonoay is dragged dowa» Afaong the 
advocates of this theoryi there ist hovewrt a diffeTonee of 
opinion in regard to the causes of the oirer-investaeut* Hayek 
and Bobbins, for instance, believed that it is caused bjr BUKiet-^ rjr 
factors, while Cassel and Speithoff have suggested taainl^ 
non-nonetar^ causes* thus, it Is with the help of these 
accepted theoretical tools that we shall try to solve the 
questions posed above becaase they represent the basic under<* 
standing of the phenoaena of boons and depressions in the 
period we are interested in. 
The Purely Honetanr Theory of the trade Qyclet 
The outstanding characteristics of a bocw period are 
rising prices and increased production* These two things can 
go together only wi^ n the market demand for output exceeds its 
sti^ ply* According to Bawtrey this situation arisen when the 
discount rate is lowered and the flow of soney increases* For 
this he starts fro« a position uiien for one or the other reason 
the reserjies of the banks are inproving and the reserve ratio 
rises above the normal* This enables the bonks to lower the 
discount rate. The reduction in the short-term rate of interest 
• I f . 
1 
ttnooura^et the traders* to borrow norc nonty for inoreaaing 
thvlr stookt; they glvt 3.arger ordors to the manufaoturert 
and ths Industrial activity Inore^ses* The inoreased activity 
leads to greiter eaiployment| thereby increasing the incoaiee of 
the factors of production* because "the vhole aoount of Ainds 
created by the banks is received as incomes, whether profits, 
wagesf aalaries, rent or interest by those engaged in producing 
2 
the comHKjdifciea". The increased purchasing power in the hands 
of the factors of production gives an push to the dessand and 
production of coatmoditiesi which lead in turn to a further 
increase in incoise inducing a farther increase in demand and 
productioei and so on. fhus a trend is set up to work towards a 
comsBulative expansion of productive octilrity. Headhiog this 
stage, the merchants and producers not only borrow nore, but 
also use up their idle balances which acts as an acceler^iting 
**Kerchant8 are the class of traders most sensitive to credit 
conditions. A producer's working capital is dictated to his 
by his output, and no consideration of the rate of interest to 
be paid on bank advances v i l l count for ouch against the 
paranount need to keep up output as near as possible to 
capacity. To a merchant, on the other hand, working capital 
•eans no itore than his stock in trade for the time being. It 
can be varied without much inconvenience within wide limits, 
and the cost of borrowing is one of the principal factors 
determiDlng the direction and extent of such variations**. H»G. 
Rawtrey, "Xondon and the Trade Cycle," American Bconoaic 
Review. 
2. Hawtrey, R«G. Trade and Credit, 1928, p.90. 
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fbroo to strongthen the upwaM aoveaent of priced and produotlon.^ 
As a deolino In the diseount rate was responsible for 
the hooB a restriotion of credit brings an end to it , Aocording 
to BavtrejT this situation devel.op& irhen afber a long proces.s of 
liberal credit supply banks find their cash i^ eserv&s falling 
rapidly* At thia stage they not only stop lending but actually 
call in some of their loans* This aay not only arrest the boots 
but set off a reverse aovenent in the reverse direction, of prices 
k 
and production in notion. On the one hand, the contraction of 
credit exercises a direct deflationary effect on prices and at 
the same time impels the merchants to reduce their borrovings 
as far as possible* m order to do thiSf they allov a large 
part of their stocks to run off without replacing i t , and, 
thereforet reduce their orders to producers, thereby loading them 
in tuR) to ounail the scale of their production and employment* 
The decline in the incomes of the factors of production through 
m reduction of demand leads to a fall of prists and production 
and so on* 
Hecowry from depression is also a natural sequence of 
events in Hawtrey^ e model* During the depression the demand for 
3* *^ hens is a principle of the instability of velocity of 
circulation which is quUe distinct frc»i the orlnclple of 
the instability of credit but is very apt to aggrakr^te its 
effect" — R,0,Ha%rtrey,The Art of Central Banking, p.17t* 
N-* **When credit has definitely turned the comer, anO> a contraction 
has succeeded to an expansion,the do^vard tendeftoy of prices 
is sufficient to maintain the process of contraction, even 
though the rate of interest is no longer, according to the 
ordinary standar8|hi«h -R.G.Hairtrey; Currency and Credit,3rd 
edition, London, 1926, p« 153* 
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erodit is ooapletely alaekened and gradually ooney flovs Imok from 
olreulatlon Into the roservas of tho banksf the reault being that 
the position of the eaah raservos la strengthened, eaualng a 
fall in the diaooiant rate* This is exactly and in all respects 
the same situntion from where ve started in our analysis of the 
genesis of the Bavtrey tielieves thnt altte:iugh there aight 
prevail pessimisa over the Imsiness horizoni yet there are 
alvays 8c»e vho are willing to borrow froa the hanks* And this 
again set of f an upward noimtaent of desandi production and inooae 
cto» to generate another cycle in the manner discussed above. 
THE ovm-mTrnTmifs theories 
The eiEponents of this theory b e l ^ that changes in the 
rate of interest bring about a change in the structure of 
production. HheR the zaarket rate falls belcjw the "natural rate*^ 
of interesti investaent becomes acre profitable. The new noney 
wouM thus flow to those lines of production, which *involire 
making things which only yield services at a later date or over 
a long period of tine* This tends to raise the cienand and thereby 
the prices of the producers' goods le-'ding to a further increaw 
in their production. At this i^tage, Robbing makes a refarence to 
5* 'T^ he r-jte at which the demand for loan capital Just equals the 
supply of savings" Wieksell, 
6. See» The Great Depression, (London,1935)t pp HO^ Wt. 
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a parallel development In th® security oarket. The optimSstlo 
reports of rising prloes and profits foater a stoolc exoliange 
booraj a miabar of the recipients of new ci»e<Slt, aay prefer to 
invost in securities I loading to an upward aovoraeat of prices 
In the fflai^cet for bonds and securities^ He, hoi^ ever holds that 
the rise In security prices tends to encourage the boom in the 
comaodifey ®arlset* High piiSifltej on the sto^ exchange, generate 
detaand for luxuries and dura i^le consuffler goods, leading to an 
Increase in their prloes. Coneequentlyi profits of the producers 
goods Industries being to rise and pzcductlTe activity is further 
extended* 
7 
However, when sl l the factors of production are e!B">loyed, 
the production in the capital goods' sector could only be increased 
by attracting the factors of r^roduction from the consumere* good 
industries, fhe producers of consuiaption goods, being in a weak 
pisition, may not be in a position to compete with the instruitental 
enterpreneures, with the result that a shift of the factors of 
production from lower to the higher stage of nroduction is continued 
The shortage of cor4Sutaer3* goods, in its tum leads to forced 
saving on the part of th© oonsuoiers. This, the over—investraent 
theorists believe has the same effect as a voluntary saving — 
a reduction in the deannd for consumers' goods, leading to a fall 
in prices* These changes in relative prices further increase 
the profitability of producers* goods industries as ccxapared to 
7* They start with the assuaptlon that the econoay is operating 
at a level of fUll employment, and therefore, productl<ai in 
one sphere could be increased only by oiaking a corresponding 
reduction in the other. 
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eonsuaera* goods industiloa* And thusf to put in the words of 
Hasrek, stiifting of the goods and servloes of this type 
would go on tintll the dlminition of returns in these stages 
a 
has equillsed the profits to be made in all stages'*.^ 
It is iiaportant to remember at this stage that the above 
ftnaljrsis of the upswing is based on the assusption that the 
Inoreased production of oapital goods is oontinuousXy fed by the 
expansion of credit. Bit as Hayek points out, sooner or later a 
stage is reached when, **to ompmsQ,t9 for the change in the 
proportion between the base lUmished by the credit and the 
superstructttrs errectad upon itf i t would be necessary for them 
actually to contract credit proportionately^.^ Thug, to 
discourage borrowing, the aarket rate of interest is raised} 
and this tonds to work exactly in the reimrse direction^ Sut 
the effect of the increase in the rate of intereftt is felt 
first in the security market| their prices declinei new issues 
are stopped and share prices in the stock exchange ultiaately 
collapse.^^ The decline in the prices of securities is a signal of 
8. Hayek, F.A. Prices and Production (London, George Routledge 
at Sons, Ud., 1931), pp. 71-72. 
9. Ibid., p. 100 
10* See, for details, Bobbins, op.cit. , chapter 2. 
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alara to the instrumental enterprenaurs* This ooablned with 
the inerease in the oost of aooosKoodation deters the entreprenurs 
fros further borrovlngt and thuS| the nevl^ started roundabout 
proeesses of production are dlsaontinued and the older ones 
ourtailed. the result belngi that the producers* goods 
of more speeiflo oharaoter, which now have become relatively 
abiaidant due to the withdrawal of the supplementary non-specifio 
goods, fall in price* The effeet of the increase in the 
rate of interest on the eonsuaier goods industries is relatively 
mildi and con8e<iuently their oompetitive power in the aarket 
t&r the factors of production is liaproved{ the production in 
consequence is increased. 
Another factor which tends to strengthen the hands of 
tt» consuoers* goods producers is the increase in the demand 
for their products* M the incomes of the factors of production 
increase they tend to restore their consuaption to the tormr 
level*^^ This causes eonsuuer goods* prices to rise relative to 
that of the capital goods and aakes its production increasingly 
profitable* Thus the net x^ esult is new and reversed change of 
the proportion between the deaand for consumers* goods and the 
II. Cf. itob?)ins, L* "The Great Depression, London t935, p* 36"* 
^Zt follows therefore, that as the now aoney becoaet 
incoae we must •xpmot a strengtheninj of the deaand, not 
for capital goods but for incone goods"* See also. Prices 
and Production by Hay^, 2nd edition, pp* 57-58. 
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dtasmd for produoors* good$ in favour of the foeaiffr**. 
Inisrtased daiaand leads to a farther rise of pfiees, a fUrttor 
inoroase In profits and therefor® in production. Th28« In th« 
words of Bayok would be" a rotum to shorter or less round-about 
aethods of production* 
This then generates the depression* the sudden and 
rapid ocmti^otion of the prociuotion in oapital goods industries 
causes unemployment amongst the factor of production on such a 
scale thttt It is not possible for the slowly eati^ andteg consuners* 
goods industries to absorb them* This causes a severe decline in 
incomes Inducing a fall in demand and there«^re oausing a downswing 
in general busieess activity. This is what the over-investment 
theorists call a *process of adjustment of the structure of 
production * 
As the boos gave way to the depresslonsi conditions emerge 
out of this pha«e to generate a revival* In the first place they 
believe that after a long period of liq[uidatlon» the cash reserve 
position of the banks improve, tending to bring the market rate 
below the natural rate* This creates an optimistic outlook and 
12. Hayek, op,clt., p« 79* 13* Xbld*, p« 80 
l^ -* Th« %rtlters of this school have not clearly elaborated the 
phenomenon of the depression and e<niceived it as an 
adjustment of the structure of production* 
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th« boprowars again com© Into tho flold, Th© expmalon of 
credit 3tl»ultit«8 tfm oxpanslon of capital goods production 
and recovery would thus gat a start* Tben, eeoondly, the 
slackness of business and investment in the period of depression, 
creates certain favourable circurastance for the expansion of 
production* fo put in the words of EobMns "affeer a certain 
intenral of liquidation and cost outtlngi business prospects 
will once ffiore brighten and revival will gradually take up,"^^ 
this aakes new Investoient both easy and attractive* 
B* tM Oy^ ffti^ YQ^ at^ inmlf 
The writers of this group also explain the phenomenon of 
boons and depressions in tenas of an over investment in capital 
goods industries* fheir sosalysis runs almost on the satae lines 
as above but with the difference that in the first place, they 
relegate aonetary factors to a sedondary role, and secondly, lay 
gre»iter stress on the variations in the pi^uductlon of capital 
goods, but do not pay much attention to what happens to the 
consuaers* goods industries* These differences apart, a close 
slfflllarity may be observed at every step of the analysis* 
Without entering into details, we may now briefly review 
the main outlines of this theory* They start from a positloon 
15* the Great Depression, V. 
16* Cf* 0* Cassel, the Theory of Social Economy, revised ed*, 
London, 1932, p* 552* the alteratlcm between periods 
of boom and slump is fUndaiMntally a variation in the 
production of fixed capital* but has no diredt ccmnection 
with the rest of production"* 
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vhen there is a sluap in industrial aotivit^r with Xargd uneaploy-^  
nent of the faotors of produotloni Xomr wages| and large oash 
halances available at lov rate of interest* These faotors mal^ e 
rooli for the ext ^ntionof production in the oapital goods 
industries where large resouarees are seeded* Among these factors 
while '*the credit is an indispensable means to the upswing's ^^  
is not in itself enough to generate the upward process* EoweTer« 
all these conditions together stimulate the producers of capital 
goods to nake new investaent, with the result that emplo^ent 
increases* causing an increase in purchasing power* ^hus demand 
rises, first for capital goods and later siso for consumption 
goods* As a result of the rise in demand the prices of producers* 
goods increase yielding large profits that would stiiBultte 
further investaent in capital goods industries and so on* So 
long as prices increase faster than wages* profits would continue 
to increase making for a continuous extension of capital goods 
industries* 
Ouring the course of the prosperityi hovsver« there 
develops a strain over productive resourcesi wages do rise to 
catch up prices, thereby reducing savings and profits; the 
cash reserves of the banks are depleted inducing an increase in 
the rate of interest! and thus develops an all-round shortage 
of the complementary goods* All these faotors make investment 
difficulty and at the same time create a pessimism over the 
business horison* 7hus, instead of being invested, money is 
- 13 -
borrovod or is U9«d to finanoa the repaytirant of loans* Tbe 
fo i l In industrlaX aotlTity by oauslng a deoXlne In the 
purohaslng power of the factors of produetion gives an start 
to a ravers© circle of economic activity. There are certain 
other technical factors, such as rigidity of irages and trade 
monopolies etc« that tend to intensify the slump* 
A revival from depresaiooi according to this theofy 
follovs almost in same my which we have shown in the case of 
monetary^overinvestment eji^ lanaticm* During the period of slump 
wages and other costs of production come dowRf the reserve 
position of the hanks is strengthened making f0r a reduction in 
the rate of intarasti and factors of production are available in 
large number etc» these developments provide strong incentives 
to the producers of capital goods and business activity thus 
restart to take up its old course* 
m& caisis i!f TBS qHiTEg m^ Atas, 
Vlhen we look at the staxt of the Great Depression In the 
lil^t of our theoretioal laodels it appears as i f the Depression 
in the tfrtited States was raeant to justify th© theory of the 
preeeeding sectiont the sQ(|u^ee of e^ rents being as follows t A 
long and continuous upward trend in industrial progress gave rise 
to optimiSQ as to higher profits, whioh translated itself into a 
wave of uncontrolled speculation in securities* fhe rise in the 
prices of stocks and shares reached alarming dimensions, so much 
so that in 1929t thoy had lost all touch with the yield of 
securities as the basis of value. Being faced with such a 
situation the Jtederal Reserve a adopted drastic measures 
of credit restirtction thnt tended to underaiine the confiidence 
of the professional speculators* thus, the sto<^&exchange 
speculation was dooned to collapse and the (quotations of shares 
started to decline raiiidlj in October 1929. Ihe slump in 
security prices spread to the coasaodity market and the business 
and industrial activity started m its long slide downward* Let 
us look at the details of the whole episode* 
ghfilpra a c^ f^flig^  In ^^ ^ ..^ .^ i^ filrttiff 
jp^ Q(^ Q^tl,oq m 1922^ 291 
following • gradual recovery trom the slunp of 1923*21 
the united States had been enjoying a grett prosperity,with only 
w soM^inor setbacks now and then, throughout the decade* The 
total prodluotion («3(prt8sod in 1929 dollars) rose froa I 66 
bUllon In 1922 t o ^ 9*^  bllUon in 1929, a rise of about hOfL^ ^^  
A0 0 the gros9 national iRcotse shoved sn ineroasse of 23^ 
vhiXd the popalatlon increased only about during the aasie period 
Botrfev^ ry the important feature of this developstent vas a 
greater eaipanaion of heavy goods and construction industri98» 
vis-ft-^via the consuaer goodte* industry* Sev^ Jral faotora may 
be accounted for this, £n the first place| since the outbreak 
of the Wari there had developed a considerable surplus capaoity 
in the industrial structure, which pressed for a speedy and large 
reconstruction. Then, secondly, during that period various 
important technical innovations vere being introduced throughout 
industry as a whole$ which increased the profitability of new 
investment,^^ It has been estimated that as a result of these 
technical and structural changes« productivity per man hour, had 
increased about 32,1 in manufacturing and by 39^ io electricity 
goneration, the output of electric power having doubled, between 
1923 and 1929,^ She increased generation of power, together with 
profitable prospects, caused investment both easy and attractive. 
The same thing was happening in the case of the construction 
industry. In the post-war years* there emerged an acute 
shortage of housing and other buildings, which tended to raise 
the rents to a high level. But, while the rents were increasing 
17* Kusnet8,&, National Ihcome and Ca>ital Formation,1919*35, 
(New lork, 1937)» table 1, 
16, lAwls, W,A,Arthur, Bconomic Survey* 1919*1939i(Z«ndon, 19^)f 
P* 39* 
19* For details, see League of Hations, The Coarse and Phases of 
the World Bronomic Depression, Chapter X & II, 
20, Lswis, U.Arthur, Qp,oit,, p, 39* 
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the cost of conatiniotlon deollnedi partly because of the technical 
changes and partly due to a decline in vage-rates. According to 
an estimate the composite weighted average of money vage-rates 
in the construction industry in 23 cities fe l l from 103*8 in 
the last five months of 1920, to an average of 97.7 in 1921 and 
92#3 in fhent again, the increase;! industrial activity 
gave an additional impetus to the mv construction activity* 
In addition to the favourable structural changes, there 
simultaneously previailed easy money conditims, during those 
years* The credit expansion m9 in full swing at the beginning 
of 1923» wben the discount rate iras slightly put up from to 
in Maid^  1923* Zt remained at about thit level t i l l the 
middle of 192^, and hencefofword the successive reductions in 
July, August and February next, brought it again down to ^ 
22 
the lowest point of the decade*" This may be ffjvourably compared 
with a level of • during the previous booa.^^ The 
market x^te also fel l in sympath i^ the rote otf prime cornmercial 2k 
paper declined by 1.M between January and July Similarly, 
in the first six months of 192^, the Federal Reserve System 
purchased f 298 million of securities,which rose to a high figure 
of 606 million, by December 1927. 
21* Heproduced from, Fluctuations Jn Zncome And Employment by, 
Thomas Wilson(London,Heprinted edition, 19*«9)tP« 122. 
22* Wilson,T.,OHOit*, p. 133>see alsoj Report of The Pederal 
Reserve Board. 
23. md* , p* 131 2^ * Ibid*, p* 133 
25* Ibid., pp 133 & 
* i? * 
Given these opportunities investment rose to a high level, 
the effect8 ms^y be clearly seen In the case of the producers* 
goods and construction industries where a large aiaount of capital 
and a longer period of production vas involved. It is eetiaated 
that during 1921-1929, the grosa investment expendlturt rose by 
§8*8 billion^ out of which $ billion accounted for producer*« 
plssit and equipiaont.^ Sliallarly, in 1927, when the building 
construction had reached its peak, the total expenditure on 
conetrudtion, both on public and private account, averaged at 
as large a» 120 of the gross national incoae*^ According to 
another estiaatei investm^t in the building constructions 
aaounted on an average to about of the total investtaent 
pQ 
between 1922 and 1929» The net investment of business 
enterprises in fijtsd equipment and construction coablnedt eipressed 
as a percentage of gross investaent rose from 10 in 1922 to 
in 1929*^ On the other hand, the expenditure on consunption 
as a proportion of ntitional incoae showed a decline froa in 
1922 to ?S$ in 1929.^ ® 
This was obviously reflected in the productive activity 
26, Vide, Hasen, Alvln H, »Flfcal Policy and Business Cycles* 
(Hew yoric, 1$k ), p. 6»f. 
27* Reproduced froB, X«wis W. Arthur, op.clt., p. 38» 
26* JKXiBnets, op.clt., p. kO* 
2f. Ibid., pp. ifO d k8, 
30, Kuxnets, 8. op.clt. , Appendix table Till. 
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of tt» producers* ana oonsunsrs* goods industries respectively. 
It should tie noted that the total output of manufactures between 
1920 and 1929 ahowed an lncre>!se of about but there was 
a wide dispersion around this average. The following figures 
of indiistrinl production for 1927-29? when the boo© was tsore 
pronounced in that country, indicate the enormous differences 
in the d@irel<^ment of uain manufaoturiag groups. 
table 1 
XnJm 
(Monthly averages,seasonally ad4u9ted,Deo#1927s100) 
ftontliiy 
average 
illl 
manufaet 
ures 
Iron 
and 
ateel,.. 
Autom-
laobiles 
Teit-
l les 
Leather 
and 
shoes 
Btood 
products 
1927, Dec. 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1928, June 111 121 153 103 Wh 97 
1928, Bee. 117 131 197 106 97 109 
1929 129 165 219 116 108 100 
Sourcet I^ eaguo of Kationss the Course and Phases of The World 
Bconoaic Depressloni 1931 • P* l^ '^ '* 
We ffliy observe froa the above the production of iron 
and steel, which was perhaps the most iOBtortant producers* goods 
industryi showed an increase of 65$ as eozapared with an average 
31. Hansen & Cleaenoe» Readings in Business Cycles and 
national Income (Sew Yorfc, 1953),P*M, 
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of tor all santtfaotarea oomblndd* On the other the 
output of food pFOduotsi after showing soise inorease toimrda 
Deoemher 1929* again deoXlned to the level of Deceaher 1927} and 
that of shoes and textiles shoved a aoderate taiproireiBent of a 6 
and respedtivel^rt during a period of IS aonthe# The produetion 
of motor industrsr no douht shoifed an enoraotis advance, having 
aore than doubled during the same period* Ibr this it should 
noted that in those years of prosperity^ deaand fbr many durable 
consuaption goods, suoh aSf autoaobiles and radios eto«, was 
enon&ous* It is estimated that the motor industi^ in the united 
States had a oapaoity of about 8 million oars while the actual 
produotion did not exceed a figure of millions during those 
yeassp^^ Bat it is important to bear in mind that the expansion 
of this industry gave the lead to a number of producers' goods 
inclktstrlesf such as, petroleum, engineering workshops, rubber, 
steel, tin and road construction etc. Thus, it may be concluded 
that the greater part of new investment was concentrated on the 
deepening of the capital structure independent of the rate of 
growth of the consumption expenditure* 
fro , f t 
VariatlcHis in productive activity are closely related 
to changes in profits* Buslmess activity would be increased 
12« The Course and Phases of The World Economic Depresslcm, 
pp* 67*-68* 
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naturalljT no long as the/ are making profits* During the years 
under reference the oost of produotion had oonslderably deellned 
vhile prloea reiaained eomparatft-veXy at able i showing only a alii^t 
downiiard tendenoy between 192^ and the V^S^Mvm of 
Labour Statistics index fe l l by Bat a deeliae of in 
prices in f^ee of a rapid increase of productiont was qt^ ite 
inaii^ifioant* the profits^ thus, continued to increase* 
According to an estimate by the national City Bank of i^ ev tork^ 
total net profits In siae hundred iiineriean Coi^oratiofie increased 
by in 1928 and in 1929» fPom the level of 1927*^^ 
Mith the rapid growth of iildnstrial production and profits* 
there developed a booa in the mai^ et for s t o ^ » the increaeing 
profits created hopes of further increase| leading to an 
exaggerated optimisa aaong the American investors, the result being 
that large amounts of capitalf both from within and f ^ 
abroad, found its way to the stock exchange* The Federal Heserve 
authorities, oioreover, helped finance the speculative activity* 
Given the optinisn and the easy availability of the bank credit 
for speculation. It was only natural that ihare prices v^i^d sky 
rocket* this is illustrated by the folloit ng index of 90 
33* Reproduced fro» League of Rations* Vtorld Sconowic Survey, 
1931-32,(Geneva,1932)p. 110* 
3^ * The Course and Phases of The World ISconoMlc Depression,p* 125* 
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represontatiTe atoclss on the Kov Kbrk market ocnpiled for tb« 
first week of Sjteaber in suocesalve years. 
SaMaJl 
mdex Pereentagtt in Annual 
of •ereaae in valtie awragft 
•allies over preoeeding yeidl,^ 
acaas^  
1926 
1927 
1920 
1929 
Feroentage increase (4-) 
or deore^seC*) between 
Sept.1926 a Beptt1929 
106,2 
131 »8 2h,i 
27.1 
h7*0 
•138^  
KBh 
if. 51 
3.97 
2.9»f 
Sources World Econonio Survey, 1931-32, 
the faet tbtit in spite of a M)^  fall in^thelr yi&l^,ttie 
prices of stocks and shares between September 1926 and 1929t 
increased by as high as 138 t^ shows the intensity of the frensy 
of speculation on the part of the American investor. Then again, 
acoorJing to another estiaate, the market value of all stocks 
quoted cm the Hew York Stock Bxohange, tr<m €38,376 aillion in 
J'anu-^ ry 1927 increased to $ 67,*»78 million In January 1929 and 
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to $89f668 ralXXion in September Whon capital appreoiotion 
took pXaoo 30 rapidly, the g r e a t p a r t oftbe aoney and oraditi 
ahould tiav8| ncttarally« gone into speouXatiqn rather than Into 
the production of goods and serriees. thus a hoots of aXarming 
diaensions developed on the stock exohange, which vas far aore 
violent than the booa of indastrjr and coaoerce. 
The policy of low rates and excessii^ expansion of credit 
suppl/ during the boos periodf ohviouslyi caused a drain of cash 
out of the holdings of the tJ»8« banking system, the gold reseriret 
hairing declined to less than 7/t of the bank credit.^^ paced with 
this situation, the Fedual H^ s^erve System, fblloved a deZlationarr 
policy by the coapaign against stock exchange speoulationt fr<»9 
the spring of 1929* this compaign included both, a restriction of 
credit supply and an increase in the rate of interest* The holdings 
of the Fedual aeserre Systen of the 0#S» Gonrernaent seduritiet 
by August, 1928, had declined to a low figure of $210 aiUione 
from 3 606 Millions in oecesiber 1927 - a reduction of no less 
than about two*third of the total amount* siailarly, the averige 
The Course and Phases of the World BconoKic Bepress^cm, p«175* 
35* "Monetary stability And the Gold Standard**, by J^ ohn Benry 
WllliaBs, in «Oold and Monetary Stabilisation,* edited by 
Quiny Wright(The Oniversity of Chicago Press,Chicago, 
Illinois, 1932),p, 
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dliooiint rat© from in January was raised to just owr ^^  
in April find to about % in August 1928, ana again rose to 
In tbe following yaar# Tlie oonstant presaure of higher 
discount ratt tended to underuine the oonfidenee of th« 
profassional speculator®. Beoause rising Interest rates, in the 
first place, cheeked investtaent, due to the simple f^ct that 
the banking system was not willing to provide the quantity of 
aoney required to carxr on the high letrel of activity; and 
secondly, from the unwillingness of the banking syatea to support 
the inflated prioes of securities, it becane evident that the 
profits of the Americoi} business corporations would not Justify 
the InAated prices of their securities on the stock exchanges* 
The advance in the stock market was at first l i tt le affected, 
but the ciKaul^ tive effect of the discount rate , was, however, 
supported by the Fadual deserve Boards* discrimination against 
further advances to finance speculative activity* Siiaulteneoaslj, 
the withdrawal of the Firench balances from the U.S* Stock 
aark t , also tended to depress the investors, and thus speculative 
activity caoe to an end* The quotati<»3s of shares started to 
decline in October, 1929$ which accentuated in the following months* 
faking a few iaportant cases, the shares of General Hotors a fel l 
froM a aaxiituiii of 91| dollars in 1929 to a niniaum of Sti in 
36* See, Wilson, T. ^Fluctuations In incoae And Biployaent*, 
(London, Pltaan and Sons Lrd., 19^),p*lMf, 
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I93O1 C3irysler shares froa 13^ to as lov » figUM as 1/8^ and 
the sHarts of G?neraX Eleetrio Company froa to diirlng 
th© anas period,^'' the lasyk&t value of all stooka, which 
had Increased from 038,37i alXllon in January 1927 to ^ 09,668 
ailiion in Septecihar 1929, fsXl to €63,589 aiUlon in December 19i9i 
a decline of about l i tt le leas than one*third within t%fO months, 
and by Hay 1931, it had fallen to a figure of million, 
M 
The aluiap in seeurity prloea was bound to haire an adverse 
effect on investaant activity in general* fhe deoliae in share 
prices naturally dealt with a seirore blow.to profit eii^ectations 
froa fresh inveataont activity, jtodeod Hobbint has put i t , »»the 
fall in profitability In many lines of industry due to changed 
relations, or anticipations of changed relations, between supply 
and demand is one of the consplcous features of the beginning of 
all downward fluctuations of this nature* It is a aoveaent which 
often shows itself in the index of security prices long belbre 
commodity prices have bean affected.^^ She first impact, was 
naturally, felt on invaatment activity which fel l sharply f^ roa 
s 
1929 to 1930 while consumption receded by a relatively smaller 
amount, private investment, for instance, from an average of $1^ 
billion for 1925-29, fell dovn to $10*6 billion in 1930* 
3f• Heproduced from, Crises and Qycles by William Ropke 
(William Bodge k Co*, Ltd., London 1936), p* 53* 
38* Xhe Course? and Phases of The World Bconomlc I)epre8slon,p* 175* 
39. The Gre-it Depression, p* 1^ * 
wti0y»a9 tbo oonguaption •xpenditure shotied a decline of les» 
than ont dollars, IVois an average of .70 Mllion foif 
1925-29* taking the IndustFlal production^ although tho 
tondonoy of th® index for the manttfaeturing output as a whole 
was slightly downward in th» third quarter of 1929* it wae, 
how0iror, only after the stook^exehange crash in ©etcsher I929f 
that the decline in production gathered spe^d. This isevident 
froa the following figuress 
fear and Quarterly indices of 
industrial pftduction 
1929 
1930 
CBase 1929*100> 
I 99 
n nh 
ux 103 
2? 92 
z dd 
II 87 
III 77 
I? 71 
Source; The Course and Phases of fhe Uorld Beonomic Depression, 
the figures above show that trm the average of 
103 for the third quarter of 1929t the industrial oroduction 
M). Hansen, A.H. *fisoal Policy and Business CyclesHew 
Xork, I9M, p. 87, 
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Itt the last quarter of tbat ymr deelined to a figure of $2 « 
a fall of about 111 vithln three months* It oonttoued to decline 
thsno©forward and In the last quarter of 1930 at about 
below the pre-Depression level and so on# Thus we find that 
as the lead of the Investaent over consumption was the main 
feature of the preoeeding booai the turning point was, similarly, 
oharaoterised by a eoraparatively greater decline of the 
produetion of investraent goods as eoapared with oonsuiaer goods} 
in 1930 the output of the fonaer decline by as touch as 26% 
against a fall of lOjS for the later, froa the 1929 level* The 
gap continued to be videned subsequently as we shall see in the 
following chapter. 
» 2!? 
HOW f m PSPHB8820H SPREAD fO OTHER COJlgrHgSi 
big d«olin« of the industfial activity in the limited 
States could not but adversely affect the rest of the mrlA, 
the United St&te 9* i n ^ t r i a l pFodiiotiony in aoeounted 
tor about of the total aanufacttiring of the aoat iaportant 
producers of the voriLdi^ ^ and she was consuming of the total 
production of 9 pzlncipal coaaodities of 15 important countries.^ 
It haa been estimated that U.S^ iaports s»d foreign investmentt 
together amounted to a eun of 7^0 million dollarSf vhile the 
value of the total world imports averaged at million 
dollarsf in 1929 Changes in i^verican foreign trade thus 
naturally greatly affected the world outside, although they were 
of l i - t l e iiaportance for her own internal economy. 
According to the findings of the Iteague of Nations, the 
value of the O.S* iaports In 1930 declined 3 ^ in case of raw 
materials, 31^ for semi-manufiactures and for the finished 
y* 
aanufactures, fr<Mi the 1929 level* the decline in the demand 
for these commodities through a reduction of the prices severely 
hit the exporting countries, these countries in turn, cut down 
their imports of Ibreign coasodities, thereby setting of f a 
vicious circle of falling demand and prices. In this process 
M. league of Nationsi World Production and Prices, 1935*36,p.22« 
U.S. Department of Coamercet Xhe Uhited States in the Uorld 
Economy, p. 29. 
»f3. Ibid., p. 6, 
The Course and Phases of The World ISconooic Depression, 
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agrlouXtural oountrles were speolally hard bit, due to a greater 
deellne of the demand and prioee of rav oateslaXs* On an 
avei^gdf the quantina of tspofl^s in five important aanufaoturlng 
eountrtes — 0.S,A. Britain, Oeraany, France and Caecboslovakia — 
between 1929 and I930 feU off in volume while the value 
declined by this clearly points to a greater decline in 
the prices of raw tsafcerials i^loh these coantrleg imported. 
Howevert taking the world m a whole^ the quantum of trade f&ll 
o f f from 110 in 1929 to 102 in 19301 ^^ the value showed a 
decline from 10? in 1929 to 85 in 1930,^ 
fhe felll in jlmerican lending ma another factor that 
precipitated the crisis in the rest of the world. the second 
half of the twenties the U.S. loans had greatly contributed 
to the increasing business activity in a number of Euz^ pean 
countries I To quote a notable examplOf Qemany» in the years 
1927 and 1928, had borrowed $ 1,027 miXllon and 1,007 million 
respectively, which enabled that coimtzy to maintain the industrial 
activity at a very h i ^ level. But, wh®a towards the end of 
1928 large amounts of funds found their way to the stock market, 
the tJ.S* lending to the foreign coimtries was stopped. Again, 
after the crash of stock exchange, there had actually started a 
withdrawal of the old loans. Thus, the imports of capital in 
Oerminy declined to $ millions ta 1929 and million in 1930 
if5. The Course and Phases of Tho World Bconomic Depression,p. 
k^m World Economic Survey, 1931-32, p. 
if7. Ibid., pp. 39-^0. 
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Ufi 
iraa SlfOO? «lXllon in 192S. ThSsy sevareXy atmok tbe Indus* 
trlr^l activity of that coimtryj the index of Geiman nationaX 
production f e l l froa 112(basei 1925-29 « 100) in 1929 to $2 in 
1930 l#e. n©*irly fhe decline in productive activityt 
in turn, led to fall in her import tradep the net nierehandise 
balance altering from m iiaport sttii»lii8 of $ 187 million in 1929 
and of $ 569 dilllcm in 1926 to an export surplus of about $22^ 
fflilllon in 1930^®. 
lAiile the rest of the world was bound to plunge into 
the Depresftion through the above process, the stock Exchange 
cresht boi#ever, shouM not have in itself produced such far* 
reaching result1 but for the fact that various others factori -
of differing nature in different countries — had been already 
working, in the proceeding years. Looking back on the period 
before the Depression, it would be noted tteit, the experience of 
many other countries was entirely different f^ rom that of the 
United States* 7o take a few notable oases, in Great Britain, 
for instance, there was no boom, either industrial or financial; 
on the otherhand British trade and Industry continued to suffer a 
recession for alAost the whole of the decade. The reason for 
this in the vain vas that Ore-it Britain had in 1925i returned to the 
gold standard at the pre-war parity th^ t^ put the British esq^ ort 
» id , ,pp, 39-^* 
Ibid., p. 90. , 
50« the Course and Phases of the World Bconoiaic Depression,p. 19»f» 
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prioaa nail abovo thafe of h®r ooapotltora*^^ This 1« ole«r it 
vt ooapare the British experlenoe with that of fiance, It lay and 
Switaiopland, Taking 19t3 as 100, the average of export price® 
tor 192?»29 vas as follows t France 101, Italy 123i Svitserland 
and 162* this, nataral3# reacted on bar export tradtf 
the average auantuo of exports was for France, 136 for Italy, 
101 for Swlt«erland# in contrast with a figure of for Britain, 
during the same period i»e* fhen, again, in order to 
naintain the exohemge ratio at a high par, Britain adopted a 
delflati<»iary policy which ei^ t^Hed a S67a£« strain upon her 
prices and production. Ab Hawtrejr has pointed out, "the aeedi 
of the trouble were being sown in fche years following the return 
of Great Britain to the gold atandard* From 192^  to 1929 
British industry was exposed to unprecedented experience of a 
continuously high hank rateCaferaging ^•85/0 at a time of 
depression and severe uaeaployaent"*^^ 
Mother factor that put jlreat Britain in an unfaTourable 
\ 
positNon was that, during that period there was taking place a 
51. "fhe United Kingdom had in 1925i together with the British 
Snpire and certain other cmtries, returned to the gold 
standard, though this step entailed further heavy sacrifices 
in the shape of prolonged unen^Xoynent and depression of 
British industries,." 
• ChiHib^rlain's »the then ChwjceXlor of the Srltish iSxchequer) 
Speech at the World Boonoalc Conference of 1933 reproduced 
froB the Journal of Monetary and Econoaio Oonfirence,J^e 1^, 
1933, p. 23. 
52* Le^,w.ji^rthiirt op.clt. , p. 
53* Hawtrey,R,(l, **!rhe Credit Deadlock**, in Lessons of Honetarx 
Experience, edited by A.D. Caryer, p. 132. 
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mpid shift in d«»and troa consuaer eooda In general and 
textiles in partloulart in favour of prodluoert* goods* Hoir, 
vbereae United States and Oermanjr bad made a eorresponding 
adjustaent of production| Britain ati l l depended on oonsuaer 
goods — teattiles comprising alaout Mi^  of the total exports 
of nanufaoturing during 1 9 2 7 * 2 9 O n the vhole, it is estimated 
that about of the British manufaeturers exports consisted of 
the coaeiodities which were in lowest dea^d in the world market, 
while that in the highe/it demand categor/ accounted only 
This can be contrasted with the correepondiiig figures of and 
29^ respeativel/t ^^ e United States* ^ ^ the falling deoand 
neturall^ exercised a depressing effect on the productive activity* 
This is borne out by the fact that the British wholesale price 
index declined from I60 in I925 to 13% in 1928t production remained 
almost stagnant and througtiout there was a high level of unemploy* 
nentf averaging between 10 and 
2n Oenany, the position started to deteriorate much 
before the Depression became world-wide^'' The financial crisis 
Lewis, op.clt. , p» 78 55, Ibid., p. 79* 
Ibld«, p* M. 
57* "Oermany had plunged downward in gloom earlier than any 
other country. She was dependent 00 foreign capital} once 
it was withdrawn industrial activity sharply fell o f f . The 
percent am of trade unionists unemployed (in building 
Industfy) as early as in 1929 was almost twiceOO.%) of the 
1927 level ( i .e . 5«3)| and in 1930 It increased to more than 
7 times (38.0).» 
„ The Course and Phases of The World Boonomic Depreision, 
p. 
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caused bjr the vlthdrawal of foreign oaplbal ms further 
aoQentuated by the dlffieuXty in the pa^ viaents of the 
reparation9I^^ vhen the oreditor nations refused to aeoept the 
paynent in klndt the only other means of payment was through gold 
exports. Sinc*^  -^^ ^mtry vas m the gold stiuddard her tsonetary 
authorities tried to protect the gol4 reserves through a dear 
money policy and other credit restrictions* Consequently froa 
1928 there vas a rapid contraction of cradit and in the ensuing 
deflatiooi the econony was overtook by a severe crisis, 
fhe experience of Prance %raa entirely different froa that 
of both the Great B^ttain and Germany* In the beginning t she 
experienced only a mild recession in prices and trade while 
ihduttrial production actually increased fr©» in 1929 to 115 
in 1930*^ ^ Ihe main factor that contributed to delay the re-
purcussion of the X)epresslon in that countxyi was that her currency 
was substintially devalued that provided an artificial advantage 
to the export trade| her exports rose in volune ffoa 71 in 1923 
(1927 » 100} to 101 in 1928» while imports in the same period 
increased only froa 100 to Xet» a reference should also 
be made to the fact that the huge imports of gold in that country, 
58. See, Salter, Arthur, Heoovery (2nd edition, London|0»Bells 
and Sons, 1932), Chapter 3« 
59* World Sconoaic Survey, 1931-32, p. 90* 
60. League of National Heview of World trade, 1938, p« 76. 
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kfpt th« position of her finanolal Bystm strmgf vhiok havt 
helped ber to resist the effeots of the Bepression* Xiet it be 
noted that the total of the gold reserves and foreign exchange 
of the Bank of France had iriereased to Billion at the 
end of 1939 from S8a6 eiiUion at the end of With this 
as the background let us no%r turn to India* 
6t. League of Nationsi International Currenoy Experienoet 
(Geneva, 19Mf) Appendix table IX, p* 23^ * 
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T ^ SqRm 
1% Should U not«d at th« outset tiiat the theomical 
models of ttie trade o/eXe^ that we have developed in the preoeed* 
Ing seotion have been propounded with referenoe to the fretaevoi^ 
of an industrial eoonony and they deal only with the working of a 
elosed eoonoflQr* India of the twenties and early thirtiesi on 
the other handp was priaarily an agricultural eoonotoy with an 
iapoHant voluae of forei^ trade. M^ufaoturlng industries 
aooounted only for a veir small portion of the national inoooe 
and output* these struotural differences and the oonse<iuent 
differenoes in the nature and working of the two types of 
eoononiesf sake it diffieult for theories and policies appropriate 
to one setting to he applicable to the other* fo take an exaii^Ie, 
In an agrieultural eoonoiay with a small industrial seetori it is 
not possible to find an over*produotion in the sense of large 
ei^anslon of the producers* goods industries relatively to the 
oonsuffiers* good industries* Cyelical fluctuations in these 
countriesI on the other han#f have always demonstrated a large 
influence either of varieties ibi the sise of harvests or changes 
in the deoind tr<m abroad^^ It is thus to an exaninatlon of such 
considerations that the following disousalon is directed* We 
shall first give a brief sketch of the aain characteristics of the 
Indian econoay to show its basic dissiailaritiee with the 
65* for a Theoretical illustaration see "Business Cycles and Its 
relation to Agriculturs**, Journal of Fera Eoonoaics, Jan* 1932. 
See also* Indian Jottmal of Hconovics, ?ol*10»part II> 0ct*1929» 
pp. 259-599* 
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inditsti^aX eountildSt and then examim their bermng on the 
oolirse of the Depresisicii in Inilla* 
f Bg mm wmtm-m og tm inmm mmcm 
A " A Greater DeoenAerioe ttpon Aggioultuge^ The tsaii} feature of 
the Indian eoonomy mw it» greater dependenoet both for inoooe 
66 
and eQplojnBent upon ogrieulture* Dr. Eao hat oaXeuXated that 
the YaXae of our agrioultural produotlon during 1925-29, aoounted 
to Hi* 1290 orores out of the total national inoome of Es.2301 
ororesi i .e. about the value of industrial produotlon on 
the other hand« vorks out onljr at ^.267 eroras* or about 11*5^ 
of the national ineoae. And) i f ve take the f ibres for the 
organised industrial seotor separately* the peroentage vouM go 
down st i l l further i«e#, about orores out of the total 
8$.2301 erores* SiailarljTf according to the Census of 1931 > 
the proportion of vorlslng population engaged in agriou^ure vas 
and of that engaged in industry roughly 10|{ of the total* 
Zt has ligain been oaloulated that no a»re than one-third of this 
10^ i#ero aaployed in the organiied industrial seotor* 
Apart 1^ 09 the faot of its snallness as « eomponent 
of the nation^ inoo»e» industrial establistolents in India 
greatly differed from the industrially advanced countries in 
66* sea his. *An Essay on Indians National Zneooe,1925*29t(London, 
Qeorge Allen and Unvin Ud«,19l9)|Chapters IV and VIXI* 
67. Mitohel is of the q?inlon that «the faotor in eoononiO organi-
sation oritioally iiaportant for the understanding of business 
oydles is not the stage of industrial deTelopment as suoh|but 
the proportion of the people \#ho are depending oalnly upon 
making and spending noney incomes••**(Business'Cye^s,The 
Problea of its setting, Heir rork,1927i 
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another r3sp«fit also* lit&if^ ast in ttio United and other 
industrial oountrieat heavy lodustile® ooaprlsed a sontlderably 
large part of the industrial structure, the basic industries in 
liidia consisted of small iron and steel Jpaotoriee ^engineering 
vorkehopsi with alimst no industry* fhougb the cotton textile 
industry vas well organizedi there was no textile laachinexT 
industry to supply the required tools and liaplements to the 
textile aills* In the same way although our railways were quite 
developed, there was no product of loooraotires, freight and 
passenger cars etc. The engineering indtotry and almost all 
industries baaed on the technical sciences were practically 
»on»existent. A break up of the occupational structure shows 
that the majority of the working population was engaged either 
in the jroduotion of consuaters* goods or for processing agricultural 
naterials, like cotton and jute and rice mills and oi l pressures 
etc* Xt has been estimated that out of the total factory populat-
ion of If756 thousands, about 736 thousand workers, i . e . k2% of the 
total, were employed in the textile industry* On the other hand, 
such basic industries, as iron and steel factory employed 37 
thousandsengineering factories, thousandsC^^); and 
the cement fscto^y, 11 thousand, or less than l^of the total* 
Thus these together did not absorbs sore than 7iC of the total 
faetory strength* The rest $0% of the factory workers were engaged 
in such small mills end factories as pointed out abdvS? 
68* See for details, Gadgll|l>.H*The Industrial Reroiutlon of India 
In Becent Tllies • Oxford University Press,19^tP* 295* 
- 37 -
B - f i f Mgnifleanco of Sgpoyti in Irt<lian Eeonoqyt Anotber 
lopoftant feature of the Indian Qoonoay to which ve bav# r0ferred 
to aboira, was tiKit exports played a significant part In the 
dtetemiifiation of national income and production. It has been 
calculated that In oat of the average national Inocaae 
of 8s.2,301 orores the exports aoaoiinted for fis*3a7 eroresi 
of the national loooae*^^ Again as regards Its bearing mt 
the imrlQue linee of prodootlont it should be noted that in the 
agrleuXtiiraX eeotort cotton | jute and teat vhicb vere our main 
crops mre mostly produced for export purpo0es# The quantity 
of rav cotton ej^orted during 1925-29 amounted to thousand 
bales per rear while the promotion of cotton for British 2;idla 
averaged oaly tbousaiid bales* This paradox of the eircess 
of esqftorts over production may be explained by the fact that the 
production of the Indico States accounted for a good deal of -
the total cotton produced* On the whole^ it la eitiaated that 
British 2ndid i^produced only 63^ of the total output of Indian 
cotton, while of the total crop was exported.^ ® In the case 
of jute, the next inportant conaerclal crop of India, kO0 of its 
total production was exported during the period under ref^ r^ence* 
69. Calcula-ted from the Hefiew of the Trade of India for 
various years. 
70. The Review of the Trade of India, 1932-331 P» 79# 
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7he pereentagd of th« quantity exported to Its total outputtwojrkt 
out st i l l h i ^ r In the oaaa of tea • nearly 97^ Ijelng exported 
during 1925*29* Apart from these aain items, India also 
exported cereals and oilseeda* Although they accounted for 
about h^ and B% respeoliirelyi of the total exports of aerchandisef 
y-uileL 
their quantitative proportion to the total ho%feir©rt 
coaparatively 8®aller«^ 
turning from agrioultui^ to industry! as we haire said 
above lndu!?trlal produofclon in todia was carried on only at 
a s!sall scale$ e^ ccept for Jute manufactures which contributed 
about to the total value of exports in 1928-29f most of our 
products were consuned internally* Cotton matiufaeturas were also 
exported but they cosprlsed only a very aaall percentage of the 
total* However, it is important to note that although foreign 
trade did not affect manufacturing dtreatly. It stimulated the 
econony as a whole, increasing purchasing power of the consumers 
nnd producing a basis for the growth of manufactures* 
In the light of the above considerations the importance 
of the exogenous factors in the deteralnatlnn of business 
fluctuations in this country can be readily appreciated* fhis 
impresolon is conflraed by a dose study of the timing of the 
onset of various cycles in this country* Ibr instance the 
trend of the cyclical fluctuations in the post-war years 
71, Calculated from the Bsview of The Trade of India for 
various years. 
• 39 -
mm&Xn that ebanges in ea^orts genesraXly X^A the way^  
During the 3®rlo<i of tm «ftr<191i#-t8? India sharedi with ttm 
vorld, lE^ neraX upward oore^ant &t prlcas* 7ho Inomaing 
detsand for axports froa tho t^elligarent Qountrlaa gava a 
grant iapattts produellmj, and W 1920| tha ludijfKifholeaala 
prtaaa raaa on an avarage W lOt par trm tha pra^var Xaval* 
During tha year in splta of higher i^riees and tmfair<iar» 
at>la rata of our estports rose to a vory hig}^  fi0ura« 
flie raaaoR for thla that in that yaar trada and indi;(Strial 
aotifity al l ovar tha vorXd had at a vary high Xevei In tha 
hopa of oontinuatlon of tha high war profits* fhua^ upto 1900 
along with tha rast of tt^ world vaa annoying a graat 
proap^rityi %nit thareaftari a world»vida aomisareifl^  oriaia oauaad 
a g3Jit of primary goods tn tha isarkat and oc^aaqu^tly the 
prioas of Indian axporta haavily daolittad from 201(ha8att91^ 
» 100) in 1920 to 178 in 1921 and to 172 in 192a. Aa a raault 
tha mXm of our axports daelinad and tha noreial halanoa of 
tradt wst9 rawrsad* Bofeh oar agrioultura and the orgaoijsad 
induatrlaa mm hard hit and aoonoaie oritia baoema ganaral.'^  
72* Sao Indifti for varioui yaars» 
- -
Tbttfli the outooae of tbd aboTO discussion is that the 
theor®tloal generallaatlon of th® prece^dlng section requires 
carefyi interpretation and shifting liefore being applied to 
India, iftiile In an industrial eeonoeyi Investaent and production 
ie regulated hy profit coneiderationsi most of the production 
in India was retained for the producers • own conetaaptican* 23b 
the absence of an organized industrial sector, the price 
oechanlsa which worked so nicely In the industrial oouatriest 
was not equally- effective in India« And thus the depression 
in India cannot be interpreted in teiws of a cumulsl ire process 
of the down-swing marked by falling production and incoiaea 
inducing a reduction in deraand thus leading to a farther curtail* 
taent of production and so on* It is needless to say that an 
agricultural and subsistence econoay can hardly generate any 
such endogenous, cutaulntive and at the sana tiae self«reiQforclng 
forces which laay produce fluctuations of the above type. Let us 
CLtMZ'J-
ther^fore see the^sequen^ of the events of the Depressl(^ in this 
country. 
THS BACKOR^ ^QF^ THS IBPRSSSIQR 
Before we proceed to exavine the actual nechaniss 
which plunged India into the jpepressiont It would be worthwhile 
to pause at this stage to make a brief survey of the business 
trends in years laawdi ttely befo <e the Depression. Unlike U.S.A. 
• M -
th© conditions and trends of those years vere more or less 
normal and tiier© wts no e^ l^tJenee of booa either In the 
sphere of production or In prices In this country. Cfei th© 
contrary, certain aspects of the let© twenties giw an li«pres»lon 
of a minor recession, particularly the docil»e of prices and 
foreign trade. As wo shall see fuore elaborately in Chapter l i lt 
In their atteiapt to stabilize the rupee at 1s«6d the Oovemtaent 
of India pursued a deflationary policy during the second half of 
the twenties. Soon aftet the Hilton loung 3111 vas passed, 
contraction of currency tooic place to the extent of Si,2,926 lakhs 
In 1926*27, Mo lakhs In t^ i© following year and again E3,3,2M 
lakhs In 1929-30 - the total amounting to 83.6,577 lalchs. The 
ocsitractlon of mrrmtQ^ In olroulatlc»5 naturally tended to lower 
the pricest from an average of 176 for 1S months ending In June 
192*f(when the rupee was worth Is 3d gold) the wholesale price 
73 Index fell to In I928 and to 1M In the following year. 
Secondly, the high exchange value of the rupee exerted 
a depressing Influence on the ea^ort trade of India. An 
additional factor that was also working In the saoie direction was 
a decline in the prices of raw materials In the world aiarket» 
However, the total value of our exports In 19^7-26 deollaed to 
about fef319 crores fr<Mi 385 crores In 192J»-25, whereas that 
of Inports slightly Increased iron to.2^3 crores to about 2^7 
crores during the same period} the balanoe of trade consequently 
declined froa te.l55 crores In 192H-25 to 62 ororei In 1927-29* 
73» See; Report of The Controller of Currency for Various years* 
aevlew of The Trade of Sidla. 
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L«t tts turn to hare a look at tho trend of farta and faetoi^ 
production to see vhether there waa any extraordinarjr ezpanalon 
In either th^t may be said to have led to any boom conditions. 
We have already seen that in an agricultural ooontry aaoh as 
India there vaa no question of an expanslen of produoers* goods 
industries which did not exist* fhe only aethod» therefore seems 
to be to exatslne the statlstios of fans and factory production 
In general. Vleired froa this anglet It ^uld be noted that in 
the agriculture sector there vas a reaar)(able const^cy In the 
e«ea and yield per acre. The net area sown only slightly increased 
ft'oa 226 ffiUlion acres for to 228 million acres In 1928-29 
and the weighted Index of total agricultural output for 1928-29 
stood at 102 as compared with 100 for 1925-26 to 1929-30.^^ If we 
take the various commodities separitely it would be found that 
while production In certain lines showed some Increaset In others 
It remained constant or even declined* The relative change in the 
output of various commodities may be the result of a corresponding 
change in their demand and prices In the foreign market, fbr 
Instancsi If we take wheat and rlcei the two important food-crops, 
it will noted that whereas the area under wheat increased from 
92.7 in 1925-26 to 95*7 for 1929-30, the area under IrtLce declined 
from 991. to 97.1 over the same period. the same,way, i f we 
take the case of the two major ccmmercial crops,cotton and Jute, 
75* 7era Austey, Economic Dovelopment of Ihdla, London, 19^, 
Appendix table. 
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vo find that th<5 Indeat of area under aottm decslined trm 
iZQ^k in 1925-26 to 110,2 in 1928-29f wbile in th« aase of 
Jufc« It showed an Increas® from 111.5 to 119#2 over the saoe 
period* Wo oan multiply a Quailatar of such oxamples* The feot 
that ve imnt to eiaphiistse here is that while there are to he 
foun<l InetnnoQs of relative increase in the production of 
eoae goods, there mn l itt le evidenoe of m over all expansion 
im the output of the agrleulttiral seotor» 
©xaminatSoo of the actual flpires of output also lead® 
to the same aonolusion. It would bo noted that while the 
produetion of sose good© showed an increase that of others 
deolined and on balance the value of total agriculture 
production in 1928«29 fe l l to te. 1,321 lakhs fro® 3*1-5 lakhs 
in 1925'-2(>. The productioii of rice for Instance increased from 
32,931 thouaand tons in 1925-26 to thousand tcais In 
1928-29 and that of wheat fron 7,112 thouaand tons to 
thousand tons} the output of the surgaroane on the other hand 
declined about lO^ it, froa 2,901 thousand tons to 2,595 thousand 
tons during the saae period, Again, taking the ease of jute 
and cotton, whereas the output of the former increased frow 9tl27 
thousnnd bales to 10,120 thousand bales or about 11 ,^ that of the 
later declined froa ^,311 thousand bales to U^ ,306 thousand bales 
during the same period* 
- Mf • 
Taking f»0to3fy piwluetion wa that oi 
average them vas llt%l« ei^ansion In this n«ld during 
thos« yearn* To take for Instance the ease of the textile 
Indtistry fbr wfeioh statistios »ro available, m find that 
the nutsber of cotton allla In 1928-29 deelined ta 292 from 
300 In 19^5-26. fho output of cotton yam after having increased 
froa 623 thousand lbs in 192 -^26 to ?Z$ thousand lbs In 1927-2S| 
again declined to 558 thousand lbs in 1928-29$ that of cotton 
cloth increased from hif thousand lbs for 1925-26 to 509 
thousand labs in 192B-28 but soon declined to 377 thousand lbs 
for 1928-29, fhis heai^ decline in the output of cotton manu-
factures is explained i f ti© reneaber that from 1927-28 onwards 
the Indian cotton indu^ mry was passing through a serious crisis* 
Both the United States and Japan^  our main custoners^ substant-
ially cut down their deiaand for Indian Cotton Qanufactures* Xt 
should be noted that the Indian ei|}ort8 of cotton yam in 
1928-29 ffell to laiilion lbs froa ifli million lbs in 1926-27 -
a decline of kC^ f and the value declined froa &*308l lalcha 
to 188 lakhs or by about 39^ » fhe value of the cotton piece 
goods export also declined during the saae period* Thus, on 
an average, the value of total cotton aanufactures in 1927-28 
stood about below that of 1925-26 level. The jute industry 
reaained in a coaparatively bettnr position. Jute being the 
cheapest knovn mterial for bagging and baling. The nutaber of 
iut« miru from 90 In 192 -^26 incfeaaed to 95 In 1928-291 
%h« output of gunny bags increased from Xakha to 
lakhs atjout m^ that of Jute eloth frm IfSO^h lakhs 
yaKls to I5t912 lakhsi op by during th« same period. 
Howevapf this increase which took placf In three years it hy 
'no means itspr@s3ltr©# ' Moreover, whlla tho output ehowod a 
aodcrntc improvement, tha valu© of both gunny bag® and cloths, 
combined, dsalimd from lekfis in T925-26 to 6,160 
lakhs in 1928-29 - a fall of fhe atatistics for the 
rest of factory pwjduetion are not satisfactorily ayailabl®. 
However, the indices of the production of coal and |}etroleu», 
that were the laain pover in Ihdia, may give a rough idea of 
the trend of industrial progress in this country .^ It would be 
noted that the production of coal showed only a slight increase, 
from 20 aillion tons to 22 million tons, over a period of five 
years, 192 -^1929» and the import of coal on private account 
heavily declined from 1*63 thousand tons to 218 thousand tons, 
77 
during the same period* «he production of petroleum 1 dustiy 
similarly, remained laore or less unchanged, showing a minor 
change from 305,652 thousand gallons oi l 4n 1919 to 306,1^ 
thousand gallons in 1929?® 
76. Review of the Trade of India for various years. 
77. See, Vera Austey, op.cit., Appendix table(IV>,p.519. 
78. Gftdtil, B.R. op.cit. , p. 283(table)» 
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From the above anal/sl* It la thus amply claar ttsat 
tbera waa no general trand toimfda Incraaaed produotion olther 
in 8grlcultu?e or Industry* Thare Is found only aome aubattta** 
%im batneen one orop and anotlisr or betneeu one manufaotur© 
goods and anotHor, as a result of ohangas In relatlva doraand 
or prlooa® but It did not affoot tho aggregate production* 
Tbtis to conolude in th® vords of Ur, Hao these years, whicU 
ware of great prosperity in the tJnlted States^ were "free firom 
the abnomal influence of slumps and booms, and on the vbole 
can be taken to represent the "norasal state" of our ttgrlou:ittral 
and monufaeturlng industries**?^ 
m, mm ,mpm 
The question why the impact of the O.S. boom was 
not felt in this oountryt must be irlewld against a wider 
perspeofclve. In this connootiooi the first thing whioh we 
should reiseraber is that the booa in the t^ited states was 
oonoeat»rated only in a few capital goods' imustries, and 
ther? m9 hardly ^y expansion in the consumers^  goods seotor* 
The 2ndeTc of the production of her textile industry which 
consumed Indian raw muterials for instance, showed only a 
slight increase tram in 1923 to 115 in 1929 or less than 
over a period of 6 years. The imports of Indian raw material 
79* V.K.R.V. a^o, op»cit., 56. 
in the Itaited stutti theroforet ^^ ^ n®^  Inewast corresponding 
to an lii«p«a0« In her ttnduatrlal rntiritym Irt a 
of great ppoeperlty^ the pereentage shay® of tlse tJalted States 
/ 
in India's export ti^de amounted to etmpat^ d with en 
aimrage of for the posts-war yearsf the total value 8imllarl|^ 
deell>^ed to lakhs f^oa Ss.3,628 lakhs over the laiae period. 
Another reason» which le equally Ijtportantf ims that 
the h0«a of the United Statiee we not a worM-wide phenomenon. 
Me have seen that at the time when the ^ited States wae enjoying 
an tinpreeedefited profperit,r» there was hardly any sign of booa 
In other coan Tim with the isiwgle exeeptiou of ^rmm* There 
had been admittedly eertaii) eyaptome of a hooia in the earlier 
year«i tout they were however* prevented froa developing by factor* 
peoaliar to those eoonotaiea* hmmg Indians main oustomere Ore at 
Britain I for teataneet was atruggling t#ith halajrme of payajente 
difficulties I and in Q^mmf the withdrawals of funds along 
with the payraente of war debts and reparations,'had created 
peeuliar dlffloultles* & Japan the speoulative activity that 
followed the earth quake year reooustraetlcm had already oollapsed 
and at the tirue of Ataerican booa she was energing fro® a 
•tate of depression. These three eousitriea together acooitnted 
for ahout half of India's exporfc trade* It should be noted that 
SO, aeview of Trade of India. 
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India *• exports to these ooootries did not etmt my tiibstantlai 
inoreaae over the period under reference. All In ail , the iTftlue 
of exporta of Indian eerohandiae In I92S deolined to ili»33»Ot2 
lalctoa from Es. 38,^ ^6 laldia in 
fa^ ^ m mmmm, 
MmmtmAn l^ d^M „|a^QrtM g^f f lwmt 
India fell a Tietlo to the Depression through her 
relatlonahip i«ith the rest of the vorld* As ve have shorn in 
the preoeeding aeetloni Aiaerlea and ntanj other liaportant 
eountriea vere industrially itiined hy the MX Street Orlsis 
of 1929* OonsefuentlsTi India exports to those oountriea 
were sevrely affeotedl A greater fall in the prices of raw 
aaterials and foodstuffs that oonprised the huUc of the exportst 
apeoially hard hit this coimtryj the terras of trade raoved un-
favourably to India. The doaestie prioes of the exportable 
produots and subsequently of the fans products in generalf 
fe l l in sympathy with export prioas* Oonse<|uently, the purehas-
ing power of the fanners severely deolined and in the ensuing 
deflation the eoonosy was dragged down* 
m haire shown above that a large percent age of 
priaary goods, espeoiaXly» oottoUf Jute and tea* produaed 
in this oountryi was exported{ and Great Britaini U.S.A.| 
Oemanyt J'apan were our aain oustoQers. Oreat Britain* in 
the taain« was iiiporting about 25^ of the raw jute and 86jl of tea{ 
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purohasod rav and isaiiiifadturtd JutOi her sbar* 
anountlng to 10 and of the totdl export of tboso eonmodttioM 
reapeotit«37, Geraany vas the laost iaportant ottstoaer of raw 
Jtttttf purohasltig about UB% of the total i^tiaittitjr exported and 
Japan iaported the largest portion of our rav oottoni her share 
heing ahout 50^ of its total export. €n ah averaget the 
peroentdge share of th^e oountries i» the total export trade 
of India VQ8 an foUowgf Britain, 25K| llj^l Qemany 10^  
8l 
and Japan the total amounting to for the jrear 19S7-28* 
It ia thus elear that the hueinees oondltions in these eountries 
greatly affeoted the Indian eoononar through the oediua of her 
ei^ort trade. 
It vould he noted that leaving Japan, both Great Britain 
. and Qensanr greatly euffered following the slump in the 
ITnited States* In the ease of dreat Britain m have seen that 
Sluap oa«e as a sefere below in already depression condltlonsi 
As a result, her halanoe of payment f tH froa million in 
1929 to • £ 28 million in 1930 and stayed passive at - £103. 82 
during the following yearf she ceased to have a surplus to 
lend, and at the same time out down her imports of nerohandise 
from abroad, Germany was perhaps the worst sufferer of the U.S. 
81. Review of the Trade of India for 1927*28, Appendix table 
108, 29-35. 
82, Iieague of Nationss Balanoe of Payment, 1938* 
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•liiisp and bad iplunged doioivard In glooa mrlt&r than any 
other oountyy. ^dustriaX aetlYity In this eountry fan 
elaost aa nttoh as tt did In tha Unload Stataaf tha Indax 
naaber of hew national produatlon f tH flroa 1l2(l»asa « 
1925*28 » 100) in 1929 to $2 in 1930 and to 76 in the foXXoving 
yaar as coaparad vith tlio daoline trm 108 to 68 and rdspaot-83 
iv^Xji for United atatea* ConaaqaantVf the Oaraan aothorit-
iaa put xlgoroua axchanga aontrols and other restriotione on 
iaportv to protect thair balanoa of payiaaats oosl tion« 
ItTith the alun^ in the industrial aotiTlty of tha 
importing aoimtriaai Indiana exports ^ra rapidly declining 
both in volume and value frc»8 October 1929* Between 1928*29 
and 1929*30 « vithin the aix montha following tha U«S« sIuei^  « 
ejcporta fel l in value by although the total irolume of both 
agrieultural and inliuatrial production continued to inoreaae* 
It baa been caXculated that the index of agricultural prod»otion 
rose froa <^ 8 in 1928-29 to 101 in 1929*30 and that of induatrial 
output shoi/ed an increaaa froa 66 <basa, 193^35 to 1938-39 « 100) 
to 79* during tha aaae period* Similarly i f va take the 
individual oocmoditieai va find that the quantity of raw jute 
exported feU froa ^f959 thousand balea(valued at fli*30 crorea 
83. League of Mtionat World Sconoaio Survari 1931*32, p»90# 
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7$ lakhs) in to thous'tfid bales (valued 27 orores) 
in 1929*30} whereas the araa a»der Jute eultivatton inoreesed 
trm 119 (toase t93»*-35 • 1935-39 • 100) to 126 and output flpon 
t0t126 thousand bales to 10t566 thousand balesi durtng the sane 
period* Similarly while the quantity exported of tea deoliiied 
from 3 in 1928-29 to about 377 million lbs. In 1929-30f the 
area under cultivation increased from 788|000 aeres la I929 to 
So^ tOOO in 1930 and 807,000 during the fbllowlng year* the 
production of raw eotton no doubt showed eoae correspondence 
with the falling ej^orts* But it was not due to soae iacsediate 
adjustment of production to falling trade* As we have discussed 
above as early as in 1926-27 our cotton lost its world market 
and the output sagged t i l l It reached a low level in the early 
thirties* Bowevert In case of the cotton manufacture again i t 
would be noted that output rose from 557f675 thousand labs* to 
7301819 thousand labs* in the ease of yaro, and frcan 376,^13 
thousand lbs. to U8 ,^621 thousflUid labs of cloth» against a decline 
from 1^,219 thousand yards to 133t^6 thousand yards, of the 
quantity exported during I928-29 - 1929-3O, Sxamples pointing 
to the same conclusion* can, of course» be multiplied* 
Around 1930*31• however, there took place some adjustment 
of output to the falling demand abroad* But it should be noted 
that whereas manufacturers of cotton and Jute goods tried to 
adjust output to falling demand and prices, the production of 
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food and ott»r crops remained unoh'^ nged or in oost oases eren 
inoreassd* 7hii8» for eaeaopXey the output of rav Jute fe3J. 
irem 807 thousand tons in 1929*30 to 620 thousand tons in the 
fo3JU»tfing sraarj whereas the proc^ uotion of rice st i l l continued 
to increts© and in 1931-32 rose to 28,799 thousand tons trm 
27*00 thousand tons i» 1930-31» while the export deolired to 
23^ thousand tons frost 279 thousand tonSf during the same 
period* the reason for this disparitjr of behaviour vas that 
the oash orops had a foreipi market vhile the foodstuff for 
the nost part were oonsuaed inside the eoontry* e^ propose 
to elaborate this point further in the folloiring chapter* 
l^on the above analysis it is clear that the first 
symptoas of the sl^p in India were to be found in the export 
products and the decline in the value of exports led the way 
to the Depression in this country* As pointed out above 
whereris in thecase of jute iBanufaotures production and prices 
both declined considerably in 1929t production of raw iute and 
cotton declined only in 1931 and the rice and wheat not until in 
193 .^ This shows that those sectors of the econoasy are acre 
sensitive to changes in prices which depended on fomign narlcet* 
The adjustment in raw jute production followed those in 
industry only later on* 
An additional deflsitio&ary factor was a change in the 
terms of trade against India* As usual^  the slump in the 
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|M>ieea of rav iaat«tial9 and foodstuffs ms aore violont than 
th« Qorr^ Bpm&tng d^oXine tft the prices of manufaotored goods 
tn the vorM isarlcett from to I93O ttie atmrage prloe of 
viieat feU cotton Qoffae and wool in the 
vorld raorketi on an av r^age^ the index of prioes of eoQnsoditiee 
entering vorld t i ^ e fel l hy for raw materials^ W for 
OK 
foodstuffs and ml^ 37% tor aanufaotures? Thusf India felt 
the severity of the sltraip in world prioes in the ease of what 
she had to sell, but did not obtain a corresponding advantage 
of a decline in the prices of what she purchasodt fhe price 
index of our exports which stood at 133 in Septe:sber t929f 
delined to 111 in Mareh 1930t and to 85 in JDecember 1930 -
a decline of and respeetl-roly against a corresponding 
decline of 6% - from 150 to iko and from 150 to 125 
respectively in the case of 
the figures given below 
show the details of the fall in the prices of our varioiis 
exports over the saiie period* (Base « 100 for ^uly 191 )^ 
September March September 
1929 1930 1930 
^ t t i raw 
e, Hanuf act ure s 
Cottont raw 
Tea 
Oilseods 
Pulses 
Cereals 
90 72 SI 122 
W 80 
129 121 105 
175 117 
155 iko 111 126 103 96 
League of Nation8« Heview of World trade vide,liewis,)ir*Arthur, 
op«oit*, pit % 
85. Heproduced froa Hfport of the Controller of Currency 1930*31* 
Calcuttai 1931 
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Wfotn th9 abov« figures it aajr be Qot«d that in the 
Deginnlng of the aluapi raw tsaterlals shoved a greater response 
to the Huetitetlons in prioes than the food orops* ^ r instance 
in the first six months of the Depression - Septeoher t929 to 
Maroh 1930 - the prioes of rew ootton declined 2836, of raw 4ute 
20$ and of Jate aanufaetures whereas the Indess nutiher Ibr 
pulses showed a deeXine of and that of oereals 16 .^ This, 
as m have airs adr pointed oat afooTe was due to a greater faH 
in the demand for raw materials caused hy a sluap in the 
industrial activity abroad. Then secondly, raw laaterials 
cora »rised a larger percentage of our exporfes and thereforCf 
shared the greater impact of the sluap of prices abroadf than 
that of the foodstuffs* Butt as the above figures reveal, 
this disparity between the decline in the prices of raw aaterials 
and that of foodstuffs narrowed doim subsequently when our 
doiaestio prices also fell in syapathy with the prices of our 
exports* 
It is thus clear that while^the case of soae of our big 
staple exports the quantity exported varied only a l i t t le , the 
fall in value, due to a severe faH in their prices, was 
collossal* fbr instance, between 1929-30, and 1930*31t while 
the quantity of raw cotton eisjorted declined team 727 thousand 
tons to 701 thousand tons, or about the value fe l l froa 6,^08 
lakhs to ^633 thousand i .e. nearly 29 ;^ whi/e the exports of 
tea fsU froa 377 Million lbb« to 356 million lbs. about the 
- -
value dtoltnfd f^oa 2|601 Idkbs to lakhsii aiDounting to 111 
Stellarlyi tbe eapoafts of raw cotton fell from k,Q70 tho\j«and 
bal«8 to 3926,000 or mmrlr la volume, vbile the Talwe 
deolined ttom about orores to k6 eror&a or nearly 290* 
Xndien thus had to export a eomparatiTolor larger auaatlt^ r of aoode 
for irhioh ahe got mueh amaller prioesf whoreas for imports aho 
had to pay eooparatlvely higher prleea for a relatively smaller 
quantity Imported* The retult naliurally vas th%t the balanae 
of trade deollned, fro® Its«d6*5 ororea in I928-29 to In 
1929*30 and again to #9 orores In the following yeax^« The 
deellae of the export Ineome through ita effect on the def&and 
of eonaunersi aet off the paoe for the reat of the eoonotay* 
Thuai the sequenoe of events of the Depregslon in 
Bidiai ifa8| a eontraotlon of export trede* both in volume and 
value, marked by falling pricoa and Ineomes inducing a further 
reduction in the prices of fans produota and a decline In 
industrial aotivity, whlchi in ita turn caused a further 
fall of incomes and thus led to a further cutailment of 
price and production, a further lowering of inoomea and so on* 
- . 
GHAHBH II 
mfgfiEs Agp^^^oai^lF m p^mmm,, m 
In the previous Ghapt@jp ve a^iw 8e«n hour the Depression 
originated in aoise of the nejor eountrles of the world* Ih 
this Qhapter we propose to exmlm the different phetes of the 
world Depreaslon in those countries* will imdorXlne the 
salient features of the Depression in India and ooapare these 
de^lopments with those that tool^  plnee in other countries. 
froa the anal^ rsis of the last oh^ter we haw sesa 
that for one reason or the other, the slump« sooner or 
later initiated a fell of prices in altsost all the important 
ootiBtries of th# world* Prioes oontinued to deoline until 
Heroh| 1933j whsn it touched the lowest level i« aoat of the 
countries,^ the first quarter of 1933t the wholesale prices 
deolined to 63 in 65 in Oemaajri 60 in France | 70 in 
0,K« and 78 in Japan, froa 100 in 1929; the general prtoe indei 
for the world(excluding 0»S.S#a»> as a whole deolined to of 
According to the findings of the l<eague of Nations, «th« 
continuing downward drift of the priee«*level in nS'trlf all 
countries is v^ry clear, IPhera wors" few, on or off toe 
gold standard, where the index-nuaber for March 1933 did 
not stand at the lowest level yet recorded in the 
depression"* World Iconoaio Sunreiri 1932-33i 
its Pfe-Depr«»J9ion level* Iti® fall la prleas signalled a 
il«0llne in prosluotion, tra l^e and tconoalc actiivlfcy iui genei^ 
the mvM industrial production daolined tradet 65^, and 
liaoaplojraent inopeased 270^ 1 during the saam peilod* In tfa® 
second quarter af 19331 the doimward t i ^ d waSf h<tverar$ checked 
and waa reiroi'sed in tlia laa^oFit/ of tbe places, tfee upward 
nmment that started la the ¥m%h of April, 1933* continttad 
2 uninterruptedly for the i^ola of fcbe 
Ros#eir®rt ^^^ i® ao^ ® ispertant to note is that while 
the dcnmnard trend of priees, trade and production had been 
praotioally univeraali there was oonaiderable gariation in the 
pattern of decline from oomtrf to ooantr/* There mr9 alao 
dlff»yenees as Ijettfeen one aeetor of the e0<a3W and another 
and froa one point of time to another, over the entire period 
of the Deprestion. For instance, between 1929 and 1932, the 
prices of Bianujniatijres fel l hy against a deollne of iiSjt 
and in the case of foodstuffs and raw materials respeotivelyi^ 
and slailarly the world industrial production in 1932 dropped 
37^ whereas the production of raw materials declined iOi and that 
h of fbodstuffs actually increased lis froa its 1929 level* It is 
i« For the world as a whole industrial production froa in 
Harchi 1933* increased to 72 by the end of the year and qmtUB 
of trade froa 72.9 to 60•2i and enployiaent was consequently 
reduced froa 29I in Karch»1933 to 2 ^ in the last «onth of 
that year(^rld Bconoisic Surfey, 1933'-3^| PP#2l8 & 223)« 
3. League of Sationsj Review of the world $rade, 1933,Chapter on 
Prices. 
Lengue of Nations t Wsjrld Sconoaio Surrey, 1932-33fP.71* 
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obviouii^ttiat witli th«se diipapitles in tbe pattern df 9Hot* and 
product Ion I the Depression shottXd haire had irery different effects 
in agricultural countries f ^ ttose in countries chiefly pro-
ducing manufactured goods. Kren in the fcrmeri there were soae 
differences between those producing foodstuff and rai^ -materla Is 
respectiveljr. This is borne out by the following Indicef? of 
prices and production for the various c«|}aat:rie8* For Instanccf 
industrial production in 1932 fel l in and Qerraaiiy 
against a decline of ^ in J'apan and in Sweden 1 froia the 
1929 level* On the oth<fr hand the teroa of trade during the 
«aae period moTed in favour of froa 97 to and Qoraany 
frosa 110 to while in other two agricultural countries, 
Denmark and New Zealand, it deteriorated fl^a I09 to 76 and 
109 to 63 respectively.^ Ifhe reason Ibr this obviously wss that in 
the case of the later countries, exports consisted of agri-
cultural products the prices of which declined feesvily* thuSf 
in industrial countries» the Depressicm manifested itself in m 
greater decline of production, whereas in agricultural countries, 
prices and export trade auffered more. 
It is difficult to aeasure directly the relative 
severity of the Depression in various countries — for instance 
by figures of percentage reduction of the national inootae - as 
5« te&igue of Hatlonss World Soonotslc Survey, 1932*33i 
« -
«aoh ilata «re not available, m can therefore« 3N1I7 m eoae 
suoh important tndloes aa prleeSf proda<3tion and 
enploynent and disouss the course of the Pepresston with 
r©fej?efiee to these irnrlable®. 
THE MfTJ^i paics MQvaHsars Bmim tm 
M& may distinguish tvo important phases in the price 
fcrendt during the Dtpreesioa. In the earlier part a 
greater decline lo the pricee of foodatuffe and raw aaterialLs 
as ooapared vith the manufactured gCN^ ds was almoat universal* 
I')}) 
Then froai th# last quarter of tiSt the abandomaent of the gold 
standard hy a group of countriee, however, caused widelj 
•arytng wowaents in the natloaal ^rioe levels. Prices ahowed 
•one improveiaeRta in natiofis that left the gald atandardy 
while in those that reaained on gold — the Onitod States| 
Oemany, Belgiuaa Holland and Italy the orlce lovel foi l 
even faster than it had fallen in she proceeding two years* 
This developaent was to be expected as a natural, result of the 
changed relations in the value of currency of those countties* 
Statistics of tradd and prcducbion also provide evidence of a 
better situation in the countries that vmt off the gold 
standard* t«et us now escanine the same in some laore details* 
tmm m m^ Am .sispt^to 
fhe noist m%&hXe f^ datur* of the eltmp daring this 
period was tti® wiae dftsparifey in tlie prices ©f fare produets 
and BjawufaQfciii?od goo i^s, the pirlces of rm materials 
djeolined due to a hQSivy slursp ia tho indiisti^al ai^nntyt tbs 
deolin® of tte food prl<s«s was eauacd t>jf a drop in the demand 
from dealars whosa stock® mm depreciating in valaa* tfe® 
situation vas, riovaver, fUrthar vorse i^ed by tt?« afesanoe of mf 
raatriction of output» fsriaar ccaitrary to policy 
puraued tey the laanufeciurarst t-rys to m&ot falling 
prices by producing nore rather than leas. Xhua, while the 
declitt® In the px-lcea of rav aateriala and foodataffa was 
cosperatlvely alow towarda the end of 1929 ^  in 1930 It apread 
rapidly and gathered wocaentua in the following wontha* Hjr the 
tiiddle of 19311 the world pricea of ataple coaaodltiea iMd 
fallen by 50 - 60$ for vegetable foodstuffs} 25-30^ for 
ninerala and tnetals, froo ita pre-DepreseScari lewl.^ Although 
the decline of agriculfcural prime was heaviest In the countries 
outside Eurcpei that proiuced saalnly cereals and testtilas^ but a 
6# Courae and phasea of the Wbrld Econonic Depression. 
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greater fall In the prioea of raw matorialt eonpaxvd to that 
of aanufaoturest vas aliaost universal. It would ba obaarrad 
that betvean 1929 ar)^  19311 tl^ prioas of rm matarlaXs droppad 
30^ against a daoBne of 20$ for nianufaoturasi in th» tin It ad 
Stateai in danaanjr tha priees of tha formar fe l l oonparad 
^th a 13^ dtelina for tha lattar and in Canada 33^ against a 
fall of 19^  during tha aaisa pexdod? 
Tariationa in riaativa prioas graatly affeefced th« 
ohai*aoter of intamational trada* tha oountHaa exporting 
aanufaoturad goods tiara abla to buy thair iisporta of fam 
produota ralatiyaly ehaaply vhila thosa eiQ»orting raw matarlals 
had to pay a proportionality largar amount of thaaa pro i^ietB* 
fot the ffa^ quantity of manofacturad goods* Aooording to tha 
fitidifigs of taagua of {fat ions, batwaen in Ist quarter of 19^ 9 
i«id that of 1931 tha total value of exports for tan oountrios 
exporting mainly nanufaetured goods fall against a daolina 
of for other six non-SUropean countries that assorted 
a 
foodstuffs and raw aaterlals*^ taking a few inpoHiant agrioulturd 
oountries separately, in Argentinai tha value of exports between 
1929*311 deolined from $907 lakhs to U28 lakhi i.e* by 
Australia} froia C592 lakhs to $31^ lakhs or by ^ ^ and in Kew 9 Zealand froa $ 29$ lakhs to $ lakhs l*e. by Aa against 
7* Vtorld Boonwio Survey, 1931*32* 
8* the Course and Phases of the ^r ld Boononio Depress ion, Bevised 
edition, Geneva 19311 p» 191* 
9« World Bconoaio Survey, 1932*33tt P* ^ 39* 
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this tbe valuA of Oerman d3cpoit« d«oliii«i<l io^ and that of 
U.S.A* In 1930 fPO» It 18 calcuXat«d that In 
1930 Gensanjr aehiaintd an export sai^lus of aboat siXlion 
as against an iaport auiplus of neairXr S167 niXUon In 1929 
P and $$$9 miUlon In 1928» 
m ham mlreBdf gem how the heavy daclin® In th« pricas 
of raw matariaXs In tba world mrltot tranaalttad itsalf 
to our ooimtr/* Bovarari susaarislng the entire period betve^ 
Septeaher 1929 to September 1931• wo find that at the end of the 
period the wholesale prioe index In £etdla showed a deoISae of 
3^1 whereas the corresponding figures fdr the tinlted Statesy 
12 
Britain and ?r^ee were 26t27 and 22% respectIveXjr* 
Jfi^ jfl^ ay j f ^Q j^ftfti^ e Py^ e^ff 
(Annual airorases) 
( Basel JUljr 191W«100) 
Ooanodltles JESMft. 
1929 1930 1931 ^ faU In 1931 
im i9g9 
Cereals 125 100 78 38j( 
OottonCraw) IU6 91 83 ^ 
JUte(raw) 95 63 ^ ^ 
QHseeds 155 127 82 Wfl 
Ootton l^anttfactures I60 139 123 2 Jnte vanufactures 122 88 76 3 
All eoMhlned 166 96 
Sourcet Review of the Trade of Jhdiay 1931-32* 
10# the Cdurae and Hiase of the Vbrld £oono«lo Depression. 
1931tPt193* , 11. Ibid,, p. 
12. Heview of the Trade of India, 1932-33* 
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The figaros In the aboiro table ihow the highest pereentage 
of deeline^in the ppiees of raw itttei fallowed by the jprlees of 
olleeeds and rm ootton respeetlveSjr* the price of eotton and 
4ute manufaoftures fel l to a emallet extent* there m9$ hoveveri 
a vide gap in the dedllne of prioes of Jute taanufaoturea and 
that of eotton manufaotiires* fhe prices of tlie former f^ll 
oomparativeXy laore because they depended almost entirely upon 
foreign market| whereas the later were consumed intex^ally* 
The heairler decline in the prices of farm products 
tuxtied the barter tersiS of trade against Indiai the ultinate 
position during the period under reference being as followst 
Prices of (l^l** alOO) prices of 
l3»orted ia^rted 
1929 Septeaber 133 150 
1930 Decetaber 85 12? 
1931 Becember 81 125 
Pall in Beceaber 1931 
as coapared with 
mM^^mr M i z i — 
Sources liiview of the World trade of ]^diat 1932*33 
F»oii the last quarter of 19311 prices in the countries 
that left the gold standard*remained sore or less steady while 
- -
la those on the golkdi It eontinatd to d«ollne* Taking 1929 ss 
100| wholesale prices In 1931 tor Instance vere 76,8 In Great 
Britain and In ilnlted States. Sheroafter they dlvergedf 
standing at tor tr«K* eoiapailng with 68 for In 1932* 
The details tot the lioireaents of prloee for the tvo groups are 
ae follovit 
Jfadex Huaiber of Sterling and Oold Prlcea 
» Eoonomists^e Index of United States* 
aterllng prices trices Irving 
I.. I . , , . „ „ I,I.,I „.„„., i.i.,„ . M f i 
1931 September 18, 100 100 
Septmber 30 108 Hovemher 2? 109 98 
December 30 109 96 
1932 Janttaiy 27 108 93 
Harch 22 108 92 
May 18 103 
^uly 27 100 
SepteiBber 21 106 
Howaber 30 103 
i l 
r? 
1933 Jamiary 2? 101 80 
March 22 99 82 
Percentage decllae froa 
18th September 1931 to 
March 1933 
m m 
Sourcet Economlstp April 8, 1933» p» 
Froa the above It v l l l be obeerved that lamedlately 
after the abandonoent of the gold standardi sterling prices 
shot up from 100 m l8th September 19311 to 108 on the 30th of 
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tli« same aonth, an Itieraaso of wltfeln 10 dnys following the 
gold suspension. Thereaffcep tt r©?aalne<l alisoat stable until 
Mareh 1932| ¥hen a deellne set Ini oawylng It In «rune 1932t to 
a point belfiw the Septeaber level. Aa against this the price 
indtox for the countries on gold deollned continuously* about 
during the saae period, then, agalny \>B%mm and 
September 1932, the prlees In the coimferles that went o f f gold 
laoreased about as oompared to ® rise of In case of the 
oountrles on gold, ThttSt It wotad be seen that at the end of 
Maroh 19Bf the composite Index for the countries or gold 
deUned about iBi whereas the decline for those off gold did not 
exceed a figure of Ijl, fro« September 1931 level. 
Depredation of exchange brought also an luaproveoent In 
the export trade of the countries off gold. The share of Britain 
In world exports, which had declined fron 10.75^ In 1929 to 
In 1931, Increased to 9*92^ In 1932 and 10.37Ji in 1933. The 
Imports, on the other hand deollnedi the value of Imports 
retained for home consumption that had risen slightly between 
1929 and 1931 (1927«100> from 102.5 to IO3 ta 1932 fel l to 
90.5. Thus har passive balanos was reduced, from £10^ million 
In 1931 to € 51 million in 1932 and sero to 1933, mainly by 
reduolng the adverse merchandise balance very substantially, 
from C U08 million in 1931 to c 289 million in 1932 and £ 263 
million in 1933?^  The exporti of the countries on the gold 
13 • l»ewio, W»Arthur,op.olt«, pp. 81 <^2. 
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standafd, on th9 other handt oontraotcd and th«ir balanoo of 
payments booane more passlye* Tbe folloving oi 
T^ue of ewpofta and iaporta proirido m i^ridaneo of a bottor 
•itnatlon in «o«o of %he eemtrim that went off tho gold 
8tandard« 
um, i 
falue of ^ o r t t and l^i^rts 
Gantries 
Poroentagt Beolino Poroontaga doelino 
mM^ 
Eypos*t» laport» S3ci>oi!»fcg tooi^i 
Qroat Britain 
J'apan 
jSveedeii 
jirfontlna 
62 
6k 
I? 29 38 
23 
36 
e? 
38 
U.S.A. 
Qomanjr 
Franco 
Svitsorland 
69 
I? 
63 
70 
36 it 
37 31 
29 23 
Source t National Industrial Conference Board, HfCfKev 
XorkiSconomio Conditions in Foreign CountrioSf 
Table I, p* 
We aay note that froi 1931 to 1932y the value of the 
export• declined coaparat ively sore in the ooimtrief on gold 
and that of iaporte, in thoee that vent off the gold standard* 
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2t is ttitis «Ti4e»t that a smaller fall In the Talue of expoTts 
and fi bigger in ttie imports plaoed tto oouatries off the gold 
ifi fuf} adirentageoue position ov'er those on gold standard* The 
eottseqaenoos of this ohange of position w-uld be eonsldered 
subsequently .^ 
I,i> ,1, A 
^ ooiBKon with Britain and other oountries off gold^ 
the indeae of prioes In India also showed scm iaproveaent 
IbHoving the suspension of the gold standard* As may be 
observed trm the following figures, ixsmedlstel^ r after the 
suspension of the gold standard the Celoutta Index number of 
nholesale prioes moved up fro» I91 in September 1931, to 96 
in the fbHovlng month and again to 93 in Deoember 1931 sod 
remained more or less steadTt ranging between 96 and 98 until 
February 1932, from Har^ h, 1932, howeirer, the decline started 
again until it touched the lowest level of 82 in March 1933* 
ThuSf on average, between September 1931 and March 1933» the 
price level showed a decline of lOiJ in contrast with a fiOl 
of 28% In the preoeedlng period of the seme duration* 
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imsJt 
CaXoutta Ind«x IfualMr of i^ oXesaXo Prioes 
tfO 19.13 
(Bas©« « 100) 
Tear and aonttas fzioe Indices 
1931 September 91 
Oetober 96 
December 98 
1932 JTanuafy 97 
Bfebruary 98 
H^ poh m 
May 89 
^ l y 87 
Septeeib«r 91 
o^iromber 90 
1933 January 88 
Maroh 82 
Soureas Ravlew of tba frada of India 
1932«33, 3. 
Our going off gold In aapt^bar 19311 along irlth 
•ttrllngi providad soise rolleff no doubt« bat vhan va 
eoapara this banaflt with that vhloh aorm other ooontrlai 
raoalvad va ara la ft vith a fealing of dlaappolntaant* Tba 
IblXovlng flguraa ihov that prioa level In India banaflttad 
least asong tha oounTsrlaa that vant o f f tha gold itandard* 
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tsms 
September Beeamber Mareb Percentage deellne 
Countries 1931 1932 1933 Sepfe#193t to 
Mareh 1933 (* DeoXiiie 
mdla 91 86 82 
Britain 99 101 98 
Japan 113 
Sweden 107 108 105 - 2i 
Australia 139 137 133 ' 
New Zealand 133 m 129 - 3^  
Sou2t}0i Morld EconoBio Surtey Iter vartotti 
years* 
Suttaarlslng the entire period of the Copres si on. It 
vould be noted that between Septeaber 19^ 9 and fteroh 1933| the 
prloe Xeirel In India feXX ae compared wltb a decline of 
2B% In Great Britain, In Japan, 13^  In Sweden and 23^ In 
Australia* The main eharaoterlstlo of tbe prloe depression 
In mdla vaS| as has already been said, the disparity between 
the prloe levels of raw materials and manufactured eomodltles* 
Between September 1929 and Mardh 1933 rlee slunped ^^^lOllseeds 
55)^ 1 raw Jute 53^ * end raw ootton on the other hand, 
eotton aanuf act urea slumped only 29J(, aetals 22^ and sugar 
during the saiae period. 
- -
fuitiing next to foreign trade ve find tbat |ftioe« of 
out exports bBtmm Deoesiber 193t and March 1933 deelined about 
aoj coTTipared to a falX of 2?;! In the preoeading t0 laonthii l*e*t 
fr®n Maroh 1930 to December 1931« fhe prices of laport® showed 
a comparatively Mggor fall during these tBonthsf between Beoeober 
1931 and Ifereh 1933 it doollned tmm Ig^ i^  to 110 per oent 
or about 13^ compared with a fall of 11^  between March I93O 
and December 1931 • the following table tllustrafces the 
comparative poalt :on of the export and loport prices before 
and afttar the euspenelon of the ©old standard* 
S a i S d ® sept. ^^yte^ber ,19:>9 m ^ 
1929 and DeoJ931 
•Un 
Exports Imports Exports laporti 
Deceaber 1931 39 17 . • 
Doceaber 1932 M5 23 15 7 
Mawh 1933 51 37 27 11 
Source* Heview of the Trade of India in 1923-33, 
p* 7-
However I it shouU be pointed out that although the 
prices of our exports ooapared to that of Isports showed an 
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la^rov«Bont yet dtoliae in the baXano« of tra4« im« th» 
heoTlest for 1932-33 { irm a figure of orores for 
1929-30, the balane« of trade f «U to 3^.8 cror«« for 1931-^ 32 
and again to a low figure of S!i«3«3 orores for 1932-33• 
may perhaps be oxplatned bjr tho faet ttmt durittg tbis year thsf* 
m» B further sloop in tti# rair cotton trado due to a greater 
deelitte in the demand for the Jlndien staples* The export of rev 
ootton fel l fro» 2,369 tfeoiitand bales valued at gi«23 crorea to 
2,063 thousand bales valued at ororea. Sirailarlyt owing 
to a sevar« competition froa ^pan in parti u l^arly the ahipoent 
of Indian ootton-pieoe goods dropped trcm million yards 
vorth lakfaa to 66A ailHon yards vorth l»*209 lakhst 
exiiorta of twist and yarn asolined froia 22 luillion lbs. to 15 
laillion lb3» In qu^ity and from R3«1,28 laRhs to ii8»79 lakhs 
in value* the export of Jute, raw and aanufaetured fe l l by 
about ls,1 crorea and that of rice dropped from lakha to 
lakh«i and ao on« the total valae of the exports for the 
year declined by ft.25 ororea or 0s ooa^ared with the 
preoeeding year* fhe total value of the ifsportsf on the other 
hi^ ahowed an improvement of Bs*7 ororea or $$ over the preoedd* 
ing year. On the aide of imports the noticeable increaae 
waa recorded in Indians demand for foreisn textilesf the 
increaae under this bead amounting to 8t*12 ororea on a total 
of crorea in the proceeding yeara.^^ 
15. Heview of the Trade of Indian in 1932-33f pp.15-l8* 
mQwastm Am EMPLoifHaMr piii^ iwa XHS BSPRgssiotf 
XmM, 8 
The fall of prices, without a corresponding ducllne 
Itt cost of production Inwlvea a reduotion of profits} 
th© aeale of pyoauetioa Is out dovn, an^  workers ©re ramoved 
from eapleyaftit^ ftie statistics of profits ttiat are available 
for thfif period under study sbow that In aost of tbe industrial 
countries heavy losses were sustained due to the depression 
of invent^rlesi and Increase in cost per unit when the volume 
of output <Jiiainl8hed» According to tfeu firsdlni^ g of the 
I^ eague of Watloos, in the United States* the profits of 1|900 
corporations reporting to the national city Bank of Hew Yorfef 
declined koi in 1910 ftpoa the hoo® year 1929 and 2Bi frota 1928. 
The net returm on the capital Invested In these concerns declin-
ed froa It.ii^ in the second quarter of 1930 to in the 
fourth quarter of that Slall^trly, in 19311 the net 
earnings of hiialness corporate enterprises tumed into a loss 
of nlUion dollars froa a positive figure of aiUion 
dollars In 1929* In Qeraanyi the average profits hy enterprise 
are estinated to have declined between 1926«29 1929-30| 
and industrial earnings expressed as a percentage of owned 
capital dropped fros their peak of 72$ in 192? to a loss of 
in 1931.^'' Profit statistics for Orefet Britain are not 
16. the Course and Phases of the World Bconoaic Depression» 
p. 
1?. the World Econoaic surfeyt 1932-33f p«1>f2* 
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aViailatilA. Bat vhatorer dalfa are found tlifi^ e indioate that 
profits daolined only littl® In 1930| they iK»r©t howoverf not 
high in 1929. In th® « r s t feaXf of 19311 profits showed a 
deollne of ftm the f i m half of 1930?® 
With the decliisQ of profits, tottsinesaw^n w&m natu«»lly 
oonpelXed to curtail produotion and reduoe the number of personi 
from fho deoline of th^ prlcds and profltsi hovewri 
affeeted dtfferesat eouatrles differently* For 4niStaiooe|ifhllo In 
ir,S#A. and Oonaany tho abrionsal character of th© preeeedlng 
years of prosperity greatlj Increased the sevarity of the sluapi 
In Britain sad a^pan the dfioHn© in industi?lal> product ton 
ooaparstlTcly mlld| chiefly heoause these eountries did not 
share the prosperity of the earlier years. The folloi#ing 
table illMStratea the deeline in induetriel product1cm in the 
different years of the Depresaion. 
Ssfeis-Z 
"'" ' ' ' "' "'"" 'ii''faii''''''^ >eli¥©en Countriea 9^29 1930 1931 1932 1929 and 1932 
tI#S,A* 107 86 73 k^ 
Germany 100 90 61 39 
Great Britain 106 96 89 86 21 
Japan 111 106 101 108 3 
Source J World Bcononio survey, 1932-33, pp.8U^  
and 8^(tablQs# 
18» The Course and Phases of the i^ torld Economic Deprasslon, 
p. 
Again, tha disparity fcbat ©merged betveen th« 
ddollne in th® ^mdmtlmi ®r upoduceM^and consumer si'goods 
towards 1929t continued to deepen In the following y@trs|while 
InvasttBOnt activity fell sharplyi conaumtition showed only h 
small decline. It should b© r»oted tfeat In tfee valut of 
gross national production during 1929-33 declined from ItOtf 
billion to C 56 Mllioot or about Coaparod to tbla avenge 
deollne of tfe© gross prl^ t© doaiustlo Inv s^stoent fel l about 
one-third between 1929 to 1930 and by 1932 It bad fallen to a 
low level of less than one billion dollars from 16 billion 
dollars in 1929, a fall of about Aoserdlng to cmother 
eatlffiute, at the bottoa of the ISepreseioni business Investment 
accounted for leas than of nation's output ae ecMitrasted 
19 
with in 1929* The personal eon sumption expenditure | on 
the other hand, in 1932 f^ll to 89 billion dollars froa lOg^  
billion dollars in 1929f a deellne of not 8»>re than 
A heavy drqp In real Investmentt thus, caused a 
greater decline of output in producers* goods ir^dustrles as 
eoapered with eonsuaers* goode industries* As early as in I930 
the world $»oduetion of iron and stell had declined nearly a 
fifth froa the preeeedlng year* In the United States, in 1930 
the output of Iron end steel flail by nore than one-fourthf the 
19* O.s.Departsent cf Coaneroet National 3hoonie,19Mi-,ldition, 
20* Ibid., 8tatl0tioal table, WO, p. 216* 
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daaand for tsaohine toeXa and other eagtaeerlug goods daeZined 
hy al)oat: ona-half and the output of motor industry daerctasad 
38^ 1 from Ita Xtval in 1929« At againat thlSf %h» produotloB 
of th^good/industry ahowad only a amaH dooliiia of and that 
fl^drinkf paptr and printing Industriea ramainad ralatively 
steady throughout the Bepraasion* fhe output of pr9duoer*s goods 
oontiiiuad to decline greatly in the foXXoi^ ng months and ultioate* 
ly hetween 1929 and 1932» the physioaX ^luae of produetion 
in inveatnent goods industriesi in this oountxy deelined 69^ 
against a fall of in ease of oonsuaers* goods industries* 
In Oenaany* siailarlyt the output of produeeri* goods deeXined 
601^  vhereas that of oonsumers* goods dropped only 20|| during 
the same period, The general eonoluaion to be draim these 
figures thus further supports the thesis that the leeding faetor 
in the oyole is in'^ estaent vhile oonsumptlsn shove only a lagged 
adjustment* 
^ith a rapid decline in industrial aotiTityt the «o1um 
of unemployment naturally oontinued to increase throughout the 
Depression* the aggregare number of the unemployed worlfisrs in 
the industriel countries of the vorld was estim tedg at the end 
21* The Course and Phases of the World Seonomio Depreteion» pp* 
22m Sesf f«SBorandum on Production and Tradsy 
Chapter I?* 
23* lAvis* w*Arthur, op*eit*y p^  
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of about it inoreaaed to 20 aillllonft hy 
the beginning of t931« faking the particular oountriost the 
position was as foXlowsi 
tm&A 
le en ms^ 12s. 
Countries 1930 1931 1932 1933 
w 2 ,9^ 10,W 13,359 
Germany 3.0M 5,599 
Britain IfZQh 1,69^ 2,666 2,660 2,821 
Japan m 352 397 hTk 
aoppodueed fro® World Iconooie Surfey 1932-33fp* 109 
the eibov^ e figures| oXcarly reveal an iiy>irard trend of 
unemployaent in all the oountries* Xn the oaae of the United 
Statesf for instanosf unenploynent remained at a high level 
for all the years of the Depression* This may he explained 
hy the corresponding deoline of industrial activity throughout 
the period In that oountrr* Equally bad was the situation 
of eaploymmt in Ger«any« vhere industrial production tell as 
«Kch as it did in the United States. The British situ&tioni 
2k* Zntemational Labour Office t UnemployBent Frohleis in 
1931, p. 12. 
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hardly needs my farther ea^lanatton* && m hwe sbowi} 
In the last ehapter, long befoire the onset of the erldle, 
indastri!3tX aotlvity had declined In that oountiy and 
unes^ Xojnaent regained at a high level all thoughoat. 
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Ammsmmhh pROPuogioH 
Altbougli the fall in the prloes of agricultural 
produota had been partioularly soverei the fcotal fai^roduetion 
rem ined more or less intaot and aetually increased in soae 
eases* In 1f30| the index of norld Production of foodstuffs 
and rav materials stoofit at 10^ and 103 as compared with 103 
and 105 respectively in 19^ 9p and the airerage for bo|| 
comhined worked out at 102 cospared with 106 for 1929* faking 
world production and trade of both foodstuffs and raw materials 
in 1929 as 100| the poaiticm for 1932 is as followss 
mmmn im 
MmtU Trade 100 $9 
^oM Production 100 100 
World Trade 100 ^ 8l ,5 
World Production 100 ^ « 
Productiont 10^ 102 
Sourcei ^produced trm I^ ewist W A^rthur* op«cit,| 
p. taken fjpOBi yorld Eeonomic Survey 
1932-33, p* 78. 
25. World Boononie Survey, 1931-32 ft 1932-33, pp. 90 a 7h 
respectlTely* 
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Xt would hG noted that while in tho l}oginni»g th6 
indlees of px^^etlon hoth of foodstuffs m& rmv matorlalfi 
mv9d togethert later on, there took place a sutji teratial shift 
f ^ the production of rav materials to foodetuffe* In 193^ 1 
the index of the production of raw aiateriels stood l>elov 
its 1929 lewl while the output of foodstuffs fe-aalaed lot act* 
fhis Was hecauae of a greater drop in the demand for raw 
aaterials in oonsequenoe of a deoXine in world industrial 
activity* We may note froa the above table that In 1932 the 
trade in raw materiale dropped about 191^  whereas that of food* 
stuffs contracted only ll^i from the t929 level, Then again 1 
as we hafs shown in the preceedlng seotiont the policits of 
agricultural protection in favour of foodetuffSf in mmy 
countries also tended to laaintain their prices compjtretively 
higher than that of raw aateriala. However, on the average, 
the output of fern products * foodstuffs and raw oaterlals 
eoablned * fe l l only as contrasted with a decline of IQ^ in 
the productive activity of manufacturing industries* 
The statistics of the world stocics also indicate the 
maintenance of agricultural production in the face of 
declining demand* It should be pointed out that in the depress* 
ion when the demand for commodities is falling, variations in 
productive activity,reflect themselves in the changes of unsold 
stocks* The position of stocics accumulation during the 
Pepression under reference is Illustrated by the following 
figures. 
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tmjUL 
l^atom of MorX^ Stooka of Prtaiarjr CoawodltitB 
(Baset 1925-29 « 100) 
Tear Oeneral World Index 
1929 
1930 158 
1931 183 
1932 19*^  
Poroantage increase 
frota 1929 to 1932» 
Souraet League of Jfatlonat World Ssononio 
Survey 1932-331 p* 93* 
From the aboTt ve may note a Qonllsuous inoreaae tn 
stook aeouisiilationa as the Depreaslons bad proceeded* There 
was, hoveireri a wide divergenoe around this averfge, according 
to the Tsriationa In the supply and demand oondltlons tor 
irarloua fana produota. faking a fev iaportant goods, for 
instance, ve find that between 1929 and 1932, the index of 
tlM world stocks of wheat showed an increase fro« 12^ to 19^ 
i«e* stocks of sug'^ r increased fro» 1929 to 230 or 7d>t 
coffee stocks trtm IU9 to 28^ or 913t and the stock of cotton 
froa 103 to iei or 
26. World Bconooiio Survey, 1932-33, p«93 
See also, '*Soonoaio Condition in Foreign Countries", iiy 
Haticsnal Industrial Cwiference Board, p» 10 table K 
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mm 
tha oovesaaat of agricultural production In India 
fblXovedl tfee worldi^ wldo fersnft. The eoa|)osit« Index of the 
fans produoticm showed a marked stability in the face of a 
Bemre declioe of prices* Althou^i tfe© yield of pajpticular 
crops siioi#9d soffid variations under seasonal infl^eneosi the 
aredunder <5ultlvation remained i»»re or less constant during 
the whole period of Depression• This Is illustrated by the 
foUoning table* 
000 eores 
rear Food crops Hon-food crops Total 
19a8liS9 200^269 51.189 251 
1929-30 aoo,2i8 »»9,839 250,057 
1930-31 202,706 >18,067 250,773 
1931*3a 251,V71 
Source I Vera Austey, op.oit», Appendix table 
Xt would be noted froa the above that in conaon with the 
world wide trendi there wet a eh«nge-over trm the production 
of raw materials to foodstuffs, throughout the whole periodi 
in this country* Between 1928-29 and 1931-3^? the area under 
non-food crops was reduced bya l i t t le less than JT crores acres« 
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vhUe that under fooderops shoved e eoi^ responding Inorease of 
the same order (about 5 crore acret) and this had taore than 
aade up the deelltie of acreage under the former* fhe figures 
of the iroluae of produetion of various foodstuffs and raw materials 
also aonflna the ahore trend* 
Dndex nmaber of Fax® Production 
year 
(in thousand tons) (in lakhs of hales 
1929-30 261^ 8592 52 103 
1930-31 27368 9306 52 112 
1931-32 29036 ko 
1932-33 26^27 h? 71 
aouroej R-vlew of the Trade of India. 193^35. f»r 
( ! ) p* 96 (2) p. 101 (3) p. t5)p.235 
It is clear from the above that the production of 
foodstuffs averaged higher than that of raw aaterlals for the 
whole period of the Depression* The output of rice increased 
fron 261^ thousand tons in 1929-30, to 29036 or aboii iZ% 
in 1931-32* In 1932-33, it however, again declined to 26^27 
thousand tons oving to various reasons* The main reason tor 
this unfafourable position vas that the principal oonsuning 
countries such as Bsst Indies, Malajra and Java had been 
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haiPd hit by tli« D©pr«s8loii» and by thl« tlo© their dmmd for 
3jndian rice draetlcally ddoltntd^ Secondly, at tho samo ttot, 
th« prospeots of the new crop in all tba riee^producing countrieai 
notably, Ohlna and Japan, were unuaually fhvourabXo, threatontng 
a heavy prodnetlon of rice* ifewavar in spite of all these 
factors, the totaX yield of rloa otop In 1932-33 was st i l l 
above that of 1929-30, although the prlee of rloe had declined 
tvm iZk in September 1929 to ^2 In Mar<^  1933 or abo^ it 
fhe produetion of wheat, except for sixbo deollne between 
1930-31 and 1931-32, showed a constant loprovement over the 
entire period of the Depress!out the index of wheat pzoduotion 
in 1932-33 stood 10.1 hl^er than in 1929-30, ^mereaa the wheat 
price index during the same period dropped by IVoa 13? in 
September 1929 to 89 In March 1933. The same is true of oilseeds 
production which ccsitinued to increase during the Depression 
years« For instance, the production of rape and taustard seeds 
in 1931-32 estioated at 1025 thousand tons, being h% higher 
than in the proceeding season, and the crop of 1932-33 yielded 
10*f7 thousand tons or 22 thousand tons aore than that in l931-32» 
The production of groundnuts, the other iraporliant seed crop, no 
doubt showed some decline in 1931*32 but soon recovered, the 
crop of 1932-33 yielding 2836 thousand tons oomparod with 
27 
2276 thousand tons in 1931-32. On the whole, the area under 
27. Review of the Trade of Jiidia for 1930-31 a 1932-33. 
The figures of prloes for various years are available in 
th« Roview of the Trade of India, 1932-331 p. 8. 
^ Bh ^ 
oll8de<ls crops In 1932-33 4Kor««5aod to isiXXion aer«s trm 
SB 
16.1 niXXion aeres in In ttie f^oo of a 63;! deeXino from 
175 in September 1929 to 65 in March 1933 • of t f prico® 
during the same period* 
The production of rav cotton and jutOf the oo0t 
Itaportant export crops of Zndia» on the other hand showed 
oonsiderabXe a^ustaent to faXXtng prices* the output of 
raw cotton between 1929-30 and 1931-32 showed a decXlne of 
about 23^ corroapondlng to a deeXine of 39if - fWMS I'l^ in 
Septe»ber 1929 to 89 In I5arch 1932 • of its prices and in 
29 
the quantity exported* The output of jute, eimiXarXyi wee 
reduced fro® 103 Xakh baXea to Xs&h baXee or about h?/^  during 
the satae period corresponding with a faXX of prices and 
27^ in the quantity ejcported* However, in 1932-^ 331 the output 
of raw cotton increaeed to h? Xakh baXes, and of raw Jute to 
71 Xakh ftaXee froB ^ and 55 I c ^ baXes respectiireXy in the 
proceeding year* this improveiaent majr partXy be attributed to 
the recovery of the export trade foXXowing the depreciation of 
the rupee* It vouXd be noted that in 1932-33 the ehlpaent of 
raw cotton f»XX only in voXune and 13;^  in vaXue against 
a decXitte of ^^O^  and 50^, in voXuae and vaXue respectiveXy* 
28* Vera Austey, op*oit., Ap-^ endix tabXe 2, p. 5l7. 
29* Review of the Trade of Iridlai l932-33» p* 89^  
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In the prttoeedlng year* SiallarX/, In the case of Jute export» 
the ittpiovdiaent that started In the preeeeding yeary continued 
during 193 -^33f the shlpiaent helng only less than In the 
prevloits 3rear{ the value of 4iite export also deollned elightly 
trm Ra.1t ororee In 1931-32 to a5#9t orores In t932»33. 
Although the output of the fara products on the vhole* 
vas comparatively better maintained a heavy drop of prices, 
however, eauaed a drastic reduction In the purchasing pover of 
the agriculturists. The details of the fall in purchaalng 
power for the various provinces of India are as follows: 
UMleja 
<1938-29 - 1932-33) 
Provlncet Percentage fall from 
1928-29 to 1932-33 
Madras 
Boabay 
Bengal 
Punjab 
Bihar & Orlssa 
C.P. 
31 
62 
35 
37 
Sourcei Review of the Tradd of India, 1932-33. 
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gittOtpyy Production 1 
On* would 0xp6e<} that saoh a ho&Tjf loss of purebasing 
p&mr would n&turally affeet the produotion of meu!iufaotur«d 
goods, t^agh a reduetloi) tn the demand for these eotmaoditi«s» 
But, ©ontfary to thli the avallehl© atatlstlcs show a oonsldajw 
ahle iner#?i8e In the produotlon of almost ali the Import;«®t 
oanufaotuifes In India, with the single axoopfcion of Pig iron 
whloh ragittoyed a dropf as In evident from the following 
llgai!<asi 
feara Cotton plaoa gooda Cotton Mils production yam 
<orore« of yds) erorea 
Refined Finlsthed Pig-Iron 
sugar steel thousand 
thousand thousand tons 
of yds* tcms. tons 
t929«30 229 2k2 111 Na 1376 
I930»3t 2U6 - 152 11M> 
193t-32 268 299 228 k^O 1070 
t932-33 311 317 370 860 
Soureai Oadgll, P.Ei fho Industrial Ravoliitlon 
of India In Saeant Tlsast Boahaj» 
tables p. mil-XIX, 
• S7 • 
Hoiwwri in rogard to tfo© aboir* statistics of 
px^ s^ duotioni it should be ii^inted oitt that th« p»>du(i%ion of 
faotorr industry in India ^ttd not represent tlie ert ir« 
position of the out*tuitt of taanufaotured goods* m tiave ataoim 
in the last ohapter tbst out of the total itidfestrial pRjfluction 
valued at ororea^ the orgahised in^etsfies socounted for 
onl:r ororee about 2%% of the total asnufactured 
produotioa. The rest of It^ tms oarrierl out by small soale 
oottage Induatriesy for vhioh statistici are not available* 
fiowe^ry it Is likely thut the impnet of the deeline in 
the fitraers* demand for aidnufaoturer«t vqs oonoentreted upon 
the produetiOR of the later rsthet- than or the output of the 
orgenixed i»du8tri«a« 
fieroy a reference should also be made to the faet that 
during those yearsy »o»e of our l»po3rt>ent Industries -were 
largely aesisted by irarlous proteotiire measures* Thus the 
sugar industry i«hioh ahoim the largest inorease of output in 
the abore table, ¥ae spedally gr<inted a larger dege^ of 
p»-<iauet4oti/ The reTenue duty oa sugar was gradually raisedy 
until in 1931, it readhed the figure of 9-1-0 per eent. This 
tended to disoourage iiaporta» vhioh deolined to thouaand 
tons in 1932-B fpoa 556 thousand tons in the preoeeding year 
and one aillton torn in 1930»3t» The i«;7orl duty on ootton 
pieoe goods vas raised upto ad i^ralorea with a ainiaum 
speeifio duty of jTi annas per pound in the ci?se of plain grey 
goodsy during the Depression years* Sinilarly the output of 
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fiitiftlitd staeX oontinuoa to Inopdasv throughout! under the 
shelter of proteotion, although th© produetion ©f pig iron shoved 
a downvard tendenoy as a large part of f t vae exported* 
Turning to the employfoent situatJoiii we have shovn 
in the preeeeding ieotlois that Qyaltml lluetuations in business 
eotlvity^ oause iffiei&pXoym$nt in the industrial sector* 
In Indiai on the other haadi the industrial sector was very 
small ^d even there the aajority of the vorfcers were engaged 
in repair end eeasoninl faetoriesi where the impeot of the 
Depression was very insignificant* However, in th® industrial 
seotor the number of ffeatoxy workers declined froa t»553 ailHon 30 
in 1929 to l.liO? million in 1953 - a fall of about 9*5 *^ Again 
it would be noted that in 1921 the number of field labourers 
and fans servants was estimated at about 21«7 isillion out of the 
total working population of 10^ *8 Biillion« or about 
Aooording to the 1931 eensus the peroentage of the former 
increased to about one-third of the totsil • 3U5 nilllon out 
31 
of 109-7 nillion* The higher peroentage of agrioultural workers 
30* Statistical Abstracts for British India, 1913-3^* 
31* Reproduced trcm »Problems of Orovith of An Underdeveloped 
Econofflv* by Bslr Ahmad Xhan(Asia Publishing EousefBombsy* 
1961) p, l63-6»f* 
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In 1931 f is a ole-jy ©vldenco of a shift of labour from 
Industry and other occupotiong to agriculture. In oommon 
with other exporting econoatos, the greater decline of 
eraployaent In tbla oountry was aoncentrated on the IndustJPlea 
that produced largely for e3E|>ort. For instance, the figures 
of persons receiving wjiemployaent benefit In Calcutta Jute 
mills reached to 5630 In ilarch 1933 aa compared with 2607 
31 
In 1929. 
thus on average, when eostpared with the Industrial 
countries! the problem of uneiaployraent In India reduces to 
Inplgtilflcance, The Depression created a problem of loss of 
Incoffles all round, rather than masilve uneaployaent• 
31. Capital, March 13, 1933, p. 610. 
TIM POLICY IN U M U A M ABHOAD DUAIHA THE 
DRPHESSI^  
In the preTlous chapters we discussed the causes 
and effects of the depression in 3isdla# We shall now turn 
to examine the currency and credit policies followed In 
this country during the depression in the light of the 
experiences of a few other countries ^Ich had to face the 
aaae problems as India In those years. For an appraisal 
oftliese policies it lS| however, necessary flrlit to give a 
brief sketch of the theory of monetary policy as It was 
understood In those days* It will give us the correct 
perspective for the evaluation of such steps as were taken by 
our aonetary authorities to meet that situation. 
THE THBQHMCAL M A M M M I 
It should be pointed out at the outset that the whole 
outlook of the writers of that period In their discussions 
on the anti-cyclical measures was mainly derived from their 
analysis of business fluotuatlona. As we have seen in Chapter 
it was cooaonly believed by all the writers oh the subject 
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that a state of depression is jreaehed because the pireoeedlng 
boom had bean allowed to proceed uncheeked# And since the 
depression la originated In that phase the checking of the 
boom in time m&y Itself psravent the aweeeedlng depression 
f^ om being developed. Hairing thaa analysed the pziobXem the 
theorists preferred to concertrate interest mainly on hov 
the waves of the ©yclea oould fee smoothed o«t and fwtnjre 
crisis be prevented^ rather than how to fight a depression 
once it has come about. Ihuc to use ?lgou»s eacpreasloni it 
was sugii sted that, "if the banks chose, or were cogipelled to 
adjust the volume of their loans froa time to another, either 
by rationing or through the discount rate, with a ^w to 
restricting the swings of credit, and so of prices that 
accompany swings of business activity, they would eliminate a 
factor which now contributes in an Important degree to swell, 
the a®plitude of industrial fluctuations",^ Flsh.r similarly 
Bcem to hnve suggested exactly the mm when he said,'•if 
banks are conservative in making loans during the periods 
of rising prices, and the expansion of credit and currency 
is, therefore, litsited, the rise of parlces is likewise 
Halted and the succeeding fall is apt to be less and 
p to take place more gradually". 
thus, according to thea, the best course would be to 
keep in chock the rising tendency of prices when business 
prospects are bright so as to avoid the succeeding reaction 
t, Pigou, A.C. Industrial Fluctuations,London, 
Fisher,IrsingiPurchasing Power of Money,2nd ed.p, 71* 
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In the opposite direction* But tills should not be Interpreted 
to mean that the posslbllltiejj to l i f t the economy from 
depression, onc^ It is reached, were altogether ignored* Indeed 
In a atrjte of deprecsion, to raiaa the vholeaale ?>r4oe level 
came to he an liapoftant objective of economic policy, fhls 
Impression la cl-aarly convoyed In laany of the important worlcs 
of the time. Hnwtrey for ©itsmplsi clearly says, "We have to 
distinguish two different phases in the regulation of credit 
hy a central haak* Sowetlmu it haa merely to raodify a 
tendency to expansion or contractlon| aoaietimes it has actually 
to rearerse it» The idaal sta e of things would he one in which 
a perpetual tendency to expansion v&s juRt kept in check by the 
central bank* But in practice the central bank is from time to 
time faced with th@ necessity of correcting ait excessive 
ejcpansion by enforcing an actual contraction, or correcting an 
excessive contraction by Inducing an expansion",^ Here he 
clearly recoraaenda foi- reflet onary measures In face of falling 
prices and economic activity, fhen, again at another place 
discussing the question of business fluctuations he comtasnts, 
"the active phase of a cycle Is brought to an end by measures 
of credit contraction calculated to cause an absorptlcjn of 
cash, and that revival is brought about by measures of credit 
3. The Art of Central Banking (Prank Cass & Co.Ud,,)2nd 
edition, pp. i68-169» 
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L. 
relaxation caleulat©d t;o indiio® a release of cash", Casael. 
in the Same way ea^ressirjg his views on t ^ same question sajrs, 
"&mry poliey of atablliaation will as already expalinadf 
necessarily invo tho diractl^n of laoiiet-iry policy in periods 
of depression I towards a rifi^ tti priises**. To quote another 
important writer, Ksynes al«o, in fcls earlier works^  eboved a 
.strong support to sn active polJey of ^WJJit e^ xpenslon with the 
aim to raise the wholessle prices from a depressed level* He 
argued that whatever the isaai's way be, the wain problem whieh 
the depression brin ;s to a country is e decline In the wlume 
of investment either ir< thQ working capital or liquid capital. 
Therefore, "in order that proteers oiar he able, as veil as 
willing to increase their noij-airaiiabl© output, they must he 
able to get coasiand of an appropriate quantity of money and at 
capital r-usGiirc^ sf; and in order that thsy ®ay willing as well 
as able, to do thiuj ther rate of interest which comaiands 
over such resources costs not be m high as to deter them".' 
To put it in simple words ±i the banking syeteo succeeds 
to stimulate borrowing for investmerft purposes, the result will 
be an increased industrial activity with hiis^or eaployment and 
inecJBjes leading to a revival of prices. 
K Ibid., p» 201, 
The World's Monetary Probleaf, Ijondon,1921, p,138. 
6. See, for instance, 'A Tract on Monetary Reform,1922», A 
Treatise on Money,1930,Vol.II & Indian Currency and 
Finance, 1913* 
7. A TreaJilsa on Money, Vol. I , p. 182. 
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With this l itt le Introduction we may now proceed to 
discuss the various aetfeods of credit -eofeeVthat were 
popular in thoae dajrs* 
tm mmhmm OF mtimmr commu 
The major Instruments of cheap money policy that way© 
popular in those days simply consisted of an expansion in 
the money supply and a reduction in the rata of Interest 
charged upon i t , Br. Sdwar*! Se^n in hl9 survey of the 
taonenary theory and policy of 1920s aM sarly thirties comments, 
"the Central Bank, the Watchdog of ^^ ht saoiigiBy in appropriate 
bonk rat® ar.d opm mrk^t policy, pn r^je^ sed a powerful means 
wherehy it could any required pras-'oro to hear vhmever 
oocasloa Tbis is a MiJhly sleotric version 
* 
of ths TlGWS o* t.ha p '0 t930 i/rlterfj on th© subject". 
/ 
While an expauaiun in the supply of currency and credit 
would directly affect the price level, a change In the rate of 
interest was considered to operate mainly th3?ough it3 effedts on 
the level of investmeut, A lower rate of interest would tend 
to encourage enterprise which through a ctiain of consequences 
would bring abcatt « rise in pricts. This fljows froa their 
The Mecaaniraj of Cheap Money(Univ^rssity of Walss Press, 
p. 298, 
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assumption that Investiaent Is neoessarllj Interest elastic* 
Thus the oonneotlon between Interest rate and ntsiw investment 
Is be'leved to be dlredt an obvious* 
In addition to the above means anoth-^ r element of 
aonetary expansion that vas well knoim In thcas tlaes was 
the purchase of the securities in the market at the initiative 
of the Central Bmk Itself known as »opea max^ ket operations*• 
The simple explanation Is that for every security purchased by 
the a deposit money is exchanged which puts an additional 
moiiey in the hands of the people directly, this device 
of aoney supply, iii the suain, rfas recoamended la eondit ions of 
extreme unsortaln^y vhan a ma*a feUange iu credit creation and 
rate of ir:t<?rc2;fe jslght hu-w ftollftfCi to attract borrowers xtrtio 
are rc/luctant on grounds other than the cost and availability 
©f credit. 
It was in this simple way that cheap money policy worked 
in their model. The whole process of its operation relied upon 
soae important links between the supply of money, the rate of 
interest and the level of investment and economic activity etc. 
Let us I. now discuss the same in more details* For the sake of 
convenience, we, however, propose to discuss the above dements 
of monetary policy under separate heads. 
A - cgyj-Ro::. of l^ai BUPFLI OF Mavsii 
The develrvpoent of non«5tayj' thirory in the 19208 and 
early thirties (until the wbllontlon of Keyries General Theory, 
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of Eiaploymsntilntsrast and Money, 1936)was ati l l fcowards 
concentrating ttn the supplj of inortey airsvl cradit as a means of 
iMfluenolng th® ecsurss of priQ^a "anol business ac«lvlty# Under 
th® Influanee of tfe?- of Msraball sconoiadabs looked 
upon tho money sw j^ply as af strategic iiaporfcance and often used 
the vnjflous f0rffiul.utf.0a3 a.t Qtiautlty S'^ uati-.-'na to eEplaia 
Q 
tb.® ffioifenents ofprlaea, A i^ t'^ ^ of Tuiz eiipaiiried by 
an tnopsfise in the supply ana a l^il of prices &l\mf8 
pj*©si4)pofi©d a ois of tbe meiMB of payamts* Ab la 
veil-known^ Ma:rohail| lo aatiy part a of hie wrke made use of 
tlie claacical veraions of the Quantity Theory whex-eby the 
questions of the deteraiiiatlon of valuo of not.ey wci-fs 
dlseussoC with rafomia© tt> tbt variaticnij in the amount of 
^precicufi KCJtiilE;' rslatively lo tLu ljuaiiiess vhiati has to be 
^y tttvu This, fox m%mpX<£i vras a:: important part 
of hlc thoughts in hi is Evid^ n^oe' 'oefore ths Ooamlttee on J^dlan 
Oi't'r^ ncy ¥fi«n hxi aai4, '^ i^ lwl^ vdr ihf^  ^tjuc of society, there is 
a ejftrtaio Tolam? 5f --^ hGii? irhioh ptsopl© of different 
ola3S93 taksin ons with 'tnoth&r oare to limp In the fora of 
eitrpencv; i f «v«ry th^ i^ig restalns tho jjaae, then there 
8, Macinlllan Comraittee >ras only ftollowinR an opinion almost 
unlv:rsally accepted lihen it aaidf ''obviously the general 
pfloe level rjust be governed by tho volume of purchasing 
po^r directed to the buying of current output relative 
to the voluaa of this output". (Coamlttee on Finance and 
Industry, Report, 1931, para 207, p. 93). 
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is this direct relation between the volume of currency and the 
level of prices, th.t i f one Is increased by lO i^ the other 
also will bs increased hy lOjS".^  Then, again he argued that 
apart frosj its direct relation, variations in the money supply 
affect the price level through its effects on the r^te of 
interest also. To use his exprejssion, •'having an extra 
supply, lenders lower sti l l saore the rate which they charge 
for loans, and they keep on lowering it t i l l s point reached 
at which the demand will carry off the larger supply. Vfhen this 
has' been clone, th€>re iu more capital in the honas of speculative 
InvQsfcoro, wto coia® on the markasts for goods as buyers, and so 
raiaie AJ^ices... Vhis a.- ears to be the way in which m extra 
10 
supply of the pmniQus ®©tais viXI brim prices up,'* Thus he 
discussed in details tha varioaa aspects of the »Quantity Theory* 
and the rcle of the rate of interest in the proee-s In his 
analysis of -he deternlnation of prices. 
From the tlcie the ?{arshall*s theory was passed to hla 
succeaaora until aoout the middlo of 1930s, It wna widely used 
in the dlscuselon on laonetary probleias and policies* The 
mewbers of Cambridge School, in particular, closely followed 
Mid popularised the various proppsltlons advanced^ , by hln. 
/»laost all of them, Hawtrey, Keynes and Plgou while having some 
9-Reprl'^ ted Ir. his ."r.n-jy,Crca.it ihd CoiaiacK»e,k>ri<l jn,1923,p«''*5* 
to. IbSd., p» bXbc H s 
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dilfferenoos Sn the conceptions of speaifle apalytiaal methods 
and in ceriainoXogy agreed to Marshall's iriews in subsfcarjce. JDn 
their am ways, following Marshall the^ '' emphasised thf^ t an 
expansion in the money supply sade available by th© banking 
system thi'ough a variety of ohMnel^ wou3.{i affaet level of 
Investment and priee-s. For oxample, the main fowdatiun of 
Rawtx*ey»s theory rested on the r^roposito thafc flow of aoney 
balanoos directly determined the course of prieea and 
productioju Ho has gone a good deal to clal® that "all emuses 
of fluctuations? In produetlvo activity coridltion&d by th© 
Bionetftry factors". It would fee noted that frosj the ^arlicet 
date of his wrlting(191i) thwaghout bis he oonstantly 
refsrred to the important rolfe of isonolary factors in trade and 
prioea. In his first itaportant vrork| Good and B-^ d Tsfad©(t913) 
for instance he aptly pointed out that * Although money is not 
wealth it is most iisportsnt factor in erionoraio orgatiization", ^^  
And further continuedi "the fact that ooney Is merely machinery 
does not prev-ent It froa hnvlng profound and far reaching 
effects on production and consuaptlon of wealth - changes in the 
quantity of taouey in cireulation react upon the industrial and 
comaercial state of the country and have effects of the greatest 
Importance"* These vl<fv8 w^ iloh were found in this scattered 
way In his earlier wJrHlngs later on developed in a consistent 
theory. In his subsequent vrorka ho analysed the effsdts of the 
variations In money supaly what he calls •unspent margins* in 
terms of 'consumers' outlay' and business transactions In a more 
11.Good Bfid Tra3s»L?'nf:on,1913»" S 12. Ibid», p, 36. 
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•jrot^ iaatio my* B#rd ho showtd that tbe baolEing of 
a country takes steps to •acpand or oonferaot eredit tho iessene* 
of the menaure is tha ©onaaqittsnt lnc»©aa« or aoorease ifi tfe© 
oonst)!ser*® inoomo and outlay* An mpmsion of credit enoouragea 
traders to release oasb^ y a eontraotlosi impels thm to absorve 
oasti'**^ ^ Zhe point is that an © s^ponsion of credit adding 
to the outstanding quantity of isoney generates inooae in the 
ooffin^ityt When the net resouroes in the eeonoiay iihother in 
the hands of oanstaisers or traders ere inoreased ther<? will 
eltrfays be tendenoy to release cash and their oonsi»sers* outlay 
would inerease. Beoause in his sshame the additional ineose 
iwnediately finds its way into increased expenditure. And 
*the arotBent consuaers* incoae diirerages from ©onsuaers^  outlayt 
4k 
there is a tendency for oonsumeys outlay to ftollow*'** fhu« 
the additional outlay saeans an additional demand for goods and 
oooaodities causing increased sales and receipts of traders* 
The release of e&sh by traders § againi would mean increased 
purchase of goods at sosie stage of production thereby increasing 
the incocae of those engaged in producing and handling the 
produotion« HoW| hertty Im suggests that since the "output 
cannot be increased without l init , and as the demand for fresh 
goods presses against the produdtiire resources of the conaunityi 
t3. The A^ t of Central Banking, II edit2on« 105. 
iK Xbid., p. 109. 
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prioes rise* HetalX rtm iMosmse stookt of goods 
heing and oannot tm ^uidkly r«p3.inisli«d$ wholesale 
priees ris* btoaus* producers are ^ieged vitli ordera that tbey 
cannot fulfil*.^^ 
Thus It should be noted as a brief stiotsary of the above 
analysis tbat a relaxation in the voXtiiBe of aoney and oredit by 
deliberate polioy of the m^etar^ autliorities eaa, in theory 
alvaya be @xpm%9d to bring about a revival of trade and prices 
from a depresaid level* ^ ^ iftien bank oredit is oi^ated and the 
tmspent margin enlargedi traders would draw an existing balance 
to btty nore goods and prioes rise* Here as we have discussed 
in chapter I the vhole analfsis is based on the basic assuiaption 
that the qaantua of the dealers* atoolc*in-trade is always 
sensitive to variati^ms in oredit conditions* And these stocks| 
he believed provide the naterial for a revival of trade and 
prices.^^ 
As pointed out above Keynes | siiiilarly« in his eazlier 
writings expressed a great conftdence in the possibility of 
bringing about an econoaiic revival by oneans of purely aonetarar 
15. Currency and Oredit (London) k%h ed* p* 
16. In his currency and credit after a detailed discussion 
on the monetaxy influences on tradi and prioes Im 
concludes, **a necessary condition of a high price level 
continuing is the creation and naintenance of a sufficient 
quantity of ouirrency and bank credit to IVaxtiish acceptable 
cash holdings* The effaotive responsibility does rest 
on those who regulate this quantity^, p« 62* 
17* See, fbr a detailed analysis his Trade and Credit,p* 126* 
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In a faiaous passage be pointed outf eontrolllng 
the prioe and quantity of banb: oreditf tl&e banking systen 
neeesaariXy oontrols thm aggz^gate ea^nditure en output* the 
net result depends on the policy of the heoHdng sjsteai in 
oonjisnotion vith all kinds of other faetors* But in so far ae 
the banting sjrstes is a free agent acting with design» it em 
18 
by ooiaing iit as a baXaneing faetor^ eontrol the final outooioe^, 
m these v&t^ s he diseusses the influence of the supply of liquid 
resouroee and bank ox<edit on investment and th& priee leyol on 
the lines of ^antity Itquations* In his analysis the <|uantity 
of money and oredit in the first place is regarded as exercising 
its influence throui^ the interest ratei an increase in the 
quantity of noney i#ould loimr the interest rate vhich in turn 
stimulates inyestiaent and enterprise* fo put in his om words, 
*a change in the quantity of soney affects the price ievel 
in the first instaacei because other things being equalf this 
weans a bank«»x^ te i^iich will change the market rate of interest 
relatively to the natural ratef and it is through the complex 
aoyenents thus set up that a new equilibrium position is 
erentually reached* with a price level dorresponding to the 
new ^u^tity of money***^ ^ We shall have an occasion to discuss 
18. A treatise on Noneyi Vol* I* pp. 182*83. 
zbid,, p, aao. 
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this point in aore details in the following pages* R« sgetni 
argued that the leirel of inveetaent is not sliapli^  determined W 
interest rates» but also greatly inflieiosd hf th® *^airailabilitjr 
of C r e d i t T o use his escpression ''a relaaeatiim or oontraetion 
of oredit the banking sjrstea does not operate hot#eir@ri laerely 
through a ehange in the rate charged to hoir2^vers$ it also 
ftmetions through a ch^ge In ttm abondanoe of dredit**?^ fhe 
operation of oredit polieyt according to hi», ti^es the fom 
of Turning availability of fu^ds priaariljr beoaase of the 
inperfeotiOQ of monejr ssarket* Zf the lending of laonejr vere to 
take place according to the prinoiples of perfeet o^petltioni 
borrowers vould bs able to raise any desired aooimt of raoney 
I 
supply by offering a higher rate of interest* But, he believed 
that in reality the position is not like that| oredit ohanges 
influenee the aarket not primarily by decreasing the cost of 
borrowing but by asking the funcis availat^e to those who 
previously found It impossible to raise the loans* The fbHowing* 
passage froa his Treatise m Ifoney puts his irlevs in « ooncise 
and olear manner i **so farf hovevert as bank loans are ooncemedf 
lending does not in Great BritMin at least take plaot aeeording 
to the principles of a perfect narket* There is apt to be an 
20* A Treatise on Money, VCl.XIt p* 36^ * 
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imtRttsfied fringe of borrowers^ the of iihioti Qan bs 
expanded or oontrsetoAi so that baolsa am influena« the voXuvd 
of Investment by expanding or ^ntraoting the iroltsitt of their 
loansi without there leing neoeesartly any change in the leirel 
of banJc rate, in T:he deaand sehedule of borroi^era, or in the 
volume of lending othertdse than through the banlcs. thie 
phenomenon is eapable vhen it existS| of having great praetieaX 
iBportance***^^ ®® expresses the same " i^em s t i l l more olearly 
in his *A tvmt on Monetary Befora irtien he says, %ht internal 
priee level ia siainly determined by the amount of credit 
oreated by the banks, though in a depression, vhen the publio 
are inoreasing their real halanoes, a greater amount of oredit 
has to be created to support a given priee level than is 
22 required in a boim, ^en real balanees are being diminished*** 
B > mmmm. M m 
As pointed out above the % t e of S^terest** ims another 
important plank of monetayy meohanism* Until the mid of 19300 
it oocupied a strategio position in the eoonomio literature of 
the period* It was generally aooepted that a reduction in the 
rate of interest whould be vary useful as a means of stimulating 
produotion and investm^t in slump conditions, although the 
explanation provided by different vriters of its modus operandi 
Op.oit,, ?ol*l, p# 212, 
^2. A Traot on Monetary HeformCHaemillan & Co«|X;td»lK>ndonti»th ed»), 
1932,P.178* 
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were not alimys lilentieal* f o quote a f9\r important oases| 
Eavtre^i for vx^ mpXe^  analirsed tlie effeots of the low interest 
rate on the willingisesi and ahility of dealers to oarry large* 
stoeke of goodei their orders to maaufaeturert and Inereaeed 
oonauBiers Inooaie and outlay* Hobertaoii maintained that variations 
in tl^ interest rate mainlj operate through its effeots on the 
wlooitar of eireulatlon of bank notes and deposits therehr 
altering the real savings* Ke^ mes, sitaSlerly* oonoeived of the 
hank rate as Influenoing the relationship hetiieen irrrestment 
and savings and through this reaching the prioe levelf and so on* 
fhus in their om way all of tls^e diseuesed the possihilit ies 
of bringing about an eoonoaio revival by the regulation of the 
rate of interest. This inQiression ims elearly3eft on the 
Haoiaillan Ooamittee when in their findings they observedi **there 
ean be no doubt in our Judgeaent that *bahk rate polioy* is an 
absolute necessity for the sound managenent of a monetary syste«| 
and that it is a sost delioate and beautiflil Instrunent tor the 
purpose***^ 
Broadly speaking the whole disoussion on the effeotiveness 
of the rate of Interest during that period was centred around 
two significant points. Ftrstly^ a ohenge in the rate of 
interest was regarded to exert its Influcaioe on the level of 
prices through its effect on the supply of money. Aeoording 
to this vlow a fall in the rate of interest would be associated 
with an increased quantity of bank credit thereby raising the 
price level* Those who emphasised this aspect of the discount 
23* Coimittee on Industry and Finance| p* 97* 
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ra tQ polioy all vork«d alaost on the snae linea* Pigou Ibr 
instanoef olearljr pointed out that the prtee level is regulated 
by the banic rate beoauee a ehattge in the rate of interest is 
foXloi#ed bjr a ohange in the quantity of mn@y in eireulation* 
Dieoassing the effects of a rise or fall in the rate of interest 
he said the *n3rake8 and atiaulants alike have a double action* 
Qa the one hid® they asjt direatly m the cjuantity of bank credit 
that ijs for&hsoising in the given o<mditi^s of desiand on the 
part of the Industrial eoasminity* C^  the other side they modillir 
the c o i t i o n s of deiaand**,®^  Then again continued that i f there 
is a large addition to the%ormal streas of floating oapital" vhioh 
the buaineeamen oan seaure oonaequent of a reduction in bank rate 
<»th® larger proportionately will be the addition made to the 25 
demand for labour and eo to the eim of industrial aotigity*** 
Professor v'^ aeaelf the another iwportant writer of the time in 
the sarae way oaintained that theprioe level ie affeoted by the 
aanipulationa in the rate of interest beoause it regulatee the 
supply of the means of payadnts. In his theory of Sooiel 
Economy he aptly pointed out that a fall in the rate of interest 
would go to raise the priee level in so far as it is assoeiated 
with the supply of **newly created bank »edia of payoent**. To 
use his esQtressiont " i f the banks tbus suoeeed in getting new 
bank wedia of payment into oiroulation»and i f on that account 
the quantity of media of payment increases in a lar ger portion 
2K PigoU|A*C* Industrial SluotuationS| London|1927t P*3M< 
Ibid* I p* 2$*i 
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thfm tbo pTOdnetlon and exohango of oemnodltiest th« 
of prioes Ig bound to rls®"* a« expressod ©xactly the 
flane Timm a litcXe indireota^r tn his another iiaportant vork 
when be eays *'ttie sttpiil/ of means of papsent, and thei>elb£>«| 
also the purohasing power of the tmlt of aone/i le regulated 
essentially the hank rate«?^ 
The second and more l«portant view conoenti*ated on the 
*prioe aspeot* ae distinet frosi the '^aantitatlire aepeet of the 
disoount rate policy* Here the slgnifioanoe of m ohanfe in the 
rate of interest is treated from the point of irlcv of its effeots 
on the cost of produotion« It was aaintained that a reduotlcm 
in the ooet of boiroiring is a eruoial aspect M far as marginal 
investors are conoerned. This approach seems to have descended 
froa thd V^ck8ell«8 thought on the subject* Wicksell was the 
first writer who suggested that the rate of interest operates 
on the price level through its effects on the rate of investaent* 
Bere he assuaed that the rate of investment is capaHe of being 
influcned even hy small variations in the r^ t^e of interest* Thus 
when the rate of interest fhlls, i t encourages investment 
relatively to savings thereby causing a rise of prices* the 
analysis, in short, is that when the cost of borrowing is lower, 
capital values become high in relation to the reproduction costs* 
This generates expectations of higher profits and gives «& 
.incentive to expand production and investment* And the increased 
investment in turn would send up incomes and prices and so m* 
26* Theory of Social Sconomy, p* W * 
27* RmdameSntal Thoughts in Econooiios, p* 128* 
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i^ eooi^ ing to vriQlii«ll, tbe above proocsa of rising 
Investaent and prleoa oontinues so long as the ratd' 
rdaalns liQXoif th« <nattti!*al of tntsfoit* the whoXa 
anaXjrsia r#3t9d on tsle assmaptlon of the full esaployaimt of 
oooiionlo of the oomtsamity* Because i f thei«<Q i t 
already fmi aispXoyta^ nt in tho econosisr the inoirease i» induatrial 
aotivity ifouid result in Inoreaa^ Qomp<ltitioi} f^r Xabottr md 
aatariiXSf vith eonsaquant Inoreaaes of wagas, ineoaafj and 
prieiJSn The vhoXe arguiaent is oXaarXy illustratad in his 
foXloving long passage a first approxiaatlont ve are 
entitled to asstaie that all prodaotiois foraea are aXready fUlXy 
eai>Xoyed, so that the increased monetary demand principalXy 
talms the foro of rivaXry hetveen eispXoyers for labour, raw 
«a teriaXs and natural facilities sto,, whioh oonsequentXy 
Xeads to an increase in their i^rioes and indireotly oving 
to the inoreased Qoney income of Xabottr and landlords and the 
increased demand for Qoa»odities, to a rise in the prices of 
all cons caption goods in addition to that vrhich arites frosi 
diainiahed savin i s " ? 
Those who populariwid the above view of the rate of 
inteT«>it reXied in varying degrees m WiokseXl*0 Iddaa. Keynes 
fbr Instanoei in his Xarge two voXumes of A Treatise on Money, 
repeatedXy referring WiokseXX discussed at length that the hank* 
rate reguXates the price leveX by affecting the reXattonshlp 
28* WickseXXf Kant, Lectures on FoXiticaX KeonoaytVbX.il, 
Pt 
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betveen jUivostaent and savings. He slioved that business 
fittctuations nroso beoaus^ tb9 volume of Investmont has soaehow 
X08t its oorrect rslatlonsblp vlth tho volume of savi»ss- an 
0X&99B of Invssttssnt over savings oauslng a rise of prices md 
vloe versa. In saeh a situation the rate of Interest he 
beXlevedi vorks as an atitomatio stabiliser; it restores the 
balanoe beti^en the voluiae of savings and His 
vlevs on the subjeet oannot be explained mre clearly than in 
his following passage J "Itolloving Wloksell it will be eonvenient 
to call the rate of interest which vouB cause the seoond tern 
of ow seoond Fi^ idasidntal Equation to be aero the natural rate 
of interestt and the rate which actually prevails the marlcet 
rate of interest* fhus the natural rate of interest is the rate 
at whieh the savings and the Value of investment are exaotly 
balaneedf io that the price level of output as a vhole ( 
exactly corresponds to the aoney rate of the efficiency etmings 
of the Factors of Production. ®vcry departure of the market 
rate f^ oat the natural rate tendSy on the other hand, to set up 
« disturbance of the price level by causing the second tens of 
the second Fundamental Equation to depart froa »ero"#^® 
Thus, although the Bank-rate does not appear as an 
explicit factor in his Bindaoental l&juatlons, it is hoirevert 
treated by hi« as an important factor in relation to its 
30. Keynes* Op.oit., f e l . I, pp. 
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on piiatsi it d«t«ffslne« the pride lo^el tturou^ its 
iiiflti^no on ony of th« ooaipoReQts of Wmdamnt&l Bqttattonat 
put in BboT%t tb& anaXyiSis ie wlion th^ rate of Interest 
capital viXues b9como htigtiy liiireatmdiit in fixed oapitnX becomes 
mm attraotive resuXting in an upward mmemnt of ioeoiae md 
pTtms* At the asm time the falX in savings oonse^mt of the 
deoXine in the rate of interest ncuXd mmn m increase in the 
fXow of iiiooaie directed towaj?d8 the pwehase of goods and 
oosmodities caueing a lUrther rise of prices* It i^ thie daubXe 
cirouXar fXow vhioh Kteynea described as tbe 'prlaary^ and • 
setiondnry* effects of a ehange in tbe rate of intereit on the 
price Xev»X# 
Hawtrey Xik» Keynesy aXso iXXwetrated the efl^ots of a 
ohange in the rate of intereet on price XeveX through its 
influence on the rate of investiaent* Oosparing his petition 
with Keynea he oXearXy said, "it viXX be seen that my difference 
froa Mr. aa to the infXuence of Bank rate on inveetaent 
if not very vide. He does not dispute that there 1« aoae 
efftct upon the hoXdi-g of stoo&s of goods* I do not dispute that 
there is some effect upon the holding of securitiesy and through 
it upon the Xong-tews rate of Interest» the amount of new 
issues and the avount of capitaX outXay* X attach iaportance to 
the earXy response of the hoXders of stocks of g o o d s . f h u s 
in bis anaXysis of the effects of rate of interest he pXaoed 
31 • The Art of Central Bmking, pi 383# 
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vlioXe emphasis on one particular kind of investment naiaeXyi 
investoont hy dealers and middle men in liquid goods* 
rested on his assumption about the greater sensitiveness of 
inventories to theshort-term rate of interest* He believed that 
a small change in the rate of interest may not muoh affeet the 
cost of manufaotutert but it will materially affeot the traders t 
'^ the amount of a dealer* s stock*in^trade is elastic and 
variable* He is very ready to hold either more or less 
according to the state of maz^ets and of credit. Lot market! 
be favourable, and he id.ll seek to hold more) let credit 
become dearert and he will seek to hold less"*'' 
Thus he argues that a decline in the .short<*term rate 
of interest would go to encourage the dealers^in-stocka to 
borrow more money which would mean additional orddrs to the 
mnnufacturer and the industrial activity would inerease. This 
as we have discussed in Chapter though a complex process 
of rising productiony employment and income would bring a 
revival of prices and economic activity* 
32* Trade and Credit, p» 126* 
See also his currency and Credit, pp* for detailed 
•naiysis* 
^ 111 -
OT mm^ GBsmrmst 
fhtts it vas in this way that oheap ooney pallcy worked 
in their seheme in a depressionw context. The oonelusion 
from this rough s^eteh is that normally it was possible to 
start a revival of business and priees by a deliberate policy 
of relaseation in the volume and teras of or^dit* But» i t was 
feared that in conditions of aeute slump with general desand 
weak and faotors of production only partially enployed ehanges 
in the volume and terms of credit may in itself be not much 
helpful to encourage business activity. 0ndef such a situation 
they reooiamended to supplenent the credit policy by purchases 
of securities by the Central Bank in the open aarket* ThiSf 
it was believedi would directly placd the funds in the hands of 
the sellers of securities a larger portion of whichCaddltiotfal 
incoae) would mean additional expenditure ultimately resulting 
in an increased in priees and producticm* Thus discussing the 
effects of a change in the volume and teras of credit what he 
calls "the normal and orthodox methods** l^ynes aaid, **if these 
measures are spplied iit the right degree and at the right 
timet X doubt whether it would often be necessary to go 
beyond thern..**^^ But he added that when the country is faced 
33« A Treatise on Honey, Vdl. II, p^  369^  
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with an acute dAprosalon tbe above meatures must be supported 
lay the purehase of the securities by banlcing iystems reoedy in 
the eirent of the obstinate persisteitoe of a slump would oonsistf 
therefore, in the purehaee of aeouritSes by the Central Bank 
until the long-term raarket rote of interest has been brought 
dovn to the limiting point 
Kavtrey, siailarlyi aptly pointed out that **the effeeta 
of a low bank-rate oan be re-inforoed by purchases of 
securities on the part of the central bank in the open market*** 
In Qonmon with Keynes he also laaintained that this measure was 
of great significance in times of acute sluo .^ when in his 
words ** a low bank*rate by itself might be fbund to be an 
insufficient restoratiim",^^ His analysis in brief was that 
i f the central banks persist in buying nore and more securities 
they will pass beyond the point at which the credit created can 
be offset by the repayment of advancest and they can thus ensure 
that an expansion is taking place*, fhe increased supply of 
money would definitely finds its way in the market for goods 
and commodities because he belie^red that '*there must ultimately 
be a limit to the amount of money that the sellers will hold 
idle, and it follows that by this process the Ticious circle 
of deflation can always be broken, however great the stagnation 
of business and the reluctance of borrowers may be",^^ 
Ibid., p. 371. 
35* Hawtre , H*0» Trade and Credit, p.113« 
36. The Art of Centx l^ Banking, p. 17V. 
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this is vhat the Theorists had to eay in the aatter* 
Let U8 now see what our monetarar authorities aotually did 
to meat that situation* But before ooming to that it is 
necessary to throw soae light on the monetary development 
in Great Britain which in fact largely determined the 
currency and credit policies in this country during that 
period* 
The story of the British monetary policy followed 
in the Depression begins with the currency and exohattge 
taanagetaent in the proceeding years* As a reference was 
sade in chapter 1 since the tiae Britain returned to the 
gold standard in 1925t the main objective of her monetary 
policy remained to maintain the desired parity between the 
pound sterling and gold* Now, as at that moment sterling 
was about below its pre«war parity the attempt to raise 
its value to the prescribed level necessitated a downward 
adjustment of her internal price level* For this purpose 
the British authorities had recourse to deliberate and 
active deflation as a result of which their wholesale price 
Index fel l froa 160 la 1925 to 13^ in 1928* The deflationary 
laeasuref vere speolally intensified after the heavy gold 
drains took place in 1927. Since then the rate of 
Interest remalaed at a high level ranglog between H and 6% 
until the end of the flret qaarter of 
there v^s a general oonaenstie of opinion atnong 
the economists and expexts on the euhjeot that the pouhd* 
sterling vas at too high a parity and was being atabiliaed 
taider oondltlona which required % substantial adjustment 
in various economic indices* Keyiie®t ^cr instanoet in his 
two important works, "^says in Pursuatlon'* and Traoe on 
rnmtmry Befoxm • discussed the subject at length and after 
a detailed analysis conoluded, "Since I regard the 
stability of pricesi credit and employaent as of paraatount 
iaportance, and since 1 feel no confidence that an old 
fashioned gold standard will even give us the oedlcuni of 
stability that It used to glv«| I reject the policy of 
restoring the gold standard on pre-war lines,w^® Elaborating 
i^n the sane point at another place he said, " i f Mr*Churchill 
had restored gold by fixing the parity lower than the pre-war 
figure, or i f he had waited until our monetary values adjusted 
37* 3ee for details, Arthur Lewis, '*Boonoaic Survey 1919-39, 
(London, 19**9)i P* 
36. Keynes, J.M* H Tract on Monetary Befora (Mactaillsn & 
Oo* Ud«, London, 1932), p« 176* 
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to the px«-wai> parlty t^ than these particular arguments would 
have no force. But In doing what he did in the aetuai 
eiroumstanoes of Xast spring, he was Just asking for trouble* 
Jtor he was coaniltting himself to fore© down aoney wag«8 and 
all money iraloea id-t^ iout any idea how it was to he done**-" 
fhent againt eiren the advocates of the gold standard euoh 
at Bawtreyi did not favour tfhe restoration of gold standard 
irrespective of "whether the difficulties in regard to the 
future purohasing power of gold have heen provided against or 
not", md suggested that "the wisest course for the time being 
might be to coneentritte m the stabilisation of sterling in 
teims of QO3!!30dities rather than t&e the poimd to a aetal, the 
vsgaries of which cannot be forseen.** 
this is , thus, how the British monetary experts 
advised in the matter. The British authorities however, 
did not pay any attention to that and remained adhered 
to their objective of stabilising the pound sterling at the 
statutory rate* How, even when the Depression came to that 
country the attitude of the monetary authorities s t i l l 
remained unchanged and deflationary measures uere persisted 
with despite the changed economic conditions* The banlE*rate 
that was raised in 19^ 7 co tinued to go high until the spring 
of 1930 %rhen it came down to Bven this reduction in the 
39* ^ ^ ^ ^ PiCrsuatlon, mcmillan & Co*, Ltd., London, 
Hsproduced from Tract on Monetary Heform* p* 17^ -* 
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(sontjr rat«a was not the result of any deliberate policjr 
Imt in the fs&in was the outcome of the return How of goM 
to Br;LtaiD and a recovery in the eeourity prices. Indeed 
during those months tsoney rates were generally easy in laost 
of the finaneial centresfibwevery later on as the 
finanoial situation worsened the Bank of England Bate again 
rose to towards the middle of 1931 and sal>se<iuently wae 
raised to a high level of in tho last quarter of that 
year* 
the same was the position of the supply of credit 
in circulation. As the British Oovernnient laid a great 
stress m the eleaent of confidence in their currency and 
finance the structure of the assets and liabilities of the 
banlcing Bystm was so regulated as not to permit an increase 
in the credit creation* to this end the British banking 
institutions all the time made an effort to bring an adjustment 
of their liabilities under acceptance credits to their 
diminished resources thereby reducing the <|uantity of their 
outstanding credit* Z t^ us take for exanplei the case of the 
nerchants banks or acceptance houses * the aost exposed section 
of the British banking systea, These institutions were 
greatly affected by the withdrawals of foreign deposits 
which took place in 1951* this deaand far foreign isoney 
from these banks was for the larger part financed f^od the 
liquid assets and by a realisation of securities* The holding 
M* World Eoononic Survey,193t->32| p* 70* 
See, for details, The Statist,May21,l932tP*0O^. 
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of British Government Securities vltb the ten instltutione 
In question dtollned oyer the year 1931 hy oillicau or 
whioh in tam reauXte<l in a deoline in the issue of 
bank oredlt*^^ Oonaidering the period as a whole betiieen 
Septetahar 1929 and Septesiber 1951 it vilX be noted that deposits 
rose £166 millions* But inspite of this increase in 
deposits there was a taarked oontraotion in bank credit to 
industry and trftde* this is reflected in the drop of £236 
million or in loans and advances* fUri»her money at call 
and short notice droped by £62 millions* On the other hand 
bank*s own investment increased by £307 millions and their 
bi l l portfolio by i£131 million* It would appear, however, 
thtst the bulk of the aggregate increase of J^ 38 milliois 
consisted of Qovemment stocks and treasury bills ao i^ulred by 
u. 
the banks with a view to strengthen their liquidity*^ fhls 
was in keeping with their objective of the maintenance 
of the gold standard* 
On 21 st September 19311 Oreat Britain went off the 
gold standard which gave some relief to the business and 
industxy* It shot^ however, be clearly pointed out that 
the suspension of the gold standard was not the result of 
a deliberate policy to bring recovery but was forced on 
Britain by the sudden withdrawal of foreign fUnds and a 
general loss of confidence in the British financial position* 
lt-3# Statist, May 21, 1932, p* 803* 
Ml-* Commercial Banks, 1925-33t p* 208* ^c jZ^ ^ 
• 118 -
Affe«r th» Credit anstal failure lo Austfla, Or«at Britain 
was haavlly Involved In the orlsls and eoDsequentl/ for^gn 
ootintrles )»egan to draw heavllj on the t^ ondon balances* 
According to an off ic ial estimate vlthdrawals of th»se fundi 
reached a figure of fi200f000|000 by September 1931 and tbe 
Bank and the treastiry eredlta were badly exhausted. It vmi 
under these oiroumatanceg that the Banfe of England received 
authority to suspend gold payaenta. The Bank rate ms 
laaedlately raised to 6% to check the flow of Itods from 
l^gland* 
The depreciation of sterllng<following the suspension 
of the gold standard) In so far as It corrected the previous 
over-valuation no doubt came with some expansionary effect 
<m British trade and Industry* ffowt as the cash resources 
and general liquidity posit on of the banks laproved their 
deposits also shoved a corresponding Increase* By slow 
stages the Bank - rate cane down frois 6 to and the 
deposits of the ten Important clearing banks by December 191^ 
had Increased by £32U vlUion l*e» by about 20j{ durlsg the 
liA 
year* Similarly the Index of discounts also registered 
an Ittproveiie t of about 66^ over the figures of the previous 
years* ' 
U6* Vitorld Bconoalc Survey 1933-3S PP» A 277* 
k7m Econoolo Journal, Vol* XI*VI> 193^ 1 li^ ondont P* 
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Ho doubt the deproolatlon of at^rXing in terns 
of old hrou^t some relief to trade and prioes as it pat 
Great Britain in an adimntateotts position over the countriei 
that were st i l l on gold atandard in the foreign markets* 
But a cloae study of the nioiresieiits of sterling prioea aad 
economics activity after the suspension of gold standard gives 
us an impression that the suspension of the gold standard 
had not the effedt upon the British econogy that might have 
heen expeeted** From the analysis of the last chapter ve shall 
recall that immediately after the abandonment of the g<^ d 
standard the sterling prioes no doubt rose from 100 on 
I8th September to 107 on the 30th of that month but thereafter 
it remained relatively stable until Maroh I932 wl^ n a 
decline again set in» bringing it to a figure of 98 in ;rune 
193s even b^ov the September level* The same vas the ease 
idth production and trade. According to the estimates of the 
lieague of Hat^ons, instead of shoving any improvement the 
national indices of industrial produotlon in Oreat Britain 
fel l from 89 in 1931 to 88 in 1932#^ The value of exports 
as ve have already discussed also shoved a very slov and 
halting recovery. 
Theoretically the depression of currency vould have 
brought about an inflationary effect on internal 
prices or at least got rid of the deflationary 
strain. 
H8,liforld Economic survey 1932-33• 
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fti0 main reaaon i#hy the Bpitl»h trade and Industyy 
oould not get the full benefit of the abondonenent of gold 
standard wag that while the British Govematent agx^ aed to the 
objeetive of the depreolatlon of ewrrenoy ;md ralalng of 
%rhole8ale iirioea thejr did not carry this polioy to ita 
logieal «Qd. At the Ofetawa Gonf@renoe of 1932 the 
represent at iTes of the Brifciah Empire declared that "a rise 
throughout the world in the general l ewl of wholes'Cte prices 
was in the highest degrae desirable and stated that they are 
anxious to co-operate with other nations in any practical 
seasure tor raising wholesale prices." But actually they 
did l i tt le to that end* Hot only this» they did not even allow 
the natural tendencies to work* As pointed out above 
immediately after the suspension of gold standainl the Sank 
of ]^gland raised the bank rate from Hi^  to 6% which remained 
at that level t i l l i^ bruaary 1932t fhe other money rates also 
stood high in sympathy of the higher Bank«rate* Thus at 
the beginning of 1932 Bank rate stood at the trer^sury 
bil l rtite and the yield on the long - dated Oovern'oent 
securities was It was not until in February 1932 that 
the B8nk*rate was slightly lowered by to ThuSf to 
put in the words of an eainent British writer, "the hlf^ bank 
rate was anintained unnecessary long, so that British industry 
and trade could take but l ittla advantage of the otherwise 
See for details the Statist.^^y 21,1932, p* 803-01'The 
ficononlc Journal, Vol.XLVI, 1936, Iiondon, p. 28^. 
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farourable situation which hod resulted from going off 
Because, the alddle of Febniiap/ 1912 whea the hanl^ -
rate was redueedi the -vlelous oircXe of deflatiofi had onoe 
again Joined, and it %raa as impossible as it had been a year 
before to indue® traders to eitbend their borroiiings bjr cheap 
aoney alorm***^ 
fhe Bam impression is conveyed when we tako the other 
taonetasy 8tatistioa« For instance, after the suspenaloi] 
of fcho gold standard there was a further sharp fall in the 
volume of aooeptancee outstanding, the total of hoadon 
clearing banks falling by £29 lailllons or 20 between Sejiteraber 
1931 and December 193^ * ^om and adtrancea, similarly« 
even more sharply than previously ' t h e total decline between 
the months taenti ned above amounting to £137 million as 
coiapared with £7? railXion in the previous years.^^ That this 
curtajlment of credit supply was the result of a deliberate 
policy of the British authorities is clear froa the fact that 
while the Sank of !i:ngland*8 holdings of Oovemment securities 
rose froa £35 million at the beginning of February 1932, to 
£67 million at the end of June, bankers* deposits increased 
frcHB £70.07 to 83.9 ailllon only.^^ Thus the British 
50. Hawtrty,ll.G. *The Gold Standard in Theory and Practice*, 
Ltjndon, 1933, p. 185. 
51. Cosaerclal Banks, 1925«33f lie^ gue of Nations, p« 209« 
52. Ibid., p. 209. 
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authorities »ven after the suspension of the gold standard 
did not aUow their reserves to serve freely as a hase for 
additional creation of eredit#^^ 
Aa examination of th© stn}<$ture of irarlous assets 
(against deposits) of the British inking system for the 
entire porlod September I929 to September 1933 also points 
to the same faet« It vooXd be noted frooi the foXIoving 
statement that there was a aarked contraction in the Bank's 
credit to eoaoence and industry • the (pantum of loans and 
advances felX froa 55 to fur&her money at call and short 
Percentage of <^rious flssaiis assets to total deposits 
September 1929 September 1931 
I.CUdl in band and 
with Bank of 
IQa gland. 10.9 11.00 
2. Balances %rith other 
banks. 2.7 2.00 
3.Money at call etc. 8.6 h.7 
if. Bills Portfolio 12.5 18.1 
5«Investaents 29,0 
ipmn 39, 
0ouroe} League of Nat Ions; Contoercial Batiks 
1925.33, p. 208. 
53* The following renax^ c of f4r»Chamberlain• the then Chancellor 
of British laccheqiier is worth quoting:"Cheap aoney,however, 
could not suffice unless the credit made available was 
actively efflployed,and this in turn depended on the 
establishment of a sense of security and confidence in the 
public". (Journal of Monetary and Econonic Conferencet 
^ e 15, 1933, P^ 
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notioe etc, dropftd froa 8.6 to h.7% In 1933* Oo tbe othsr 
hand the combined ratio of their own Investments and bills 
portfolio to tbe total deposits rose trm 27% to h?^ 
during the game periods this la a tendency closely parallel 
to that existing In the London aoney Sarket prior to the 
suspension of the gold standard* 
THIS IHDIAH MOKEgAHr FOLICY 
a in 
In conroon with Ore at Brltaini the Indian aonotary 
polley(fallowed in the Depression years) also oannot be 
studied and analysed aside of our foreign exchange policy 
adopted in the prece^ding years* As pointed out in CSbapter I« 
the aiovement of exchange stabilisation in this country vas 
tota.ly dictated by the developments in the field of currency 
and finance in Oreat Britain. Since the fate of the Rupee 
vas linked with the over-valued sterling the monetary policy 
of India hcnce forward was designed to subserve the 
requlremenisi^of exchange stablllt^r the n t e of exchange wts 
• Uh -
aadft thfi nora and evavy thing olsd \tm to adjustud to keep 
that ratio intact. As m shall disouse in details* at the 
rate of la gold, tha rupae waa given an external vaittt 
in exoaaa of ita intexnal value and the maintenanoo of 
exohange at that laval involved the introdttotion of 
deflationary oeasuras to foroe doim the prloe level in 
sympathy with the falling prioes in dreat Britain* Thus 
the Government of India adppted a deliberate policy of 
credit restriction vith the result that frosi an average of 176 
for 1@ iBontha ending in June t92Mwhile Btiipee iraa worth ahotxt 
gold) our price level f e l l of to in I928 and 
farther to 1M in the following year*^ Thu» the price level 
had started to decline in this country l<»]g before the cmaetf 
of the Impression* And iihen the depression came in 19^ 9 its 
effects were superitnposed on the falling trend of prices and 
econoaic activity* to use the expression of an eminent 
Indian econonist there vas **a general feeling thi^ t the 
Ck>vem<8ont of India soired the wind before the depressicm 
begany and the count ly had been reaping the whirlwind since 
then.'*^^ tot us exaaine this question in soiie aore details* 
i 
the arguaent %rhich the Oovernaent of India put 
forwai^ in support of 1^.6d ratio was that "at this rate, 
the prices in U.K., America and India had converged to the 
See, Reports of the Controller of Oirrency for various 
years* 
55* Dr* Gangauly,B»H. Iftiither aupee(.5.Chand ^ Oo«,Delhi, 1919)> 
p* 81. 
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saM level « al a figure of t60* tt votild noted that 
ttil9 ma not a aaffielent grotiQd for ehoostng t^at rate of 
exeliaii^* Qeoattse* Ki tlie first plaoe^ tbe ooavargenee of 
Indian prices vith that of Bfitein and ll«3*A« m& not m 
natural ad^ uatment Init one that had haan brought about in 
an artifioial my by *>tbe of f ic ial ^iniatratlcm of eurraniiy* 
^It is olea^ that i f the ratio ia ftrtifieiallf raiaed ahoire 
ita natural lofel to an^ esitentt and leapt pegged at the nay 
level hy manipulation, t)se intefnal prioe atrudture is hound 
to gat itself adjusted to the nev ratio eoaner or lat^r* 
Baoause thora ia alwaiya a negative oorvelation be|i#aen 
exehange sanipulation and the price level* This is iiliat 
aetuaUy happened in the present oase* As the than Federation 
of Indian (^ lanhers of Cowree and Industry rightly put 
"since its stabilisation in Haroh 19^ 7 exchange has baan 
able to see just a fev vonths of seourit/f particularly 
during 1928* for the mat part of the rate has been 
persistently belov the ts 6d level and at tines fhe forvard 
rates have been sunk belov the lover gold point* Qovemtitent 
have been supporting it by artificial stringency at the cost 
of trade and induati^ '** '^^  In this connection it should be 
noted that soon after the Hilton Young Bill vms passedf 
contraction of currency took place to the extent of ai.29«26 
Federation of Ihdian Ohaabers of Cowwrce and Xhdusti^ i 
•Indian Ourrency and BSxchange, 19311 P* 3B» 
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«roi^s diiriQg tht year fi^is vas bjr ^ 
further oontracatloti of .^U .^tO ororos in anA 
orores in 1929*30 • the totaX eon traction aiBotxiiting to sueh a 
high itgur® as ©rorea in a period of four yaars*^^ 
then apart f^ oia thia actual, and oonteaplatad conti^otion 
of ourrenoyi the another var in wh'oh a stringenoy in the 
aofiey taarket vaa oreated %ra8 hy preventing the expansion 
of o'urrenoy to the extent noraalljr required aa is ahom by 
tha following figuresf 
AnnuaX Average • Expansion or 
- Contraction of 
currency 
Pre-war • crores and over 
1921-25 4 fe.ll to 12 crores 
1926-29 - Iii.l6 to 17 crores 
Caloulated from the Reports of Controller 
of Cur3^ eney* 
7hus frost the above disoussion it is eXear that the I8d 
ratio was the outcome of the ad^ustmest of our prices and not 
foIXoved by it» fhen, aedondlyg the nere fact that the 
wholesale prioes in the three oaintiries Britain and India 
had converged to the sane leveXClSO) did not deserve the 
57* Reports of the ControXXer of CurrenoyCGovet^ uent of 
Ihdia) for the yearn 1926*27 to 1929-30. 
• n? -
iaportaneft vhieh w.it attaoh«d to it* lifhlle aoeepting it 
as a baais for exohsaga atabiXisaticsn our laonatafy 
auttioriil«s did not conaidar tlia diirargant djmanies of tha 
prioa etOTaiieata <• ttie rata at wbioh pricaa wara rising 
or falling in ttioaa ooontriea* In fact tlia ^Xton foung 
Ck»aaia8ion thamaalvaa ada2ttad(para 186) that t^pom Oetobar 
192h to S^ptaoibar ifZ^t t^ara vaa a rapid and violent 
downward aovesiant of rapaa prioa laral vhioh vas not the 
raZlax of any aiailar aovamant in iiorld prices*^® for 
instanoaf tatciigg tha period from ^uljr 1922 to Fabniary 
1926| nhila tha voxldCgold) prioa indax remained intaot 
at the Calmitta prioa X&mX showed a deolina from 16t 
to 158* the auhseqaent tendanoy of the otovesients of prioea 
also reveals the same faot* Between end 19^ 9§ the 
British Board of frada index registered a fall of over 
and Caleatta index aiailarly shoved a fall of oter IdjS* 
Suit the positIcms was different in othar countries. In U.S.A. 
fbr axanple, the index of the of Trade fel l only by 
while the index nunher of wholesale prioea both in Oeraany 
and Franoe remained staady during those years*^^ 2t was thus 
a wrong assumption that the Indian Prioa level was brought 
in harmoney with the prioes of other oountriasi the ad;}ustfBants 
had st i l l to co«e« 
58* Reproduoed froa *The Indian llonetary Polioy*, by B»P« 
Adarl^ri AUahabadt1939fP. 
59* Oangualyi B.H* op«eit*, p« 90. 
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then again, an la^OTtant point vhieh wa« missed 
our authorities was that a ooaparison of Indian prica Xatrel 
with aorta in othor countries al»ne was not a onmoiont ground 
for ohoosing a certain rat« of exchange* Because as BaherXer 
right!/ pointed outf *'the iseasurefflent of purchasing power" 
parity based on comparison of price levels or of changes 
In prloes lewis In tvo countrlea offered only a very rough 
and unreliahle criteritaj of over-valuation or undervaluation 
of a country's currency**^ Oassel 8tfflilarly» elaborating 
upon the same clearly said, "stabilisation of exchange 
should always take account of the l@vel of wages ^d cost of 
living as well as the level of wholesale prices and should 
try to find for the currency a value to which al l these 
levels can be adjusted with the least possible disturbance, 
There was howevert litnle or no reference to these considera-
tions in the arguments or decisions of our sonetary 
authorities* 
the above point would be clearly illustrated i f m 
exanine the comparative position of our wlwlesale prices 
and the cost of living indices^ Taking the period between 
192^^ and 1926-27 as the following chart shows while 
the wholesale price level registered a heav7 fall of points 
60, See his Prosperity and Depression, p« 
61* Postwar Monetary Stabilisation, 1928,p*13' 
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or th» cost of living iniiex remained intasti stsoving 
an inslgnifioant d«elin6 of 2 point» I.e. 1.3^ 
mufiVB um^m OF moiMAm FRIGES 
MT mmmmmm. 
(base 191^ « 100) 
m^-^k m M k B S H Z 
(^bS^ 161 15»f 157 155 
Source I The Indian Journal of Statist ioi 1937«> i^ 
p. 179. 
Thue the ebove survey of the events of ourreney 
stebiXieetion during the tvsnties elearly shova that our 
ttonetary authorities etieapted to stsibillse the ourrenay with-
out *aaking sure that the eoonomio baekground was rl||ht*» 
Consequently the rate of exchange ms prevented to find its 
natural level vhidh Involved a deflationary interference with 
our ourrenoy and oredit conditions causing a persistence flail 
of vholesale prices* All these consequences would have naturally 
intensified the offsets of the Deprsssion which follovod on our 
econoHlo lifs« 
62. Ooaaentinir on the disparity between costs and prices an 
Indian econoaiiet siadj" our quest for a nooial rate of 
exchange nust be futile until prices have adjusted theaselves 
sufficiently to the costs both at hoae and aborad^and thsre 
* vConti*• 
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faking the entl?® period of the Depressl 
th« Indian Honetary palloy, like that of Greot Britain, 
aarkdd two distinct phasea of its op^r^tion —(i ) the monetary 
aeaaures adopted during the years 1929 to September 1931(when 
India was on the OoXd Standard) to maintain the statutory 
rate of exohange« and Cii) new trends in laonetary managenent 
after the suspension of the goXd standard* we shall therefore* 
examine in details the operation of ourrenoy and credit 
polioies during these yearsf before and after the abandonment 
of the gold standard! separately* 
In continuation of the practice and policy of the 
proceeding years, the ourrenoy operation of the Cknremnent of 
India during the depression years were regulated by two main 
considerationst ( i ) to maintain the statutory rate of exchange, 
and ( i i ) to make remittances to the Secretary of States* 
Conti** 
is no pressure on the exchange rate in order to meet 
foreign obligations** 
•Devaluation & Bscovery in India* by J* :*Sinha,Sankhya,1937-38, 
p. 3^ 8* 
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Hov, iiihat happened vas that linco 1925 there had been 
developing a eontlnous atiraln o»ottr sterling re8ouf<ees« 
Zt was further accenttiated by the heav|r fall in our 
export Inoooes and balan^ of trade tn the depreeaioa jresrs* 
The reaction of these fiaotora on our ejcohange rate was 
It vas general!/ veak and the Government faced 
a difficulty in purchaalng sterling to make remittencee 
to the SecretaiT of Statee* Zt was onlr with the contitious 
issue of freasiisy Mils md contraction of currency against 
rupee securities of the Q&vemmmt of India that exchange 
rate was kept high* As the Contri:»ller of Currency hiiaself 
admitted, "the isaue of freaaury Bills enabled the Oovernaent 
not only to maintain the exchange "Talue of the rupee without 
selling gold or sterling hut to purchase a fair amount of 
remittances towards taeeting the requirements of the Secretary 
of States**,^ ^ Thus ftroo the very hdginning of the depression 
Treasury Bills were issued continuously to tighten the 
aoney conditions. While there were no Trensury Bills in 
the hands of public during the preidous three years 1925-28, 
it would be noted fToa the following stateiaent that it aaounted 
to over te.26 crores in September 1929 s«d contlnously rose 
to 1ts*^ *06 crores In Septetnber 1930 and to over crores 
in March 193'}* Thus instead of purchasing the securities in 
the open aarkit to Increise the simply of ooney in circulation 
our aonetary authorities followed a reverse course of action. 
63. Report of the Controller of Curr«ncy, 1930-31. 
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Yj^stji^r msTAmim 
At the end of 
each month 
iferoh 1929 3^ 99 
September 1929 26.70 
Haroh 1930 36*03 
Septeaber 1930 h9*06 
Maroh^  1931 
Source} Bsport of the Controller of Curifetiey 
1930-311 GovsHiaent of Iridla. 
EomreTf Inaplte of all these manIpulttIons, *exchange* 
continued to remain mek at Is 5 13/16(1. ^ throughout the 
first quarter of 1930. in all the Oovemiaent vas able to 
purchase sterling to the tune of £1^ 215 thousands and e 
further amount of £1182? was trsimferred to the freafuxy 
balances of the SeereHar^  of States in London against an 
equivalent contraotlon of currency in India. Thus, during 
the single financial year 1929-30t the total eontraotlon 
of ourr noy in the abore process| aaiounted to an high 
figure of orores, as against a net «pan»lon of 
II.1.90 crores In the preoeeding year. 
Ibld», p, 13. 
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1930-31' 
Ag^, during tho y@ar 1910«31 also* the exoiiang« position 
had been difficult not withstanding tbat '^ treasury bills Wttre 
sold finely throughout this poriod trnd contraction of currency 
to the extent of l»#2o croron were laade against rupee 
aeoursties,"* fhe highest rate during this year touched In 
i^ ugust and Septeaber was Is 5 25/32d» and the lowest 
in the following nonths* By the middle of November the 
% 
position had becosie st i l l worse imd the exchange remained 
coaatantly weaii t i l l the end of that year. The GovemiBent 
again eacperienoed a great difficulty In purchasing sterling. 
Tbu9 during that year only a l i t t le over £53 lakhs sterling 
could be purchased In the market in India, and alaost an 
equivalent amount had to be sold. How, the Seoreiary of 
States requlreaents had to be met by other means such as 
remittances through paper currency reserves and borrowing 
in tmdon. There were raised three sterling loans during 
the year amounting to £31 millions. In addition to thiSf 
tempiraxy advances were also taken from the London branch of 
the Imperial Bank of 3j;)dia to the extent of £6 milliont. The 
entire holdings of the paper currency reserves In England . 
amounting to £2U81 thousands and sterling securities held In the 
gold standard aeserves in Jtegland for thousands were 
Controller of Currency's report 193031* 
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trwiefeyred to Boa® Treasury against eorreepondlng 
contraction of rapeea In India* The whole poaition for 
various aiontbs may be Judged frcxa the following figuresi 
Qov^mnim ow PAmn mimmt HSs:SRTrs3 
Cln crores of i^ees) 
fietalllo Bes^rves Seourltlee Internal 
'bin of 
Gross Silver Gold Silver-nterllng Es ^ c - exohsnge 
olreulatloB coins In Bull^ Bull- aeeurltles eurl-
Indlla« Ion* ion* In i^glend ties 
In 
March, 19?-9 188.0 i0.06 »f3.2 2.0 
Sopte.1929 186.08 108.0 39^ 1 X 
I3ee. 1929 103^ 7 32.2 h,2 1.8 37.3 X 
March 1930 177,2 108.1 32.2 2.3 0.1 33.8 X 
Sept. 1930 171.^ 115.9 32.2 5.6 1.8 X 
Dec., 1930 161.3 11»f.6 31*7 - 9.6 X 
March 1931 160.8 117.8 25.8 6 . 9 • 10.1 X 
Source* Controller of Currency*« reports 
The aboTe atatement of the position of Paper currency 
Beeerves clearly shows that the quantuta of sterling securities 
In Ijondon as well as the rupee securities In India which 
provided a considerable backing for the Issue of currency 
contlnously declined during those years. Between March,19^9 
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and t93t volune of rupee seourlties in India feXX doim 
by more tbm while the sterling aemrit^ In England VBpe 
totaXl3^ exhausted* Suoh an heavy loss of resenres oMously 
resulted in a decline in the total note issue, Aoeording 
to the offielal estiQateSfthe total conti*aetion of (Mtrreney 
during thla jreap asouiited to ororee over and above 
the figure of croret for the previouf yeari1929-30• 
1931*32 (From April to September 193t)« 
The first six aonthe of the financial year 1931-32 
sia^ljr repreated the story of the preeeeding two years. 
As earlier J the i^hole efforts of our laonetary authorities 
st i l l eonoeotrated on stablising the exchange ratio althou^ 
the eeononio conditions had turned from bad to vorse* fo 
sunmarlse the developments of those months1 inspite of the 
oontinous efforts to keep it at a high level exchange 
remained weak during that period. After a short reviral 
towards the close of proceeding year exchange opened dull 
in April 1931 and shoved a downward tendency until India 
reaained on the gold standard* The course of the rupee* 
sterling exchange in the various aonths is illustrated by 
the following figurest 
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laMa— 
April 1931 
Jfey 1931 
Jme 19^ 1 
«ruly 1931 
Aiiftist 1931 
Septemfeep»3l 
SBblLS 
1« 5 13/I6d 
1« 5 27/32d 
If 5 25f/32<i 
Is ? 13/I6d 
Is $U 
18 
jmsS. 
1«,5 23/32d 
1».5 25/32d 
1«i5fd 
is.S^id 
Soureet Report of the CoiitiK>13.0r of Cmrreney 
1931-32, Statement IX, p. 
Thus, again ae tile exchange vat veak itistead of being 
able to purchaae sterling the doTsmment had to sell sterling 
to the extent of Hih laillions end that anount vat found hy 
draving on the seooritiea in the reserves along vith the 
amount of £9 aiUlon for neeting the ordinary requireaents of 
London Treasury* Indians balances beld abroad vere therefore 
considerably depleted which reacted on our internal money 
conditions* The loss of these resources can be estimated 
froa the fact that on the 30th iprll|1926, our gold assets 
stood at 81 orores of rupees in the forts of sterling 
securities and 30 orores in the gold bullion* To this vas 
added orores of rupees gold bullion in 1928*29, 1,89 
orores in 1930-31 and about 9 crores in 1931-32 so that the 
• 137 • 
total gold asset0 that vo ougbt to have on ttiat date voald 
have ham wortti 12 *^3 orores of mpees, vher«ad tho gold 
t9§ouTQeB taking th» gold bullion and sterling soouritioa 
together stood oBljr at 58 orore« of mpeea,^^ The loss of 
assets again In tuni oaiised a deollite In the ourrmey supply^ 
the total contraeticwi of oumnoy amounting to a figure of 
OTores dup&ng a short period of six otonths* 
Thtts the above survey of the nonetary situation fQr the 
first tiio years<1929*31 )of the depression elearly shovs that 
our entire currency sperations iiera directed towards the 
sole ohjeotivo of exohange stat»ilisation. It is amply clear 
as repeatedly adaltted by our authorities also» that the 
stringency in theaoney market vas the direct outcome of 
Oovemment action in contracting ourrenoyt or in placing 
strict limita on possibilities of ejipansion* At a glandSi 
the whole situation may be viewed fron the following 
stateaenti 
Annual Average Ki^an8icn(i>) or Contraction^*) of currency 
Pre-Wart 
1921 - 25 • Si»20 orores(and over) 
1928 - 29 CM 1,12 crores 
1929- 30 - fe.32.M crores 
1930 - 31 - li#38,6*f CBores 
1931 - 32<April to Sept*) -8s* 36*00 crores 
Sources Report of Controller of Currency for 
various years* 
Legislative Asseably Debates,?o Umvi, 1931 »Delhi,p. 1063. 
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T,HB QRSDIY PGLtCtt 
It 18 needsfaiT to peint out at tho outset that the 
stud^ of crtdit polloy of India for th© period under rovlev 
in kandieapp»d bj tbe faot tbat suffloient data are not 
available on irarloua aspects of credit manageaient^  the stain 
reasons for this being that In tli© flrat place there was no 
fUXl-fledged Central Bank In those ^arst and seoondljr, the 
organised banking sector that published Its records 
systeaatlfally, aceounted only fbr a smaller part of our 
money oarket. Thusi for this study reliance has to be placed 
<»ily on such statistical records as are airallable for that 
period* 
In Indlay In those years the chief source of credit 
supply lias the Imperial Bank of India «liloh was assisted in 
Its business of credit aanvigeaent by a aeober of joint stock 
banks« It Is true that the credit sup-tiled by the unorganised 
sector of the money market was equally good for practical 
purposes* Nevertheless In the absence of any preclee 
1. formation on Its activitiest this has to be left out In 
the analysis of our credit policy* H^ltalile and more 
comprehensive statistics are only available relating to the 
business of the (Big Five** commercial banks, which constituted 
Bank of IndlSf Central Bank of India, Punjab National Sank, 
Allahabnd Bank and Bank of Baroda* 
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a» InpiHant pai^ of the organised Indian momy A 
studjr of th«ip balanee-sheets and %h&t of the perfor^anoe 
of the Itapuxlal Bank of India aia^ t ttierefor@i give as an 
insight into the oredit situlttion of Xndia^  m idea of 
the outlook of our laonetary authorities towards the then 
prevailing oonditiona« 
On the theoretical lines of the preeeeding seotiontve 
aay analyse our eredit poXiey in respeet with two important 
aspeeta of credit isaanagement • (i}the coat of eredit (the 
rate of interest)f and ( i i ) the avBilahility of credit* 
A - aasDuyim oy RATB OF iKTjsa f^ > 
Jn hamony idth the ourretioy poXioyi the sioveisents 
of the rate of Interest during thoie years also clearly 
refleet a deflationary trend of aonetary policy* The year 
1930 opened with a ^nk rate at and did not go below 
alaost for the whole of the year* During the following 
year it ranged between 7 and t i l l Septeasber 1931 when 
India left the gold standard* The aoveocnts of the other 
•oney r^ ites also followed «ore or lees the aauui pattern 
and remained at a high level* The details of their 
oiOTeaents say be observed frosi the following table* 
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laSs. 
^Qte ay^ ^ other m&i 
6666 
B^k Call isoney lapeirial Bank 
Date percent rstt© peroeit Hundl rate 
Bombay petoent* 
Basar Bill 
percent 
Oaleutta. 
mo, 
January 
April 
July 
October 
m i 
January 
April 
July 
October 
mi 
January 
April 
JWly 
October 
mx 
January 
April 
July 
October 
I 
6 
5 
6 
I 
8 
6 
6 
t 
3i 31 3i 
4 
I 
n t 
I* 
I 
6 
6 
J 
8 
8 
6 
e 
3 
3i 
11 
11 
n 
7-8 
7-8 
7-8 
6-7 
6-7 
6-7 
6-7 
6-7 
Coaplled froa the Reports of the Controller of Currency 
for the years 1929-30 - 1933-3^. 
fbe above table shovs that the Baear hi l l rates« the 
rate at which the indigenous bankers discounted the bill of 
traders roaained specifically very high during the yegrs of the 
der>res8lon» The Jjcuperial Bank of India Eundi rate also stood 
at a high level ranging between 8 to over the entire period. 
B fhoald |J0 noted that theor«tleallyi with a sluitp 
in aoasiodity market md Industrial activity there must he 
foroes on the raoney aarkat tending towards pttlling the 
aoney rates doim« But our authorities did not aXXow it to 
fall to its natural leirel, in their atteiapt to maintain 
the rate of exchange intact. The then Finance iSeaher of 
Jiidia himself clearly admitted the same fact when he saidf 
«with this objectiir©<«tahlli8Stion of exchange) the 
Ooveniment have had to naintain interest rates at a higher 
iQvel than would otherwise have been necessary and have had 
to draw suipltts funds off the market by the issue of 
66 
Treasury Bills at expensive rat©"* ^ Similarly at another 
place, the Controller of Currency remariced that as the 
denond for money was weak the "only support to the aarket 
was affected hy the continuous issue of treasury bills 
at rates which wei^  sufficient to keep the bank«rtte 
67 • effective". ' The Indian writers and JLegislatore Bade 
a lot of protest against the above policy of high money rates. 
66. Budget for 1931-32» para t08. 
67»Report of the Ctontroller of Currency 1930-^ 31 »p.20. 
Cf. Legislative Assenbly Debates 7ol.XI|1931,D«ii,p.t7^ 
Cowaenting on the above policy of the Goveranent of India, 
an Indian Mnber of Legislative Assembly said, "I very 
strongly object to their persuing the policy of 
Contraction of aoney, their raising the rate of interest 
their sale of Beverse Councils Bills and their Mteing 
loans at very high rates of interest in Btagland. All 
these four policies require very serious consideration". 
The Qovemmmt of India hovdv»r| did not pay anjr attention 
to that and simply replied that they %ad no ohoioe in the 
matter i f they are to perform their firat duty as ourrenoy 
authority • the duty of maintaining the atahility of 
i> 63 currenoy*'^  
Thus, the extent to which the money situation durigg 
that period waa go"immed hy the issue of Treasury Bills to 
keep rate of interest at an artifiolaXly high levelf nay 
be gauged from the following positiont Fspoa the 1st Aprilj 
1930 to 1st July of that year three and nine months Treasury 
bills irfere offered to the eaetent of worth U,2 orores weekly* 
The sale of the three oontha* bills was suspended from the 
23rd of July to the 11th of August, but weekly offers 
were resumed with the addition of six months* bil ls from 
12th August, 1930, Again from the 3rd MarcK, 1931, three, 
six and nine months' bil ls were sold to the extent of 
orores in aggregate per week* In the same way during the 
jflrst six months of the year 1931-32, the issue of treasury 
bills by the Covemment eontinued on a considerable •C'lle • 
the total amounting to about fb.20 crores* 
It was the^i^ this huge continuous sale of the Treasury 
bills that the Govern lent kept the demand for money high 
whloh tended to maintain the rate of interest at a higher 
level. The total outstanding of Treasury bills at the end 
68, Budget Beport for 1931-32, para 107. 
of the year t930*31 amounted to orores and rost to 
7^*75 erores by the month of September 1931* This was 
definitely a course of act 1 cm juet reverse to what was 
suggested by the theorists of that period under conditions 
of eoonomlG sluppit "agr remedy in theeveat of the obstlfiate 
pesLstenoe of a slump would eonsisti thereforei in the 
purchase of seourlties by the Central Bank until the long 
term market rate of interest has been brought down to the 
limiting point".^^ 
THE POSgKM OF CHSDIg StIPPLtl 
Coming to the posit/on of credit suppl]^ 
It first 
be remesibered that the o^tral bank of s country can encourage 
the credit expansion by putting the members banks In an easy 
reserve position and vice-versa* In other words the control 
of the quantity of bank*credit is operated through instruments 
affecting the reserves of the bankst since the ability of the 
baliks to mtike loans and advances depends on the strength of I 
the reserves In relation to legal reserves requirements* 
to expend credit| thereforei the banks must either 
have their reserves increased or the reseris ratio should 
be lowered. lfow» It is important to note in this 
69. Hawtrey, R.G,, Op.oit.i p. 371 
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oonneotioR that in Xfidla there vas no fuU.«fle(lgod central 
hank at that tine whose llahiltties could oon0ld0P@d the 
(U/V 
eqfitV'ilQnt of otoney ms-i inortasft in th9 cash reserves of the 
hanks had to cotae only through either the paper ourrenojr and 
tl^ metallic reserves or the investaents in the securities. 
As the investoento of the haUks for the most part consisted 
of gowraaent securifciest the stiffening of money rates during 
that period caused a reluctance on the part of the hanks 
to increase the irolume of their investment in the government 
securities that would have served as the basis of additional 
credit creation. Then, sec-ndly, as the following flgttres 
show, our authorities did not allow their deposit liabilities 
to increase in the voluise of their Investments* faking the 
figures of cash and investments of the loperial Bank of Ihdia 
and the Big Five coaaerolal banks togetheri it would be noted 
that while showed an Increase of about between 1928 
The Balance Sheet of the^ljiperial Bank of India and the 
^om^r^XnAJ^pJ^^t 
.of ..Ml,^ ..IMe Big M^ m Toti^ l 
Total Invest- Total Jhvest- rmmu 
Deposit went. Deposit aent.^ ®®^ l^l^l ^ ^ f ^ 
liab. llab. it l i ib 
1928 79.0 21.8 10.$ 20.0 6.8 127.6 17.*^  
1929 79.0 33.0 1*^ .0 if6.0 17*9 6.2 125.0 50.9 20.2 
1930 84.0 29.3 13.0 50.8 17.9 6.7 13^ f.8 C7.2 19.7 
1931 72.2 30.3 11.0 49.9 18.4 6.1 122.1 U8.7 17.1 
t932 75.V 1 2 . 0 21.0 2 0 . 8 7 . 0 I32.I 52.8.28.0 
1933 ^ . 6 V7.0 18.6 26.6 8.6 138.0 h.O 27.2 
1. Statistical tables relating to Banks in India and Bums, 
Bombay, 19*^ 1 tP» 2. 
2« HuranjattfS.K,Modem Banking in IndlatllZ 
- . 
and 1931f the total deposit XiabiXitlcs Insttad of 
Incroaslng registered a f^ll of fis.5 orores during the soae 
period. agaln» i f we take the entire period of 
depression we again find tfeat while between 1928«-1933 the 
each and Investments increased by about the deposit 
liabilities showed an irisignifieant increase of about Bi only. 
The sane conclusion is reached i f we examine the 
statistief of loans and adranees laade by the Impei*ial Bank 
and the other big five corataercial banks. S r^ instance, it 
may be observed from the following s;;atement that the loans 
and adTancesj both in volume and as percent of deposits 
0 ^ K 8 k ¥J>, ,A ,y A C g S (In orores of &•) 
Ibperial Bank of ahdia The Big Fire 
f^eor Vol.of loans As percent Vol.of loans ^s percent 
and Advances of deposit asd advances of deposit 
1928 61.6 31.9 65.6 
1929 60.6 66 28.9 61.8 
1930 83 25.2 50.0 
1931 M.6 67 22.8 
1932 30.5 5^0 20.7 36.J 
1933 23.0 ko 21.3 37.1 
1. Statistical tables related to Banks 4n India, and ^imsj 
2. M2ran4ani,S....?Hodern Banking in India, XIX ed,TableXV,p«<^37 
showed an heavy decline during the depression years. While 
the loans and advances aade by the Imperial Bank were ireduced 
to a l i tt le over one third of Its 1928 level, that of the Big 
^ ike ^ 
Five also registered an heary deellne of about 355^  In 
ifolume and as peroent of deposits* It is of oourse not 
easy tod^  isake out hov far the decline In thevoluae of loans 
end advances ima due to tlie deliberate restrletion put by 
our taonetary authoritle8| it isayt hovewr, be taken ee a 
symbol of atrlngeney In the laoney market. 
mm 90m m. mm.mmmm 
After Septemberi 1931 # the Ihdlen monetaxr polley vfts 
expected to enter a new phase of cheap and easy money 
conditions, The suspension of gold standard placed our 
aonetai^ euthotities in a posit to follov more active 
and inde:?endent monetary policy than vn^  possible under the 
rules of the gold standard* & i^ umber of other oountrtes^es 
ve shall see, made full use of that opportunity. The 
Indian authorities! however, did not take ti« full advantage 
of the situntion and sti l l shoved a strong inolination to 
preserve the continuity of their economic policiesf followed 
hitherto. 7h« aims of monetary policies as expressed ia 
Finance Bills and other official declarations remained the 
same as before. 
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fbu9y iiBBio<liQtel7 lifter the abandonneiit of gold 
standardi the goremment of Ihdia olearly thftt th« 
first aim of their monetaiy poXicy voald b ^ to ttabilifld the 
pttrehoaing power of the •rupee* so as to preserve confldtnoo 
in the eurreuoy* This oaae oat of their feeling that the 
depreciation of rape© (following the suspension of the gold 
standard) i^uld result in inflation. The then Finance Memhor 
of India, in his budget apeeeh said, *'onc6 a cotuitry'fi mrreney 
is cut a drift from ths moorings of a sta-ble standard such at 
gold| it is particularly necessarly to avoid getting into any 
sort of inflationary position",^® Suoh an emphasis on 
feared rise of prices put a strict liaitaticai on the free 
working of monetary factors emarged out of the situation 
created by the suspension of the gold standard. On the 
oo'strary our authorities adopted further deflationary measures 
to create an artificial stringency in the aoney taarket. thusi 
iataediately after going off gold, they raised the Bank-rate 
froo to which stood at that high level upto the end of 
the first quarter of 1932. Tho other money ra^es also followed 
an upward trend in sympathy, fhe call money rates and 
imperial Bank hundi rates for instancei rose from k ^ to 
and to 8/^  raspectireJy. And by the time the Bank-rate was 
70. Statement of the Financial Posltloni Annexur* to Budget 
for 1932-33» p .n 
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lovei^ to towards the end of 1932, the vlolous ciycle of 
Elation had already had a strong hold of the economy, thus 
what Haiitrey remarked for Gre-st Brltalni "the opportunity had 
been lost, deflation and falling prioes prevailed Inaplte of 
the abandonment of gold, and the pound sterling had become a 
eurrenoy only one degree lesa Intolera hie than gold itself) 9 
wtia equally true In ease of India. 
Similarly^ If ve examine the faots and figures of 
our]?eney operations of the Oovamment of lndla» ve would find 
that Inaplte of the ^vourahle conditions created for the 
expansion of curranoy supply§ by the depreciation of the 
•rupee* the raechanlsm of the currency reserves was so 
regulated as not to allow an Increase in the money supply* 
in this connection it must be noted that aftier the suspension 
of the gold standard a new situation emerged when more 
ste l^lng became available in India than was necessazy for the 
current requirements* In the first five months after going 
off gold) Instead of selling the gofemcient purchased sterling 
froa the market worth M) oiilllon at a rate of ts*t56*l23d« 
Sioilarly, in the following year 1932-33f Government purchased 
in the open market sterling amounting to £35*7 million and 
the next year such purchases increased to £^5 millions*^ 
NoW| i f this excess of sterling purchases over the current 
requirements of the Home Charges would have been transferred to 
71* For a detailed illustration, see Controller of Cttrrsnoy s^ 
Heport of those years* 
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the paper oori?otiey reservesi i t wul<l have resulted In the 
expansion of ourrenqjr supply* But our monetary authorities 
kept it from exeroltlng an expansionary effect by transferring 
the excess sterling bought to the gold standard reserves 
against payoont In gold to th© paper ourrenoy reserves and 
a corresponding amount of the Govemiiient of :fodi& SeourltleSf 
vas extinguished leaving the balahoes of the g o v e r n t h e 
same as before* Thus it would be nested from the folloving 
statement that except for the year t931-32f when the currency 
reserves were no doubt Inerensed through an Initial expansion 
in the go^mient of India seourities and advances to the 
ImperiBl Bank, the composition of oaper currency reserves was 
so nanipula ted as not to penalt an increase in the currency 
issue, Jh the following years, 1932-33 and 1933-3 f^ there vas 
C0MPO3III(» OF PAHIR mmmnoi HBSgRTOIS 
(4- 'Sxpanslon, - Gontrrtction) 
Oovt.of Advances to Sterling India the Itaper- GoM secuMties Total Wloa SecuMt- iia 
ies* Bank, 
Oct. 1929 - Har 1930 -7A - »5.8 -5*8 -8 .2 
Apr. 1930 - Mar.1931 -28A - -3.3 
Aprl1931 - I4ar.1932 4^ 31-6 49,6 -20.6 - 420.6 
Apri1932 -Mar .1933 -19.8 -9.? ^20.7 - -9#6 
Apr.1933 - :!ar.193^ -23.8 - 48,2 -0.1 
Source* neport of the Controller of Currency Ibr I929 -30 , 
to 19-3» .^3?» 
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m addition in gold worth k*20*7 end 15*5 ororts againat « 
oorpospondlng Qcmtraotlon in the Ooyemment of India 
seouritiea worth Es«19«8 and 23»8 crores respaotlfely* Advances 
to the Imperial Sankf tho anotli^ r itais of ourranojr djcpansion 
also ahoira the nme position* 'i^ his elearly points to the 
fact that although we left the gold standard, our monetary 
auttioritiea remained gold lainded for praetioal purpoaea. 
Againt the same impreaslon ia oonveyed i f we examine 
the position of the reserve ratio kept against the note 
issue. the following figures show in detailSf over the 
entire period of the depresaion, the ratio of the reserve! 
W e ,,.,. 
pmmimAaE OF fmAihic RESBHvm HELD 
yiS 
i$etallio Beservea Seourltles Peroent«ge of 
^ear £ 1 W Gold s U w Sterling k secu 
D c^. coins BulliOR Bullion securities -rities Sir i^-r® 
3?itt. in aigland in Jndia^ ®^ ® 
1929 163.8 32.2 ^.3 1.8 37.3 78.2 
t930 31.7 «H> 9.6 9^.0 
1931 115*1 7.3 if* ' 73.1 
1932 97*8 18.7 12.5 -
1933(Mar^ 6,3 26*0 - 39.1 77.8 
193»f 86.5 M.5 11.5 8.2 29A 80.0 (Maroh) 
Compiled from the Report of the Controllar of Currency 
for various years* 
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against ourrenoy Issue reoatned on the high side - It never 
f « l l h«lov th« ttreo*fourth of th« total oiroalation* Zt 
Atood at 0ueh on ahnomal high figure as in 19I0 and 
oontinuod to fXuotuata betvaeR 72$ and 80^ nftar the 
iuapension of the go34 8tandard« this as m have pointed 
out repeated3^ ima the reault of their great eaphasis on 
liqtuiditr due to the feared rise of pfloes. 
Evidently, the effedt of this policy of maintaining 
high reserve ratio was to prevent a large volume of our 
reserves available from being used to serve as a baeking 
for a larger issue of currency. The on^ kr lustifioaticsn which 
our govemtsent gave for this policy vas that it vould 
aaintain public ccnfidence in our currency* W&r this it 
aay be pointed out that this aay veil be a long-term objeotive 
of a sound currency policy under normal circumstances. But 
in abnomal times of depression iiith falling pricesi it was 
advisable rather necessary to relax this principle and to 
allov the given volume of reserves to be served as a basis 
for a wider issue* Moreovert as the Odd Delegation of 
the Uague of Nationa rightly observed* **8o long as the 
world is not disturbed by wars and other disastrous events 
the cover of bank-notes is a very l ittle concern to the 
public) whereas til tbs event of such a disturbance, even a 
cover of 100^ would not be possessed of the power to preserve 
confidence***^^ Similar suggesti(»)s were made by the 
72. Selected Documents, League of nations, 0eneva,1930, 
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Hacmlllao Cojamltt©© In 1931 # These suggestl ns were 
utilised by e nualier of countries that were under monetaiT 
strains. For instance in Argentina, the note cover was 
lowered froai 100 to kO% in Beceniber 1929, in Australia ttom 
2$ t0 in June 1930, in Denmark from 50 to 33/5 in October 
7k 
1931 and so on. 
To SUE) up the ¥hoXe position at a gl^mce, the 
regulation of our currency and credit policies on the above 
orthodox lines exerted a great deflationary effect on our 
economic oonditiona. As may bo observod from the following 
detailed statesent, in the first two flijancial years(1929*30 
and 1930-31) of the depression, there was a not contraction 
of currency to the extent of crores. Subsequently, 
after an increase of 21 crores and 38 lakhs in the year 
1931-32, the curr ncy again showed a net contraction of 
Bi^ S (srores and 38 lakhs during the next two year?. The saise 
was fche position ef the credit supply* Taking the case of 
both the Imperial Bank of India and the Big Five, between 
1928 and 1933 the increase in their cash reserves amounted 
to nearly 10 crores of rupees. It may be noted that bad 
the banking systoa aaintained a stable cash ratio say 10^ 
(which seeais to be reasoaable figure on the basis of past 
•xperienct) and kept the ^lue of their assets constant,then 
73* Comidttee on Industry and Finance,Report, para 
Xieague of Nations 1 International Currency Bxperienoe, Mag c 
19^5, p. 97. 
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th9 auppljr of our would haif<j Increaaed by Id. 100 eror^s* 
But aa the foUowing figufoi shov their total deposit 
' laibilitl«s did not inoreast vore tt&an 10 orores duzlng the 
•ntire period* 
tma. 
m lakhs of nipeeaT 
Motoa in Ahsoro Xotal deposit Vapiation in 
SifCttla- tion or'iSamiiilOmSjC taSAh liabilities deposit 
Tear «ion« oontxmot Saiaill of Ijniperial liabilities 
ion. ooins. Bank of lidia 
a the mg Five 
(for eilendar 
ygngg). . . 
1928-29 178.10 • 303 -303 96 127.60 -
1929-30 159-30 -1880 -2171 -»*037 125.00 - 2.60 
1930-31 -1137 -2158 -3360 f 9.80 
1931-32 165.17 •172»f -•3.93 •21 •2138 t22«10 - 12.70 
1932*33 150.36 - I W -7.55 •10 -2221 132.10 • 10.00 
1933-3*^  163.88 •135»» -30 #65 •1389 138.00 • 6.00 
1» Heport of the Contooller of Currenoy fbp Tarious years« 
2« Statistical tables relating to Banks in India and Barsaa* 
If ve txanine the above trends developaents in 
our monetary fflanagenent in the light of the experiences of 
certain other countries (that were similarly situated as 
India during the Oppression and vhose ourrsnoies «ero also 
Ilisked vitb sterling) m find a curious contrast* yiiil« 
I^dia mmaimd atrictlr ti«d with Sterling, « timimr Qt 
other countrl«3 aueh as AustraliSf Sweden and Japant followed 
independent and active esonetafr neasures suited to their 
om Internal oonditionsy after going off the gold standard* 
Atistraliat'*' for instance provides the he t^ example of a 
count ly where the raonetary authorities realised the gravity 
of the situation at quite an early st§|e of the depression* 
3P!aodd with the prohlests of crisis| she left the gold 
standard as early as in S)eceaberf1929 and hy the first 
(juarter of 1930 her currency hegan to depreciate in relation 
to gold. No douht| initially it was forced an iiustralia 
by financial difficulties, but subsequently devaluation bad 
advanced to a dcnainant position among the measures,that were 
followed to fight the depression* 
The iaportant point to note is that instead of 
Maintaining a fixed parity with Sterling, the Australian 
authorities wholly concestrated on the internal econoaiio 
4* Australia, like India was an exporting econony, raw 
materials and food stuffs, such as wo^,hides and skins, 
wheat and dairy psroducts etc* oomrising about of the 
total exports* Thus, in coatton with India,tb* prices of 
her exports wore severely affeoted by the state of world 
warketlng during the depressloni between 1928-30,the 
prices of her export declined by about 50% while that of 
the iaports showed a faU of 10^  only, turning the balance 
of trade against that country* Thus to put in the words of 
an Australian writer the main problem of that country in 
depression was "to adjust the econoaiy of the country to a 
loss of inoone that had fallen with special severity on 
soae sections of the people, and was gradually causing 
distress to all* Primaiy producers were more severally 
affected because their in cones were exposed to the l\ill 
blast of the fall in export prices'** 
Sea,Copland,D*BtThe Preniers Plan,neproduoed fro«'*The Itature 
of Monetary Policy*,!*I,A*(London,1935P« 176* 
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dtvelopiiQnt* A tmi nonths after leairing ttie gold standax^ df 
in 19301 th^ro appmmd the first Eeononio aanifesto, 
a publio stateaent by a representative group of eeonoalstsi 
uherein th&T suggested tbati ioeoedlate dlfficaXties of 
the present tiiae would be inoreased by a credit polloy 
directed to the rapid establlahaent of parity in the liondon 
exohange. 0ntil the position clears ire consider that the free 
iBoireiaent0 in overseas exchange will lessen the 
The ilustmlian government gave a <|ttick response to these 
suggestions and the then Australian treasurer,Mr.S.a.fheodore 
officially declared the (lovornai^t*s monetary plans for 
restoring the price levels to that ruling from 1925**29« Ibr 
that purpose he said^ **the exchange rate should be allowed to 
go to a level cosisiensu.ate vith the disparity in the Australian 
price level as e(^pared with those o v e r s e a s * T h i s attitude 
is clearly constrasted with that of Indian authorities when 
they said|'»Oovem«ent had no choice in the matter i f they are 
to perform their first duty as currency authority * the duty 
of mAitaining the stability of the current."* 
Thus by September, 1931, when India and Britain left 
the gold standard the Australian pound luUI already depreciated 
Budget lieport for 1931-32 pare 107. 
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by about 30j{ on »terling and then further shared th« fall 
of sterling also* Zn this process it deprsolistad to a point 
i«hor« 195 Auatrallan Papar Pounds were equivalent to 100 
gold poimdsi i#e# the prioe of gold was raisedf by 
the depraeiation of currenoy deaandad a corresponding dagraa 
of inteifial inflation* 7he Australian go7em»ant adopted the 
fivaaury bi l l finance as an iaiportant iraapon for carrying 
through the internal expansion of credit. The goTemment 
raised hug floating debt in the for® of Treasury bills be i^xlng 
interest at and diaoountable at the Gomdonnealth Banic* 
AGCording to the official estimate for the quarter ending June» 
t930» the trading banks held at least £t5 million of treasury 
Bills* fhen again^ it is estimated that the quarterly average 
of these trensury bills outstanding rose from ailllon tit 
the end of I930 to about aillion in the firat quarter of 
Wy*^^ Thus by 1932 the ConRBonwealth Bank^ s holdings of 
the government securities rose to £68 laillion f^ ost a figure 
of aillion in the third quarter of 1929. The fUnds thus 
provided by the central bank vere drawn upon by the govemaent 
which ultia-rtely turned as banking deposits in the trading 
banks* Against these deposits the trading banks held balances 
at the Coeimonwenlth bank* Thus, in this way apart from the 
76. Reproduced ttam "Public Investa»nt and Full Eii^ loy»ent**| 
I«L«0., 19*>6, p, 192 <lbotnote)« 
77• Fisher, Stabilised noney, p.338» 
7Bp Looit. Orisis and Headjustawtt in Australia by Allent 
O.B.Pishert page, 776-
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Treasury Blll« held directly by the trading bankSf the 
of the treasury bills by the Ooi^onvealth bank hes the effect 
of increasing both the cash resorts and the depoalta of the 
trading bi»iks» The Important feature of thie mechttnlan 
Has that In place of gold the trading banks now held balances 
at the Cosaionvealth Bank as their Cash reserves vhldh forsed 
the basis for new credit creation. Then again at the same 
time, they also lonered the ratio of the gold reserves which 
the Commonvealth Bank was required to hold against Its Issue 
froa 25^  to tgl In 1 9 3 1 T h i s further Increased the elas-
ticity of the credit creation In that country* 
i^ 'icltrdlng to ofslclal estimates as a result of the above 
deTelopaents there came a net ei^anslon of ^ ^ In the central 
bank credit during the years 1930-3d« Blscounts and 
Q q 
advances etc. rose by about •^O millions between 1929-30. 
The Interest rates were also considerably z'educed. For 
Instance the rate of Treasry b i l l which stood at at the 
beginning of 1931 was reduced by successive stages to 3 ^ at th« 
beginning of 1933 and to a low level of t^ the middle 
of that year. The rate on time deposits was brought dour 
|ji on two ye.^ r*8 deposits and on three months deposits 
in 1933 as compared with k ^ in 1931. Similarly the over-
draft rates were also reduced; the maximum fbr loans to 
primary producers' being In 1933-®^ 
79. Ibid., p. 779 
80. Sae|Flsher|I«6tablllsed Honey, p.BM. 
81. CSomaerclal Banks - 1925-33 - League of Nations, p. 327. 
I^ HS SW^ DieH jKaiETARY POMCT UH tHB TOBSSSICWi 
fhe i3ion«taiT PoXic^ r of Swodldn* bo long as she rmmin^^ 
on fehe gold standard is of l i t t le intorost in the present 
oontext* During those ninths in aoatnion with other gold 
standi xd cotmtrieS| the Snediah Oovem'^ sdnt coR««ntrated 
on waintaifiing the desired parity between their currency 
Krona and gold* But after the tkboXition of gold standard in 
Septaber 1931« she gare the vorld a sueoesslUX deaonsti^tion 
of r^ationary adjustiaents to face the prohlens of the 
depression* In the first fm months folloviing the suspension 
of the gold standard the Snedish nonetaxy authorities no 
douhtf showed some reluctanoe to embark on expansionary 
neaaureSf but soon after as it beoame increasingly apparent 
that the fear of in flat i ;nary rise of prices was a mistaken 
view under the conditions of the d^ression, th-^ r» caae a 
In oomon with India, in Sweden also the depression was 
an inported phenomenon* She catastrophic collapse of 
American business and its impact on other countries 
seriously affected both the volume and value of her 
exports* On average between I929 and 1930 the dollar 
value of Swedish exports declined by I5l(against a decline 
of 7% in the imports) whereas industrial productioi s t i l l 
continued to increase - the quarterly index of industrial 
production rose from 99 in the last quarter of 1929 to 
110 in the first quiirter of I930 and averaged at 102 in 
the following three months* According to the of f ic ial 
estimates between 1929-32. the total value of Swedish 
exports f s l l by causing heavy losses on foreign trade 
account) three quarters of the reduction of national 
income were calculated to be accounted for by reductions in 
the vilue of exports* 7he deteriorati^ of export trade 
first affected the industries producing the exports goods 
and then spread to the other sectors of tha econo^yi 
•«ciMnt • • 
otiange of front In the policy deoisione. Henooforward, 
there vas felt an Ineroaslng need for an antl-depreasion 
monetary policy both By the acadetalolans and policy makers. 
Trm the beginning of 1932 the Swedish Government fra«ed an 
active and planned reilatlonary policy that was "eonoerned 
prlaarlly with the country's Internal price conditions and 
On 
the state of lndttstry» not with a certain sterling 
fhe strategy of this policy In the words of i^rofesaor Fisher 
WQS to make '^wlae adjustiaents of foreign exchjaage operations 
to the domestic requlreisents of the country abandoning 
the exchange stability of the ICrona with the English pound 
when such exchange stability tended to pull dom the Swedish 
price levels but isaintainlng a stable sterling exchange 
When the beneficial influence of a rise of British wholesale 
prices oould thus be made to affect a corresponding rise of 
Swedish wholesale price l e v e l . T h u s Instead of makinf 
it a fixed objective of their eoonoialo policy as was the 
case in India, the Swedish authorities on the contrary utlllied 
the exchange rate raanlpulntinns as a laeans of raising the 
wholssale orlces from Its depressed level* 
Conti*. 
causing]; a generil fall of prices and econo«lc activity* 
(See for details, Jorld Bconoalc Survey, 1932-33fPP*2^3, 
109,21^ r^ nd 3rialey Thoaas,Monetary Policy and Crisisi 
A Study of Swedish BxperJnceCHoutledge 193o>,p«l80» 
82. Vide the Statist, Octob:r, 1932, p. 
83* Fisher, Irving, op#cit., p#330» 
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The aln vas» tbiis, now foeu6is«d on intemaX prlea 
<Seir9Xopm3nt8$ tbe extomaX vaXue of^Krona had to ha adjusted 
to tha i.iitf}](>naX purohaalng power* Bt^  ApriX 1932 the Krona 
jpsXX about beXow sterXljsg, whes*e«s In oeptemher 193I 
the foraer waa quoted about abova the Xater« And In the 
itoXXowlng year it had depreciated by about in reXatloo 
to goXd and roughl/ In relation to othsri Icaportant 
gk j/vVO, 
ourreneles of tlie worXd# ^mt/on the one hand pXaeed 
Sweden In a fa^ourabXe position In the world market and 
at the aame time made for easy tsoney eondltlona« The value 
of Swedish exporta between 1932 and 1933 increased by while 
that of imports ehowsd a decline of and the paaslve 
balance of Krona $$ million turned Iftto an active balance of 
trtJde worth Kr#78 million. 
The improireiiient in the balance of trade greatly helped 
In replenishing the exchange reserves of the Blksbank. The 
statistics as they are available show that by the aiddle of 
1932the Swedish foreign our.enoy reaerfes rose by Kr.19 million 
and during July and August the Blksb^nk bought Kr«38 allllon 
of foreign currency while the holdings of the private banks 
remained unchanged,®^ And the strong position of the foreign 
exchange reserves and general liquidity of money diarket ixi 
turn enabled the Swedish banking system to create cheap 
•oney conditions. Thus the discount rate in that country was 
Ibid.I p. 332(fc«ealso Statist,Oct»1932» 
85, Vide Statist, October I932f P. 
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reduced to M by the middle of 1932 and to ©xoeptlooally 
lov level of In the foUot^liig aonths from a high OiC 
figure of 6% at the end of 1931« They similarly also 
adopted a l lhai^ attitude towards loan and advances} the 
bank credit and advances aho¥ad an increase from 100 in 
1929 to 106 in 1931 and so on.^^ 
m HQMAaY POLICf JAPj^ fTt* 
The sbbry of the aonetary policy i;; Japan provides 
an interesting coaparison with that of Sweden^  In the 
beginning of the Depression the Japanese authorities also 
concentrated on maintaining the rate of exchange of their 
86. Srimley Thomas, op*cit., pp. I8l-183« 
87• World Economic Survey, 1933-3^, 257# 
The one important feoture of the Depression in Japan in 
coasion with India, was a sevare decline in the irices 
of her exports. The Japan exports* trade during those 
years depended for the larger part on a small group of 
coaiaodltiesi specially silS and cotton; and 8eeondly> 
it depended on an even greater extent on a single country, 
the United states which purchased about 3^^  of the exports* 
With the industrial slump in tJhited States and other 
countries. Japans» exports to those countries heavily 
declined. The raw silk exports fe l l b th in volume and 
v&lue. Then againi as was the case with India, while the 
quantum of exports did not fall so heavily, the export 
prices fel l by 23:1 during the same period; the total value 
of exports thus deoli <ed to 726 million dollars in 1931 
from a figure of 991 million dollars in 1929. Then,secondly» 
again like India, the severity of depression was felt 
main in a heavy decline of wholesale prices which profiuction 
remained comparatively intact - the wholesale price Index 
fell by 0^% whereas industrial production dedlined onlyS^ 
below the level of 1929*(See for details World Bconooic 
Survey of 1929*30 to 1932-33)-
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imrr0nojr« Bat subtaqueotly vith th© suspenaJ&n of the gold 
stondRrd in momtser 1931f the deTeloptoent of aonetaiy 
policy was towards focussing on internal, econoalc conditions* 
With this in view, they allowed the eurrenoy to depreciate 
to whatever ejrtent It ailght heoome necessary to bring 
recovery of piloee and exports* fhus after the initial 
depreciation in DeoemHter 19B1 the exchange Talue of the 
ten m& further reduced fro® 36 cents to 21 ©enta, that is, 
from 72$ to h^i of its gold parity in 1932, And when 
ultlwateajr stohill«ed In 1933» It had lost about of its 
gold value as oowpared with a flgute of M)^  fbr sterling, 
fhis meant that the /en was depreciated about over the 
so 
iterling. 
With the depreciation of tm there quickly emerged 
an escplnsi-^ nary monetary policy in th^t country. The 
Statistica that are available show that both the currency 
and credit condltione ihowed a remarkable iatprovement after 
going of the gold atandard* The note circulation ioisnedlately 
rose to 1125 tallllon Yen in isld December 1931 which was now 
only 27 million less than a year ago, To introduce further 
elaaticityi the normal llait of fiduciary iscue of the Bank 
of Japan's notes was raised (in June 1932) to Yen 1000 
million f^ om Yen 120 milllon*^^ Comming to the credit 
88« Lewis Arthur,W. op.olt., p,119. 
89» world Economic 3urv«y, 1932-331 P* 
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supplyt the percentage ratio of oelih to total deposits 
mn P0auo®d from 9.3 in 1930 to 8.7 In 1932» Similarljr 
the Bank of Japan lowered it« disoouct rate on suceessiva 
occasions from in Beeeraber 1931 to in Septeasljer 1932 
and to 3.65 in July 1933» Suaaarislng its finding the JLeague 
of Hatlona remarked, «in pursuance of the cheap aoney policy 
of the Japanese authorities since the ahondonment of gold 
itandard at the end of 1931 the interest rates at the post 
office sav'inga banks, the Bank of Japan and the Deposit 
banks of Osaka and tokyo haire been reduced and the Bank of 
Japan had engaged in extensive open taarket operational*^ 
90. League of Hatlonst ConuBercial Banks, 192?-33fP* 35* 
mmm „ l y 
sggosgAiff miQi w psgr mmQmm m mm 
mmm pmmmm* 
Imi aiia3^»i0 of the last ohapt^r It is ^ p l y 
oX«ai* that tba poasibilltlea of brin^ginf about ai} aoonoaie 
ravtiral fsrott tjpada dafiraasion ware largelj eonaiderad In tbe 
light of ourronajr and oradlt |>oXloiaa« Alttomh opinions 
d l f fa j^ as to tha oannar in i^ioh sonataiT aaasurat nozScadi 
thair potantialitiaa to mitigate tha businass fluctuations 
vara ganaraXXy agraad upon both by aaadaaioians and poliey 
aalEara* this optiaistio attitude towards aonatary poXioy 
did not artoourage tba aaarab for additional aaaauras and tha 
question of fiooal polioy was tharafora rela=gatad to the 
background* On the eontrarjr soaa of the writers of that 
period argued that inoreased publio spending would ultiaately 
be at tha cost of reduoed employaent and business aotivity 
in the private seotor of the eoonoaj* ^  this view was based 
on the a8suiQ>tlon that all the factors of production are 
nomally fUUy utilised by private people and the state 
can thertf>rs obtain the use of such factors only by depriving 
1* To quote an iaportant exaaple Cassel Qustav in one of his 
waitings saiys, "against the activisation of econcaic l i fe 
through publio wai^ s aust be set the further crippling of 
private enterprise which nay possibly follow upon the 
appearance of the state as an entrepreneur* • • PriiMte 
enterprise aay see itself equally t hreatened i f the state 
interfenes to help private firms which find theaselves in 
difficultiesi thereby disolocating the essential pre-
requisite for coapetitive efficienoy*** (Heproduced froa 
* Business Cycle and Kconoaic Policy* by B»Lundbarg» ptllif)! 
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the former tjpom using tbem. fheny it vae also maintained that 
m inorease in public spending would result in an iocrease 
in vages vhdbh vould o«ul•^a. fafilty adaptation of oosts and 
prices* Anong others this viev %m» mainlr represented hr 
Pigou who believed that the de&ressiio is aggravated by *the 
tendency of worte-people to hold up wages in bad tiaes**! and 
therefore suggested that " i f vage rates are rendered less 
rigidi the aptitude of industrial fluotuations mi l be 
protento r e d u c e d . C a s s e l tn the same way pointed out, 
**8tate interventicm aay result in the maintenance of the 
wages of certain workers at an uneconoaio level, i . e . , a level 
incompatible with equilibrlua In the country's econowy".^ 
this, in brief, was the understanding of those years on 
the quistion of fiscal policy* It should however b© pointed 
out here that while a policy or active state intervention in 
business and industry was nonaally not locked with favour, i t 
did not ejcclud© the possibilities of compensatory fiscal 
measures in the event of a serious falling of private enterpJfise. 
m other words, such budgetary adjustiaents were not considered 
incoapatible with the principles of sound finance. On the other 
hand aany of the wtiters of th^t period actually recosnended 
extensive public vorlE prograaoie to aeet the exigencies of 
econoaic slunps. To quote a f«w inportant examples, Hawtrey 
2. Op. c i t , , p, 281. 
3. Op» c i t . , p. 
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alt hough being an ardent supporter of mondtarjr neasurest 
writing In 1928 said tfeat aUi tinea of toono®ic depres«lon,"a 
•iolant rest riot ion of oredit oootslons sueh a dlsoouragtaieiit 
of enterpriso ttiat tbe unspent aargin inoreasoa. fhis may ocour 
becmuse traders hold the proceeds of sales ldle»«. the i&oner 
borrowed by sows my stagnate in balanoea of others'*. And 
thereforoi suggested that in such events the iovemnent aajr 
resort to borrowing by selling its seourities," not merely hy 
taking the place of other capital issue, but securing money 
L 
that vould otherwise hare remained idle in balances'** Then 
again stressing upon the same at another place he pointed out, 
*if the GoYemment confines itself to enterprise which are 
either not suitable for priirate enterprise, or If suitable 
are not ripe^ then the private demand on capital market will 
be undiainishedf In tt% event of government spending".^ Pigou, 
sifltilarly, allowed a roo« for discreti(»i for suitable budgetarar 
arrangeaents in difficult econoaiic tiaes when he said, '^ nobody 
would suggest that govemaent expenditure of a regular nature| 
such as expenditure on the arayt navy and civil services, should 
noraally be net, otherwise than out of taxation* This does 
not raeani indeed that this class of expenditure should never, 
in any circuastances whatever, be financed out of loans",^ Thus 
K Op.cit., p« 228. 
5* See, his "The Art of Central artOJcirig**,!! edltlon,p,J^3?. 
6» Op»cit», p» 
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t i l t pttbllo expenditure in tbis form was looked apon as a 
levex' to raise private detoand and business aetivlty and not at 
a substitute tor it* 
It is against this baatlcground that the budgetary polieies 
followed in India would be exaalned* For the take of analysia 
and appraisa3.| it is again thought neoeasai*^ to pnxteed from a 
surfey of the fiieal aeasuree adopted in certain other eountriea 
to a aore partieular acoount of the features of Indian budgetary 
policy, 
Sspeoially when the depression approached in 19^ 9 the 
possibilities of fiscal measures were widely discussed. In a 
nuaber of countriesf as we shall see subseq,uentlyi the financial 
experts and authorities made a strong advocacy for increased 
public expenditure as an aid to economic recoirery* these 
opinions and reoomsendations had a great iApressi<m on the 
financial policies of those countries during that period* thust 
it would be noted that while certain countries taade a remarkable 
headvay against the crisisi the others also soade appreoiable 
efforts through irarious budgetary arrangements* United states 
for instance provides an outstanding exaiaple whore strong 
fiscal devices were adopted to fight the depression* As with 
the growing severity of eoonoaic orislst govemaent revenues 
began to deollne| -^ he Hoover Adainistrsticm instead of 
resorting to additional taxation and curtailing the public 
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•xpenditu2^a aXlovttf iubstaiitiai budget deflelta to take plaoe* 
In the 1931*32 and 1932-331 the budget defioits aoioiinted 
to dollar 903 nlllon aud $ 2^ 73 million reapeotlTeljr.^ 
^part froa the aboire budgetai^ adjustmenti, a grest 
emphasis iias laid on emergency ilsoal measures for ea:tra 
ordinary purposes, lo 1932 the Ataerioan authorities provided 
for an heaify reoovery progranme in the fora of the establlshaeDt 
of E»f.C» and other soheaies of public vork relief that were 
primarily aimed at increasing consuaers* purchasing povat* 
Broadly speaking all such agencies <tan be put under four heads i 
firstly, there vere the agencies for the relief of debtors such 
as f^m Credit Administration, and the Ecmie Owners Loan 
GSorporlitioni secondlyi provision of money was made to the 
industries throughf for Instanoei the Heconstruction Finance 
Corporation. The third category similarly, consisted of relief 
payments to the fariaers and unetsployed* And lastly, the most 
important item vas the public vorks programae, which absorbed 
large sums of money. According to an estimate the net income 
generating expenditure on such public works scheises amounted 
to a high figure of $1.9 billion in 1933#® 
To sum up the whole position the total budgetary 
expenditure of the n.S. Oovemment more than doubled between 
7. Vide Dalton & Others "linbalanoed Budgets"(Oeorge Routledge a 
Sons Iitd., London, 
8* Wilson Thomas, op.cit., p. 176* 
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t930 and 1933 - it liior«a»6(l ftom AoXXmr 1«231«1 lakha to 
lalitit. Aa the ]peo®lptt ©f the Oov@3TOf!ient durlag y«»r» 
more or Xosa the 8a«9 as for tti« flnanoiaX ytara 
I926-3O1 the fedoraX budget deftelt rose to dollar 2.5 btUlon 
ia 1933 and again ahot up to 3*9 biU.ion in th@ fbllovlng yaava* 
Hoify the expanaionaxy aapeot of the U.S. polior vaa that along 
v&th soma inoraaaas in taxation« a larfer portion of the 
budget vaa financed through borrowing* thus aa per off icial 
records the publlo debt of the Uhlted States from dollar 16185 
lakhs in 1930 rose to dollar 27053 laWis in 193*^ .^  
fuming to the two other countries whieh we selected fbr 
QomparisoTi with India in the lest ohepter, we again find a good 
attempt towards budgetar^ r adluataents to meet that situation, 
Japan, for Instance, provides an interesting exanple where the 
cheap money policy was greatly assisted bjr fiscal measttres* The 
main feature of the financial policy of Japan was a large Increase 
in Qoiremment expenditure with the object of ec®pensating the 
loss on prlv?3te account* Thus there was a distinct tendency 
towards increased budget expenditure in that country and froa 
1932 onwards the dosestic situation continued to be dominated 
by the unabaianced budgetary posit inn* According to off ic ial 
estimates the budget expenditure for the year 1932-33* was 
the largest in the history of Japant the total expenditure 
oaounting 2238 allllon yen, out of which extra-ordinary 
expenditure (deliberately undertaken by the Goramiaent to Increase 
9. IbidM p»176 and 181» 
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purchasing povar of tbe people) aooounted for 881 miXXict) yon* 
fho important point to note is that this inoreasod exponditturo 
vas entiraXy cot by borroving, fhus vhorofts botwoen tho end 
of 1930 and 1931 the national debt had been reduced by 26 
million yen, it increased by a high figure of ^ million yen 
at the end of 1932 i^en it stood at 6M2 million yen# And 
during the nestt two years it further rose to ?3?k and 8683 million 
yea respeotively* The gre '^ter part of this loan waa taken 
up f^m the Bank of Japan and the Treasury Deposit Bureau,^ ® 
The aovemment spending of sueh enormous magnitude financed 
by borrowings in th% first plae# eauaed m substantial inorease 
in the industrial investment* The secondary effeot of suoh 
expenditure vas an inoreased demand for oonsumptlon goods» 
Taking 1930 as 100 production of inrestment goods increased 
f^ om 91 in 1931 to 13^ in 1933 «nd 1?0 in the following year. 
The production of consumption goods similarly inoreased from 
100 in 1931 to 118 in 1933 and 128 in Prices and 
employment as ve have seen in chapter II also showed an rapid 
i^ooTery fallowing the Ooveroaent spending* Thus the Department 
of overseas trade in its firdings on the effects of fiscal measure 
on the economic conditions of Japan said, '^a close study of 
recent economic development (in Japan) leads one to conclude 
10, World Bcwiomic Survey 1933-3^i p. 
• t7t -
not that th© Qovamment has l>een enabled to n.oat large 
if sue out of favourable economic aonditlme bat ratber thit 
the loan flnanoed expenditure of the Governnient has set in 
motion eeonoalo foroes vhioh were a^iting release and haa 
thua produced those favourable eondltions**. ^^  
Australia, similarly provides a good example of^ country 
whore a reflatlonary policy va« ooablnod with a balanced budget* 
^he baals of the Australian finanoial polioy was the Preniers 
plan * a progrnnme of reeovery vorleed out a oomaittee of 
econosdsta and heads of treaaureles* Woi^ ing on this 
the Governisent of Auatralla resorted to Increase taxation and 
a reduetlon of in all adjustable Govem-aent expenditure 
inoluding all wages and salaries in order to keep the budget 
balanced* These were obviously deflationary measures* But 
along with that the Austrilian Oovemraent also resorted to 
borrowing fro® the ^banks to sake up the budget defioits, 
which to a great extent counteracted the effects of the above 
deflationary ptasures* Thus it would be noted that the floating 
debt of that country rapidly shot up froa 120 nlllion in JUne 1931 
to £^ 0 ailllon in 1932* Then according to anottesr estimate the 
11. Cf* Department of Orerseas Trade, Report No. 
The Bconoalc ctaititions of Japan 1933-3^^p. 
Reproduced from World Economic Survey 19j^35f P*30 
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aiaount of osntral bank oi^ ecUt for aboiro pux^osd ims Increased 
hy about kQ$ tn 1933 o w tho 1931 Xewl.''^ 
Coi8!ii«Rlliifig on the above policy an Australian writer 
rightly «ai(l,^it was sound in the orisis mainly beeatiso it 
was less orthodox than that vhieh ao-«alI«d finanolers vould 
roadlly pursue. Indeed it is inot \ iinretisoneble to say that the 
9mee89 ot Australian plan lay in its net balanee of orthodox 
and unorthodox taeasures**^  Beoause in his words,^the deflation* 
ary elements created oontidenoe in the oapaeity of the Govem* 
auint to make the necessary adjustments* The lnflatlonax7 
elements prevented these deflationary f&rees from causing 
further Slaol^ning of entefprise and laid the foundation for 
finanoial reooveiy which always proceeds econoaie rewovery*** ^ ^ 
Yhe Indian glsoal Policy 
In contrast with the above expansionist measures 
adopted by the other countriesi the fiscal policy of :&jdia 
12, World gconomic Surfey, 1932-33 (See also Australian Monetary 
Policy In iJepression", op.oit.i pp» Mo-l¥), 
13* Reproduced from stabilised Money, p, 338» 
t fhe Figures and statistics on j;hdi«tn Budgetary Operations 
are taken from the Budget Reports and F^ports of the 
Controller of Currency for various yeaira* 
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x^ aaine^ i atrietly r«iitrlotiire and orthodox duritig th@ entire 
period of tli« 4s vm sb^ aJl 000 in the following 
pages »ot mm a slight atteapt was stade towards budget ^^ 17 
adjustiseiits to meet the exigencies of the crisis* On the 
contrary the Govemajerit of India laid a g»eat eapbasis on the 
neoessity^^ Iceop the budget balanced Irrospootive of the 
diffictjl econoaio airoutsatmtces* ^s the loss of incoae and 
foreign tvaM oauaed An heavy deterloratlow in Qoyern^ s^ent 
revenues I reliance, vaa placed entirely upon additional taxation 
and retrenciaaent io public expenditure to balaacii the budget• 
7hua It would be noted that the additional taxatioja yielded 
iBucb a» 18.75 crorea yearly in those difficult years as 
coapar«d with an average of crorcs for the previous five 
year® of coaparative proppority froa 1923-28. Simultaneously 
they also made large reduction in public expenditure. Sot mly 
this, over and above« instead of financing the budget deficit 
through borrowing ae far iRStancef Australia and Japan did, 
our financial authorities provided for the repayment of old 
debt out of current revenues, f^tll these measus^ s would have 
definitely exerted a deflationary effect on our prices and 
ti^de. the following pages we propose to discuss In 
details e l l these budgetary operations of the Government of 
India under two broad heads » <1) Public expenditure and 
Taxation, and (2) the loan operations of the Govemnent of 
India during those nonths. 
. -
To stdrt from the Deginnlng tiheni In February 19^ 9 
Sir George Sobusteri the then Flnanoe Member of Ihdi^ y 
presented the budget esttfuatee of the flnenolel |»ar 1929-30, 
he ei^eoted e balanee betveen the revenue and eiependiture 
for that rea^* Tbe aotual results howevert turned oontrarf 
to his expeotations* UhiXe taxea on Inootses and ealt and 
opiuo receipts together shoved an improiretaent of [!s»112 Xakhs» 
there were deelines In revenue under custoraa worth Bs.?5 lakhs, 
post and telegraphs ili.^ O lakhs and other heads lis. 8 lalchs* 
On the baXanoe there was a net deterioration of la^s oyer 
the estisated receipts* This together with the original deficit 
of &.90 lakhs I which could not be covered, as es^ected by 
transfer of Revenue Fund, brought a total deficit of !ti.l56 lakhs* 
To make up this gap our Government proposed additional taxation 
aaiotmting to a suta of Ss«^ *80 crores* 
With the opening of the financial /ear 1930-31 the 
•conovic depression had travelled a long way and its effacts were 
considerably f i l t on the finances of our govern ent* From the 
revised budgetary estinates we find that we had a loss of as auch 
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as crorea ander ouitoaa of wbioh eotton pioco goods 
and Jttt0 eQeotinfeeil far oroapss and lalihs rasp^etlvsly* 
Under on Inootaes, ther« vas a loss of about 2.20 ©roreai 
tfeio re-renues of tiio fedlan posts iKid telegraphs deparfeisont 
showed a Xosa of ^•1*36 erores against an antioipoted figure 
of Hs.^  lakhs and so on* Thas to sum up the vhoXs position 
wblle th© original budget estlraates showed a surplus of 
lakhs, tha rovisad ©stiwatos brought an actual dsflott of 
fe. 13.56 erorss for that year. 
Wlth-out asking ao/ allowanoo for the ©aclgenclss of the 
depressaon our financial authorities reacted to that situation 
on strlot orthodox lines* Ihey showed a strong Inclination to 
balance the budget end addifelonal taxations were considered 
necessary to f i l l up th® gap* The ohanges in taxations iK»re 
fts underI ^ ^ 
1 - fii addition to the revenue duty/(e# proteotlon 
duty with a alnltiua of Si annas per lb» was imposed 
on cotton pleoe-goods imported from oountrles outside 
the United Rlngdoi9« 
2 - Jhe excise duty on Keroslne mn Increased ttom a anna 
to 1 anna and # pies. 
3 • The duty on sugar va« inoreased so as to yield on 
additional revenue of 180 lakhs. 
m See for details, Budget for 1930*31»Explanatory Memorandum, p. 
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h - Inoone iax on personal IUCOUK) of ti.l^ fOOO 
&nd upwaiHl vae raised Uy t1 pies in ttoe rupeo 
and a corresponding Inor^ ae© ma aad® in the 
super tax in all grades* 
5 • oXd import Antf m silver of ^ ennas per ounce 
wa« reintroduoed, 
Similarlyi the most important of the oustotas suroharges 
was that of on the general revenue schedule of A 
% surcharge vas plaoed on imported cotton goods also* The 
duties special articles such aa alcoholei drinke and sugar 
were considerably enhanoed* Ihus, in this way tte® additional 
yield of the increased custotss was estimated at B3*9«82 «rorefl* 
With the help of th^se measures the aovernnent was able 
not only to make up the gap between revnue and expenditure 
but also to provide for a Kaall surplus for that year* Inspite 
of this the then Finance Meaber added a word of eaustlon**^ 
"^^ expenditure and revna« returns will have to be carefully watched, 
and i f conditions show signs of deterioration, i t may be 
necessary to take interira taeasures to counteract that* 
15, Budget for 1930-31. 
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^dget for 1931*52* 
aiaphasls on a baXonoed budget Is t^iXX mavQ eirident 
from the budgotary operotJions during the year 1931-32 and 
1932-33* As pointed out abov© this was mainly dae to their 
consideration for the aaintenance of confidence in the national 
finances* in esatters of outrrenoy isanageisent, here also in 
effeetive contrast with the general outlook our Govemaent 
were so afraid of inflation after the abolition of gold 
standard. A close study of tfee budget reporfcs showe that our 
Finance Member repreatedly mt&rred to the "dangers of any 
inflationary action for the purpose of laeetlng the current 
expenditure'*. And vith that in r im they made all poeaible 
efforts to ko©j> the budget balanced. The follodng adjustment 
in cur revenue and ejspenditure shw how our financial 
authorities managed to achieve that end in those difficult 
months* 
/ 
While presenting the budget for 1931-32 the Finance 
Member of Indiat estimated a total deterioration of %«18*10 
crores as compared with the estiaates fbr 1930-31t over the 
various revenue heads as follows} 
fax revMoue te.13»lO crores 
CoisBorcial Uhdertakinga Hi* 1*18 orores 
General Finance headings fe. 3»76 orores 
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HoW| as the estimates for 1930-31 provldeil for a 
auiplus of Ki.86 Xalch8f the net de^oit for 1031*32 was 
reduced to 17*2^ erores* Shie ma the gap vhleh he 
propoeed to {tH up hjr etitting down expenditure and iitoreasing 
taxation, thwe he propoeed a reduotion worth lalshs 
in military oxpendltum and for lakhs in civil expenditure» 
the total curtailment amounting to fe#2.73 croree against the 
deficit of !is«17tt2^  orores. This reduced the gap to 
croresi vhlch ms proposed to be met out by neir taxation* 
the plan for additional taxation covered in the taain» 
t%fo broad heads • the custoss and taxes on incoaes* As regards 
custoia duties, the total additional Income was estlmiied at 
fis«9«82 crores* The taxable siniauoi inooae for levying incoiae 
tax vas fixed at Ri«2|000y vhlch was not to be lonered* Then, 
"the rates of additional taxes iiere so adjusted as to produce, 
in the final result, an evenly gradual scale of burden 
increasing as the incooe increasejf Thus to sum up the whole 
position, the total yield from the proposed increases in custom 
duties and taxes on income amounted to crores against 
the gap of crores, again providing for a surplus of 
li*31 lakhs* 
16* Budget for 1931-32f 
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this ims hmt our FinaneiaX antltoritlds proposed to maki 
up tho gap between revena« and expenditure for 1931**32| in 
the original ^d^et estimatea* m the eoonoaie oonditiona 
farther vith tfea deepening of aluiapi the aotuaX 
Qo^mmmt revenues etiXl fel l short of the original 
estisatea* Aeoordiiig to the revised estiaatea the total 
deteFioi^tton in the puhlio reirenues for that irear 
was worked out as follows! 
St* 11*33 erodes in tax revenues 
at. erores in Coassereial Bdpartt&eiats* 
U, 2.29 orores in general financial headings* 
ii« 0*23 orores under eaetra^ordinary receipts. 
Thus whereas the original budget estimates provided for 
a surplus of k.31 lakhSf on the haiis of ths actual estimates, 
the net deficit came to Hi. 19*55 orores for that year. Then 
^aint in the saote way he expected a further deficit of Kt*20 
orores fbr the following /ear, 1932-33* Thus pointing out 
towards this gap of li.39 orores for both the years together 
the then Finance Mttsber saidf **if we are» straight awn/, to 
estj^blish a really sound position* we need to devise a plan 
which will provide us during the reoalnder of the combined 
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two F0ar«* period ©Ithr wltb reductions In ©3Q)©ii61tttr« or vlth 
Increased rewoue to fiXl this gap"*^^ And with that purpoee 
he p resent edf in Sfptetnher 1931 m emergenoy budget for 
18 aonth9<Sept«ast»er 1931 to Marah 1933 thereby proposing an 
action on the following lines to realise their aiabition of 
haXanoed budget* 
1 - Hetrenchaent in Expenditure 
2 • Ao Baergency cut la salaries 
3 Fresh taxation 
I<et us disiitss these adjustments and their results in 
details t 
his supplestentary plan of retrenchnent in eiipenditure 
our Flnftfice Member proposed to bring about an eoonomy both In 
the isaintenanoe of ciirll and military adulnlstratlon and a 
reduction in the proirigion of oapital expenditure on new works. 
As regards civil expenditure reductions were aade In two wayi* 
Firstlyt there were the iniaedicite eoonoaies worth Ss.120 lakhs 
in connection with the budgetary estlaatesf and seoondly» a 
policy was fbroulated for reducing the cost of Govemaent 
17. Budget for 1931-32. 
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ftdaiinifltr^tian as a whola* Sinllarl^ taking the ease of 
{ail&tarj expendltui<et budget was reduced within that 
period of 18 months to orores from the average of 
opores in the originaX estifflotes for 1931-32» 
As the eaope of retmenahiaent the oiviX an<l militayy 
expetidlture was found to be Xlnited the larger outt wete made 
in expenditure on new public works* Xhe plana for new works 
were altogether out down and Xarge reductions were made in the 
slse of the works in progress* Presenting his budget estiaates 
for 1932-33 the Hallway said, "the finaneiaX oircuastances 
of the tiae are sueh as to leave^us no option|-and the progrmam 
of new works has been ruthlessl/ pruned* fhe total sum provided 
is onlj 9| ororos, of whieh thoffiajor portion is debttable 
to the depreciation fti^d.* And further ocwitinued, the end 
of next year therefore the oapltal wcpenditure to which 
Qovem -sent stands committed will be reduced to a very low figuret 
and expenditure csn be Halted strictly in accordance with 
the financial exigencies of the time*** fhus it has been 
estimated that whereas during the three years ending 1929*30 
the total works expenditure on railways amounted to Ss*M coores 
per annum, after 1930 all such expenditure was cut down and 
hardly any new project was carried out by the railways 
department* Similarly during the year 1932-33 the total works 
expenditure came down to Rs*6*^ orores, which was only one-
18 seventh of that of the year preceeding the Depression*'^ 
18* aallwoy Budget for 1932«33i p.3-
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If %m look at th© entire period of Ifep3P©»aion(1930-31 
to 1932^33) mt a glanoo m find that the total Govement 
©xpenditur® on railways and civil vorfea froi th« pra^Depreaslon 
of i^ .^ O ororda deellned to R!»12 <irore8 * « fall of about 
7$$* th% provineiaX 0iEpftiadltui?e ©n th© elvll works, In th« nmm 
way I was out dowrii to oae-balf and ex?)endltura eharged to 
revenue to of that of the last pre-depreasSon yoar*^^ 
B was thus a sorsry state of affairs that when owing to 
eeotiomle eluisp and widely prevailing uneaploytBeRt a vigorous 
public woi^s policy should have been purauedi as certain other 
countries dldf our Government ruthlessly out down such 
ea^endlture# Pointing to the eaae a conteaporary Indian writer 
r^as^edy "the l ^ e bank balances clanourlng for Investisent 
douple«(with the aooumulatltm of post office cash certificates 
(vide the Budget stateaent of 1933*3U>} pertly due to exports 
of gold out of our eountf^ ehou34 be an auspicious occasion for 
a capital prograBKBe of public wox^ Sf father than the present 
financial policy of reduction of capital prograaae of Go-vernaent 
of lidla fbr the puvpose of valntalnlng Its Imdgetary 
equilibrium to which undue Importance has been attached rather 
Strangely** We have already seen above how other countries 
like Australia and Japan aade use of this opportunity. 
19. '*lndla In the World Depression'*,by P*J.Tho»as,BoonoBilc 
Journal, Vol* Xli7I,London,1933, p. 
20* "Inflation & Public Works as a laeans to Pro8perlty**by 
Munlswanl,Ihdlan Journal of Bconoalcs, 7ol*IVt1933*3^*P*3B2« 
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Eawrgenay Ooit In Payi 
To sappletBont the eoononies In the pti^lio expetiditar*» 
it vas also proposed to taako a lOjt reduotion itt pay* This 
vas purely an esi.ergeney mmum not extending beyond a period 
of IS laont^ a. It brought a aaving of Ss*35 Xakhs for the 
reaainder of 1931-3^ and ^•It^ laltiis for the next flnanoial 
•c-
year - the total aoouiAlng to lli.UjO cror©s# This taay i^ll 
be ootspared vii^ the orthodox mecisure adopted by aefiaany 
(Qovemaent deoree) ordering a general reduetion of 10*t5 
per eent in expenditure on aalarieai rent and interest* ' 
ireah Taxationt 
lliet u« now turn to the third eiaergenoy meaaire|i«e*| 
additional taxation. Here the important ehangee introduced in 
the tax struoture in the tuain nere (1) the exeiaption l is i t 
vi|8 reduced fro!i2,000 to IfOOO, and a tax of h piee in the 
rupee WiB Imposed on inoones betveen 1,000 to 2,000 per annujo. 
Then, seoondly, the entire rate stfucture of existing taxation 
vas lifted upvard. The main plank of the plan for additional 
taxes was to put a temporary suroharge on the existing ta»s« 
21« For a detailed description, se^ Keynon.S*Poole, German 
Financial policies 1932-33, Cambridge I939f 37-50, 
- m -
The surcharge VQS applied to all oustoas and exoise duties 
(iDOludiiig salt) and to the Ino me tax and super tax* The 
rate of the surcharge was as high as Qn the existing 
cCr 
rate in each case except that it was;^ the rate of 
on incoiae tax* 
Along with these general surcharges the plan also 
included certain other new taxeS| saainly various import 
duties* It was proposed for instance, to increase the innort 
duty on artificial silk pie©#-goods frcm 20 to ko per cent 
and on artificial silk yaro froa tOjS to l^jlf on brow sugar 
froii to on Cotaphar and electric hulbs from 20^ to 
and on laaehiiiery and djres 10;t* Thent a surcharge was 
again levied these increased duties* 
Along %rith this additional taxationi soae enhances^t 
was isade of the inland postal rates namely an increase in 
the existing rates in respectw with letters and po8t*card8* 
The rate for Inland postal letter was increased to 1 anna 
3 pies from 1 anna and for post-cards $ pies instead of 6 
pies, This enhancement fee both the rates of postal letters 
and post cards cotabinedi produced an incoae of &s.73 lakhs in 
one o^ year and went to cover the deficit of Bi*92 crores in 
the working results of the department* 
ThttSt the burden of taxation during those difficult 
years of the depreasion had reached alaoot to a breaking 
point* The total receipts from the additional taxiticm 
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anounted to eror«s for the reoftining aonths of 
1931-32<ln addition to tt» noraaX r«o«ipts worth 8i.l5 erores 
for tfaat year) and to 03?ore» for the year 1932"»33. 
ilooordtng to a oaXouXlitic^ vhile the Inoidortoe of tfixation 
of costoa duties was something like 0 annas before the j^rt 
It oame now to ahoat - annas per capita of the population 
And ilallarl^ the rates of income and the general inoldenoe 
of taxation had gone up by nearly over tt^t for 1921-22 
although the Inooaes of the people had oonsiderably deollned 
since then* 7he then Finance Member hlnself adisitted that 
••whereas in the comparatively prosperous five years from 
1923-2if to 1927-28 the extwjt to which the Oovemci^ nt had to 
rely an tax revenue ( less the cost of collection} aa^unted 
to only to an average figure of about crores we are 
endeavouring for 1932-33 e period of un^opled depression to 
22 
raise fro« tax revenue about b#77 crores*'"' It is obvious 
that such an heavy iopact of taxation would have seriously 
affected business and investisent* Pointing to the sane the 
then Madras S^ r^ pean Association saidf '*the proposals for 
increased taxation in the Bill of supplement to the Indian 
finance Act 1931 and a surcharge of custon duties will be 
disastrous to ttks trade and coaaerce of the country at the 
22, Budget for 1932*33t para ^9. 
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pT&a«nt tiaO| ond so f^f trm profiaing the inofttased 
rdirfnue anticipated are oaloulated to ddovoase then by 
dioiinishing the souzves of t&iati<»i*« 
It tma thus by cutting down the public esi^enditure and 
by talcing a heaw tel l of the lioited oarnlng oapaoity of 
the naas of the population that tha Ootramiaent was abla to 
balanca tha budget for thosa yeara. The net result in the 
words of the then Finanee Member beiag that "over the two 
years <1931-32 and 1932»33) we not only paid^ur way so far 
as budgetary inoome and expenditure is ooncemed but in 
addition provided a sum of !b»353 lalchs for aeduotion of Itebt.**. 
Budget for 1933«3 i^ 
AgaiQf the emrgmoy plan of increase in taxation and 
reduction in expenditure referred to abo7e» was extended 
without alternation for the next financial year, 1933-3^ 
also* 2h his budget proposal for that year the Finance 
Meaber saidf '^ the position is sound, the plan had worked and 
proved equal to the efflergencyi budgetary equilibriua has been 
restored. But the future is s t i l l dark with uncertainty 
%re therefore think that the stru^ure oust, at least until 
23* Vide Legislative Assemb^ Debates,November 1931-
Vol. VII, p. 1836. 
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things vere (Nearer ramaisi un&Xtex^ ed and I hav* aooordlngljr 
no remission of taxation to p r o p o a e . . T h e tolaX reviaad 
estiiaates of revi^ nue for that year was about 1^ *88 crores 
ageiinat a figure of orores fbr the expenditure f^r that 
year* fhU8« lea^ng out of aooount the protriaion for reduotioo 
of debt I the budget provided a aurplus of Xakhs* liot 
m now proeeed to wake a brief review of the details of iseoae 
and ejcpenditure for that year* 
In his inooDse estimates f^r that year, making an 
aXlowanoe Ibr minor variatiofis the Finance Member put' the 
ou0to?a revenue estiaates at lakhs, and te.1770 lakhs fbr 
ineoiae tax to which he added an aotount of lakhs 
representing the to* on offietal salaries which had been 
exempted hithertOt The total actual estiaetes of tax revenuei 
thus, afBounted to Bt*6966 lakhs for that year# 
As regards tbe estiaates of expenditure, under the civil 
head the revised estiaatas for the year were 2053 lakhs as 
ooHDared with a figure of li.2089 lakhs fbr the previous 
financial year - thua showing a net reduetion of fii»36 lakhs. 
Similarly tbe militafy expenditure amounted to orores 
as coar>ared with orores for 1932-33. As regards ttas 
policy towards capital expenditure the Finance Member 
clearly said, "our on »ital prograwae for 1933-3^ is a very 
attenuated one. Apart fro» the conpletion of our existing 
comsiitiiients, it provides only for bare essentials* Ho new 
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lines «r« to bo undertaken Thus, t l» capital 
outlay for that fmw amounted to Xakhs, expenditure 
on olvii to 8s«90 lakhs and net oapital outlay of 
Gomaierolal department did not exoeed the figure of Hi. ^  lakhs and 
so m* 
Kext ooaes theloan operations of the OoTemaent of 
India* It is neoessary to point out in this eonneotiont 
that for the prupose of present diseitssion it is not enough 
to com idep aerely an excess of horroving over repayaenti 
or the excess of '^ayvent over borrowinge* Increase or 
decrease in Govera»ent borroiring does not have an^ oeaning 
t 
until the sources and purposes of the borroving are specified* 
For instance I Qovex^aent borroving to finance the excess of 
expenditure over incoae vould have an expansionary effect on 
the eccRoa/ i f there is an Increase in money supply or in 
aggregate expenditure* This would hi^ pen aostly when the 
borroving is done flroa the banMng system* Because, as we 
have seen in our theoretical discussion of chapter III, 
i f the central bank buys Qovermaent securities, additional 
credit creating capacity of the cosniercial banlcs Is created* 
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On the otber hand, If GovBmaent obsorbd th© purohatlng power 
which would otherwise had been spent either on constimptlon or 
on In r^estoent by the prlTate Indlirlduals through borrowing 
of the genuine savings of the people, the net effect on the 
money conditions would bedeflationary. 
fiewed the above angle i t would be noted that oar 
piibHo debt policy during the entire period of the Bepreeeion 
remained deflationary* Iflhlle during the years when India wee 
on the gold etandard the Ocmrnwent raised floating debt by 
issue of treasury bills to oreate artificial stringency in the 
iioney iB»rlcet| after leaving the Sold Standard they had to borrow 
to meet the remittance requirements* In botb the oases they 
absorbed the purchasing power frota circulation* I»st us now 
examine in brief| the loan operation of the Oovernment of 
India for the different years under review* 
It would be recalled from the ^alysis of the last 
chapter th<^ t In order to maintain the rate of exchange, the 
need for borrowing was felt as a oeans of absorbing the purchas* 
ing power from circulation, at a mafficiently early staka of the 
depression • To start from the beginning during the year 1929^30, 
the rupee loan consisted of two series in the form of a k ^ 
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193^ Bonds Which brought iti 9*06 oror«« and a5»98 erores 
rospeotlvely or » net total of crox*@8 against tho 
original budget ©stiaato of to.26 orores* Similarly, the 
total proceeds of the rupee loana for th© year 1930«''31 aaoonted 
to about i!s«35# «roro« of whioh 221 «roro8 ropresentdd 
Oonvsraioo of bonds, maturing 1930 to 1932. fh« aotual 
( 
oasb reoaived in subsoription to tha lo«i for this year 
amounted to 13f orores only* fhis vas eroraa less thais 
the total new loan provided for in the budget* In 1931*32, a 
rupee loan tax betiring at issued at par and repayable at 
par m the 15th of September 1935 vas raited, amounting to a 
figure of ^•16*9 orores of iihieh crores represented 
oonvaraion of I931 bonds^  fhe budget estimates for that year, 
provided for an amount of crores. On average the aotual 
borrowing were therefore, equal to th© budgetary estimates* 
fhus the ooabined amount of the borrowing raised in the 
above way during these years corresponds roughly with the 
budget foroasts* la other words we oan say that to this 
extent the Government borrowing was justified by our 
budgetary requirements. But this is not the end of the 
natter* Vhat is important to note here is that these 
borrowing were supplemented by large issues of Treasury bills 
in India as is illustrated by the following oharti 
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It vottXd bt observed fpofli the abow table that the 
amount of the Treasury bills otttatandlog with the pubXlo for 
the jBiar 1929*30 rose to 36*0 orores froa a aaall figufe of 
ororet In 192S«29* In the eane way, In the nejct two 
years it further shot up to a high le-rel of end ororet 
respectlirely. As against this the revised bii^ get estimates 
for the frmamer bills held with the pybllo oaae only to a 
flgttre of orores and li.ao orores fbr those years* Thus 
the exdess of frea mry bills held with the people amounted 
to about worth •^59 orores for both the years* As pointed out 
above these eimesslve operation were siaply undertaken to 
absorbe the aoney firoii ciroulaiion* this Is also eonflraed by 
the following stateaent of the flnanoe llstsber of Ihdia* 
had to raise our floating debt not merely to meet our revenue 
requirements! but to a far greater extent In order to eontraot 
surplus ouprenoy". 
Along irith an Inorease in the voluoe of Qovemisent 
seourlties in the hands of the peoploi another parallel devilop* 
aent which say be noted froa the following figures was a 
continuous decline in the holding of the Qoiremment securities 
in paper oarreney reserves} it showed a decline froa 39*2 
crores in 1928-29 to a sa-^ll figure of 5*9 crores or about 
The loss of curr ncy reserves on such a large scale reduced the 
base of currency creation and the issue of notes further declined 
in the way discussed in the last chapter. 
Budget Beportfor 1932-331 
Aftor th« auspenslcm of th& gold atandax i^ aXthoug)) 
in differeot vayithe borradng operations of the Oovez^ mont of 
ZDdia «ti3J» reiaainod defXatinnarjr in nature* Aa pointed out 
above the Oovemaent borroiring during this period was largely 
neoenoitated by the exoesaive retuireaenta of the reaittanoe 
progrmmQ* l^t reealled fmm the analysis of the laat 
ehapfce^that while in the earlier months of the year 1931-32 
the Ooyemment of India had to sell sterling to support the 
aagsing exchange in the later wolithe they were able to affeet 
remittances to Londos through the aarket* At the risk of 
repetititm it would be noted that subsequent to 6epte;iber 19311 
the sterling purchases of the Oovern^ e^nt aaounted to 0*0 fflillions 
for the yeaalnder of that year* Turning to 1932-33f the budget 
prograaaie for reaittanoes was aillion, 3ut sterling 
purohases for that year actually caae to 136*2 lailllon. Then, 
aa sterling issue of 19^ 2*^ 7 was made for a total amount of 
£10 million* Against this the outstanding balance of 
million of 1932-33 bonds was repaid or oanoelltd. On 
avorage, thereforei the to .al receipts by the Secretary of 
States were million and disbursements on extra-ordinary 
items £9 million* Thus the balance for ordinary expenditure 
was £M}*9 million for which the budget programme was S2kjf 
million* The excess sterling resources in this way amounted to 
£16*^ million* As thsre was no expansion of currency against 
this trmufQTt tbe London balances increased by £16*^ nilXion 
and thd cash balances in Itidla feXX off by an equal amount* 
mrtm the following 1933-3^ In the saaa way the 
budgetary provision for resiittanoe® im« £26 aillion* But the 
aotual reaittanoesf oame to millloR* And, thertforVf 
ai^ ain the Ooirernn^ ent issued two sterling loana, one a ^ jC 
1f»i8-58 loan in my 1933 for £t2 islllion and another for 10 
million. Against this 1932*35 an^ 1933-3**' loan® were paid 
off I the redeption aiaount being Cl*!'*^  oillion* The net result» 
however, waa that surplus aterling resouroes of £37*37 
aillion were available to the seoretaxy of States, of these 
£17 ailliona were transferred to the ourrency reserves and 
thus there was left a net surplus of £20 ailllons to swell the 
Iiondon balancesi which again m ant a depletion of cash 
resouroes in India to an equal aesount* 
Let us now i&so review the corresponding trends of 
borrowing operations of the Government inside the coisitry* As 
regards the year 1931-32, it is in fact, difficult to establish 
a link between the renittance programme and theGovemment 
borrotfingi because the purchases of sterling came only after 
spetember 1931. However, during the year 1932-33, i t was 
proposed in the budget that the new loan would be raised only 
to pay an old loan of li.lH crores* At the same tine i t was 
stated that the aaount of Treasury bills held by the public 
would be reduced by 7i crores*^ But the actual result for this 
year was that in all , four loans were issued and apart from the 
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eoQTerstofi operations, the total subscription in oash and 
Tr9B9ury bills came to Si#35 croroi* There vas tbu« an 
exoessive borrowing of about Sf*20 orores during thia yean 
the original proposal In the budget was for a loan 
of fti*^ orores along with a loan of Es.30 ororea for eonversion 
of the oM one* The ataount of loan aotualljr tendered for 
oonirerslon was e$*33*65 orores* It obTiously merns that on the 
basis of the budget estlraatesy no oaah loan wns now needed to 
Bieet the requirements* But again It should be noted that the 
cash section of the 3|- per cent loan issued in May 1933 
tfistohed ei* 16*60 orores vhloh isaaiit an excess borrowing daring 
that year* 
This lA short is the story of th© Qovemment borroirlng 
following the 8uspen3i<»t of the gold standard* Had the 
Ooveroraent utilised these borrowlnga for the prupoae of 
finanoing the budgetary gap or would have spent over public 
works prograSRse as other countties dldf It would have been 
helpful in Improving the econoalo conditions* But in the 
present case, on the contrary, In the process of ezcesrl^ 
remittances the Government merely transferred the aioney ttom 
the people of India to the London stock of balances* Had the 
Qovemtaent troated these renlttanoes as sere currency transslbloiis, 
there was hardly any necessity for this ex«e$sivs borrowing* 
C O H C L t l S I O H 
m mmm^^M m mmh ^omm 
In tli0 present dhapter m propose to mmim and 
dlaousg ihd main findings and oonclusionn derived flpoa 
tnaXyals of the foregoing pages. We shall, in the main concentrate 
on the appraisal of the ©onetarj and fieoaX seaaures so as 
to see at a glance the relation in whioh our tsonetciTjr polioy 
stands to the theory and praetioe of that period. In the 
process there would emerge a proper monetary-fiscal prograame 
that vould have helped India out of the Bapression. 
Zn order to appreciate our monetary and fiseal policies 
in its proper perspective i t is necessary first to give a 
brief review of the eoonowic problems which India had to face 
in the depression. Because it i s obvious that monetary policy 
or any policy can be framed only with reference to the 
problems that are proposed to be solved, in this connection 
it would be recollected from the analysis of chapters I and XI 
that the problems of the depression in this country In the main 
were, (1) an heavy decline in tto value of exportSf and 
(2) a drastic fall of our wholesale prices. This was more or 
less the common experience of all the countries that were 
exporting primary goods and raw materials. 
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If V6 and our ston^tai^  policy foUoiifed 
in tho99 ydars against tbo baekgroand it vould at onee 
bodome apparent that there was hardl/ my relation betveen 
our monetary measure® and the problems of the depression 
faced by the country^ We have already eeen how slnoe the 
middle of 1920s our taonetary authorities vere ohssessed vith 
the question of exehange stahllizatic^i and persuaded deflationary 
polioies to that end* How, iihen the depression erne there was 
hardly noted any change in their attitude and made little 
reference to its prlhlems in their policy deolarations* fhe 
trends of our currency and credit management analysed in tist 
preceeding chapter giire a clear impression that our monetary 
policy during those years was n»rely a continuation of the 
orthodox deflationary measures followed in the preceedlng 
years* The passive element in our monetary policy was not only 
that they allowed the depression to deirelop uncheclced but they 
actually played an active role in eo;sbating the aatural tendency 
of prices to rise by enforcing an actual contraction of currency* 
iis we have already pointed out our Finance lieiabor clearly said, 
•^ with this object (stabilisation of exchange) the government 
have had to draw sux^lus funds off the market by the issue of 
Treasury bills at expensive rates*.^ to bring down the internal 
price level. 
n Budget for 1931-32I para 108, 
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the ultiaatt importenoe of the exoliffiig« 
stability in the normaX tioes mii^t be* one thing i^ieh 
stands out oXeiirly is that such a course of aetion vat 
defl 'itely not warranted bjr the then existing eoonoaie 
oirouTBStanoes. It is obiriously a oont:radiotimi in terms 
that highly deflationary meaaures were superiorposed on already 
deflationary oonditione in this country* It is difficult 
to understand why our taonetary authorities were so mutch 
particular for maintaining the high rate of exchange when there 
was a general fteeling th-^ t the external value of the currency 
say he ecnveniently aanipulated according to the internal 
requirements under the then existing economic conditions. 
The argument was that exchange stability under the abnoretal 
conditions would in itself be not able to maintain confidence 
in the currency and finnnce« On the contrary it was considered 
that f^edom of exchanges wouM be helpful in contributing 
to economic recovery* To quote a few important exa^plesf Cassel 
expressing his riews on this <|uestion aaid| ''under difficult 
circamstances it is natural enough to <^oose a value for the 
new currency slightly lower than what would correspond to the 
general level of prices in the country. As it is impossible 
to know exactly the right legel of stabilixation it 'Bay be 
thoughtadvisable to have a certain margin of safety**Bawtrey 
2. Cassel, Qustav, Post-War Stabilisationt t926, p. 
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In the same way reeofaaendlng for a deppeolatlcm of curreney 
under those otroumstanees mi^ m sald» '*lt stimulates 
output and raises prioesf and ttmmhy Inoreasee the Inoomes 
of the producers of home trade products* There is atll l 
further increase In d«aand for products of all kinds| t i l l the 
consumers I income and outlay are once isore in et^uillbrium 
vlth the world prloe level ae raised by the depreciation of 
currency**.^  Keynes in the same way both in Tract on Monetary 
fleforai and Essays In Persuatlon clearly expressed a preference 
for price stability over exchange stability under such 
circumstances* We have also se^ n that a number of countries aade 
£U11 use of these ea^ert opinions in those years. The Oovemaent 
of India I howeveri did not give any consideration to it and 
continued to naKe constant efforts to maintain the rate of 
exchange at the oost of falling prices* 
3» Bavtreyi E«0» *Qold standard In Theory and Practicei p.19^* 
*»Stabllity of exchange is in the nature of convenience 
which adds to the efficiency and prosperity of those 
who are enaged in foreign trade* Stability of the price 
on the other hand, is profoundly laportant for the 
avoidance of various evils described above* Contracts 
and business expectations! which presume a stable exchange, 
siust be far fewer, even In the trading country such as 
Sngland. than those which presune a stable level of 
internal prices*^*(Keynes, '^•M.iBssays in J?er8uation,1931, 
p» 196). 
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yhlle it is difficult to that the abo^e mmet&fy 
Qieasuref foXlowdd in this country mrQ primarily responsSK^ Xe 
fior depression, tt Is however, certain that they were definitely 
in«truffl@nt^  in aooentuating the fall of our prices* fhis is a 
faet which hardly re«iuir«« any further elaboration, Beoauae, 
as pointed out above the very purpose of our monetary taeasurei 
adopted in those years was to bring down 
the price level for exchange stahiliiation* 
The then Flnanae Member of India clearly said that the rate 
of exchange wa9 changed from Is 6d to 18 l4>d there would have 
cose an inprovement of 12^ in the rupee prices* This is further 
oonfiraed i f we coiapare the proportionate fall of our prices 
with thit of certain other countries that were also eicporting 
primary goods and raw materials* faking for example, the case of 
Australia and Hew Zealand we find that by the end of 1931 the 
wholesale prices declined by in Uw Zealand and 21^ in Australia 
k 
against a 30j( fall in India from its I929 Icfel. The excessive 
decline of prices in India( as compared with other agricultural 
countries) points to some peculiar internal reasons other than 
the fact that India was an agricultural economy* 
This Sa^  in short, was the development of our monetary 
policy in the earlier months of the depression when India was 
if* for further details see Itorld Economic Survey, 1931-32, 
Chapter on }4ovetgent of '^lesale Prices* 
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on gold fltandai?d«What Is st i l l laore objeotlonabl* and atrloklDg 
l i that ftven after th« suspensim of the gold atandard th« 
attitude end performance of our monetary authority retaatned 
the same aa before* In ooanon irith Qrm% Brltainy they laid a 
great emphnaia on the eloaent of eonfidenee» atability of 
exehange and roar of inflation. It ahould be pointed out that 
this attitude* of our monetary authorities resembled to that of 
the gold standard oountries rather than those who nere off the 
gold standard*^ Beoauaet as ve knov, all these factors vere 
the essential requisites for a proper fUnotioning of the gold 
standard* Hoveveri an important question that arises here is 
that why India folloved Great Britain so striotly vhile a 
number of other countries ( as ve haire seen in th';> last 
chapter) pursued independent monetary policios after going 
of f the gold standard* It is obvious that the polioles that 
vera suitable in ease of Great Britain would have hot suited 
India as the nature of the problems in the two vere different 
during those years* ks Professor (^ssel rightly saidf under 
disturbed olreumstanoes, '*eaoh individual country has to 
consider independently what is to be the level cat which it 
desires to have its prices stabilised**,^ Hawtrey also showed 
To quote an important example the l>rench Representative speaking 
from the side of the gold standeird countries et the Vtorld Economic 
Conference S8id,*»wide fluctuations of the exchange do not merely 
impirel national currencies or national economies; they shake to 
its foundation the whole system of modem society which is based 
on credit* In a word, without stable currency there can be no 
lasting confidence*."(Journal of the tlonetary & Iconomic Conferenos 
JUn2 2l| 1933f P* 79» 
6* See,his Honey and Foreign Exchange after 191V,l922,p*27U-* 
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'W 
an sgroement on the sanet vhen he saidt **eaeh eountxy flight 
go Its own wa^ i oontented to seoure internal monetaxy 
equilibrium and to leave rates of exchange to look after thsm« 
selves**.we have already seen that the Indian writers and 
legislators also supported the same view in those years whioh 
unfortunately eould not reoeive any attention of our monetary 
authorities. 
fhus the over-esphasis on confidence and the fear of 
inflation oane in eonfliot with the policy of expanding credit* 
Our Finance Member on repeated occasions warned of the dangem 
of inflation and out right rejected any plan for aonetary 
expansion to raise the wholesale prices* ^ t only this, on the 
contrary they did not even allow the ejEpanslonaiqr forces that 
daerged out of the abondonment of the gold standard to work freely 
on our nonetary conditions* For a ready reference we say recall 
from th0 discussion of the last chapter that following the 
suspension of tho gold standard India was in a position of purchase 
acre sterling than «ras necessary for the current requireaients* 
This was a good opportunity for monetary expansicsi^  Because i f 
this excess of sterling would have been transferred to the Paper 
cur'^ ency Reserves it would have served as a bails for additional 
7* The Oold Standard In Theory and Practice, Ist Edition, p* 227* 
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. eurrency •upply. But instead of (iolng fehii, th« Oovewiaent 
of ^dia transfarrtd this amount to the gold standard roserf»i 
vhloh 8laply meant a replaceoent of the goveffnnient of India 
securities by a corresponding amount, without any expansionary 
effect on our money conditions. Zn the saiae way they also 
laalntalned the reserve ratio (against the issue of currency and 
credit) at a very high letrel which put a rest^etlon on the 
additlanaX creation of currency and credit. Thus all these 
aeasures were adopted In order to create confidence in our 
currency* But here^ they over^od^ked the basic point that the 
creation of confidence largely depended upon psychological factors 
which were adverse at that time. As the League of Nations 
rightly pointed out "even a purely metalio currency Is no absolute 
safeguard against debasetsent*'. In those years as we have seen 
in the last chapter the gold Delegation actually reconaended 
for a lowering of the reserve ratioi "without In any way weakening 
the general credit situation".^ 
The apparent weakness of the above policy was that it was 
based on a wrong analysis of the then-exlsting econonlc situation 
in India and also en a aistaken view of the effects of ths 
expansionary aeasu es» Ih other woitlSf although tbare was a 
severe depression under way to becooe s t i l l sore acute, the fsar 
arose that cheap money conditions would result in an inflationary 
rise of i>rices in this country* This contention of our 
iUiproduced from International Currency Srperience, league of 
Rations, Chapter on Reserve Hatlo* 
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authorities nas again in efftotlve contrast with the general 
consensus of opinion of that period* There was a eonmon faeXing 
among the QooiKmists and statesmen in those dajs that some 
increase in the level of prices is highly essential for econoolo 
reeonreiy. Mr. MeKfennaf an Important figure of that period 
supporting the case for an Inflntlonary rise of prices under those 
conditions said, "controlled Inflation from being the remedy 
of fools or Knaves» has hecoase widely regarded as the best 
available solution of our troubles, particularly since it has 
become realised that a substantial rise In wholesale prices need 
o 
have no more than a slight effect upon the cost of living*** 
Eawt3?ey suggested the sane st i l l aore forcefldly when he said, 
**Just as deflation fsay be needed as a corrective to inflation 
to which economic system has not adjusted, so at the present 
time inflation Is needed as a correctivo to deflation?'^ Now 
taking a practical example we have already seen how Australi«f 
Sweden and Japan laid an exclusive emphasis on a rise 
in prices and put aside the question of exchange 
stabilisationf in the formulation of their monetary 
policies* Even Great Britalni of course at a later staget^^so 
stressed the need for a rise in the prices, although they did 
very l itt le in that direction« The delegates of the British 
8. Vide Statist, Itebruaiy 1933, p. 173* 
9* Rawtrey, H*G. Trade Depression and the Vfoy Out, p* 77* 
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Bkiplre at tha vorld eoonoalo oonferanoe of 1933 8aid« "The 
Qovemaents of tlie British Coamonwealth should persist hy ©11 
means in thsir povsr^ vhethsr monetary or eoonoaiic, wl&hin the 
liiaits of sound finonce, in the policy of ftjtrtiioring the rise 
of wholesale prloes until there is e^denee that equllibrlusi 
has h@8n re*establlshedt and therefore they should take vhatever 
measures ars possible to stabilise the position thus attained",^® 
Probably, the malu reason for the fear of lnflatic«i on the 
part of our authorities wss that they shared the views of suoh 
countrlea, France and Germanyi that had experienced the iforst 
sort of Inflations In the post-war years.^^ It should be noted 
that In the early twenties France suffered froa a run away 
Inflation whdi led to the flight ftpon the France In l925-26» 
yhen finally stabilized In 1928t the franc stood at about one-
fifth of Its pre-war ralue. This had a great psychological 
effect 00 the minds of the French Qovemraent who regarded currency 
depredlatlon and cheap money polleles to result In tnfXatlon 
and undemlne the confidence* Geroianyt In the same wayi had 
been a vlotla of inflation for several years after the close of 
12 the First World Vftur. This wes accoapanled by an heavy 
10. Reproduced froa 'The Gold Standard to Theojpy and Practice* 
by a.G« Hawtrey, p.227. 
11* Our Tinance Menber on Occc^ sl ns madd a reference to Qeroan Inflatl n while discussing the question of exchange end prices. 
12. See. for detallSf PooletH.Keynon, **Oerman Financial 
Pollclesi (Harvard tJhlverslty Press|C«iabrldge, 1939)pp.20. 
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daprddidtiOQ of her ourreno/ and large budget defioits* How, 
when the depression caae they hesitated to adjpt any plan 
for raising the prleesf as the meiaorlee of the past Inflation 
were sti l l fresh in their minds# In view of this there is 
thus l itt le wonder th^ t^ theso countries hsA a fear of inflation* 
Bat while this issue was ifawtant from the point of T1?w of 
the above countries^ ths?« was hardly any ground for India to 
develop the fsar of Inflation, As we have seen in ohapter I, 
oontrnry to the experience of France and Genaany during the years 
preceedlng the depression td^ Indian edonomy had been under a 
constant pressure of deflatlcmary forces, fiven after the 
suspension of the gold standard there was hardly my appreciable 
increose in our prices - after a slight Increase in, October 1931 
it again started to decline touching the loi^st level of 83 in 
March 1933 as compared with 96 in October 1931 and in Sopteaber 
1929. It is» therefore clear that our fear of inflation was 
absolutely baseless and eatne in the way of the recovery of our 
prices. Thus, what Mr# Brown rea^rlced in ease of Great Srltain 
that her oonetary policy after the suspension of the gold 
standard was ** a hard and uncomprotaising obstacle to price-
raising soheaes by monetary laeans^ .^ ^ equally holds txue in 
case of India* 
13« W.A* Brown 1 *^ he International Gold Standard* Eeinterpretedf 
1913-3^(Kational Bureau of EoonoBio Bsserve, New ToriC|19 i^ 
p« IS69. 
• 207 -
So fai* we h«v« b«0n oonoewidd <mXT with the aetual 
operation of our mondtafy policy and ita bearing on the course 
of deprossim in tbls ceountry* Let as now turn to consider the 
neatt important <|uestl<»i posed in the Introduction of this study, 
whether an eif^iuislonlat aonetary'policy i^uld hare heen helpful 
In bringing a recovery of our prices and trade during that period. 
This ^estlon dan be answered in two wayst Firstly , we can see 
what the acadetaiclans and policy nakera of that period had to 
say in that matterf and secondly we can examine that what wai 
the aotu«il result in those countFies that adopted such neasures 
in those years• 
Now, as regards tho first question, we hope that it has 
sufficiently been answered In the theoretical discussion of the 
III chapter. To put in brief we hage seen that there was a 
clear unanimity nmong the wrltei« of that period and a deliberately 
provided and timely monetary action was an Indispensable means to 
lU-
l i f t the economy from the depression. Vfe have noted how all 
the Important economists like Hawtrey, Keynes and cassel stressed 
m*. Concluding its impression on the understanding of that period 
the Macaiilan Committee pointed out '*for the world as a whole 
the best hope of a remedy lies in a monetary policy designed 
to increase the volume of purchasing power, to increase the 
ease of borrowing, i f necessary by guarantees, to diminish the 
rate of interest long-term and as well as short-term and 
to stimulate in every possible way the spirit of enterprise 
and the volume of investment".(Oowmittee on Industry and 
Finance, 1933),p.190. 
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thai In oyder to bring a reoovary of prlcds and trade cbeap 
and plentiful eredit should bo provided and its oiroulation 
should b© aotivaly enoouragod* It should be pointed but here 
that ^11© rocommendlng these measuresf they did not overlook 
the fadt that In times of the abnermal economic erisls there 
is a wldi spread loss of confidenoe and the induoesient to Invest 
is generally veaker, Havtrey, for Instance, in one of his 
writings clearly saldf '*a conspicous feature of a trade depression 
Is alvnyg a stagnation of balancesi a low veloolty of oiroulatlon, 
These balances ere sialnly composed of the Ideal working capital 
of industrial or commeroial c<»ieera8. The same contraction of 
deaend which makes people fear falling prices and restrains theo 
from borrowing to buy comisodities, also leads them to hold money 
idle**,^^ But he believed that this does not exhaust the 
possibilities of economic revival through a monetaipy «otion» 
Stressing upon this point in a long passage he saysi "however, 
severe the depression may be„ that does not mean that economic 
activity has been brought to a cjead stop. It may be working at 
no ttore than 70 or 8Q3f, of Its normal capacity, but 70 or 80 
per cent is st i l l something and whatever their Is econoalc 
activity there are potential borrowers'*. Keyfies similarly 
believed that there always exists "an unsatisfied fring of 
borrowers" who are ready to borrow under all circumst-inces. ttoder 
such conditions he, however, reeomeiended a l i t t le stronger 
monetary action than is r;^ quired In ordinary circumstances.^^ 
See, TradeDepresaion and the Way Out, p.77 
16. Ibid., p. 
17. For detailed ani.ysi8,8e@ his A Tract on Monetary Inform,pp. 178*^ 
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T)teiii soeondlyi tf pri<ws and foreign trade om bo taken 
a« an index of econotaic reeoirery, ve find tram the analysii 
of chapter 12 that the oountrlee that had left the gold 
standard vere better off than those who were etiXX on the 
gold standard. 7hen» from this general position! i f ve 
take the oases of those partiouXar countries that speolallj 
ooneentrated on depreciation of ourrenoy and cheap ooney 
policies with the definite ohjeetive to raise iirholesale 
priceSf ve find a st i l l better position, faking, for example 
the case of the coontries that we choosed for comparison in tbe 
last chapter m find that in Mstralia the depreciatioi of 
currency combined with cheap money conditions played an 
ioportant part in the recovery of trade and production of that 
country. fhe immediate and perhaps most outstanding 
developaient in the words of Professor Copland was that "with the 
depreciation of currency the faH of export prices in Australian 
18. **Soae Australian economists go so far as to regard this 
credit expansion as the most important element in the 
econotiio recovery %rhioh followed and, while this view is 
challanged, all observers agree in ascribing considerable 
importance to the coaaonvealth*« operations". 
(Vide '»torld Economic Survey, 1933-3^» p* 27.). 
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eurrenoy stoppedi though there v@re minor flaetuations. 
this regardf it ¥ou34 bo noted tfe^ it while so many other 
countries were s t i l l struggling with a eontinous deterioration 
in their eoonomie eonditlonSf reeovery of exports end eoonomio 
activity had well started in that eountry as early as towards 
the aiddle of 1931* Acoording to official estitaates, in the 
twelve months ending June 30yt951| there was an e^ses^ of exports 
of £A M^ Si million exports hnving been £^102 million, as 
against import s of Jp 60*^ taillion in contrast with the 
excess of imports of 6 nillion in the previous oonths* 
Then again t between 1932 and 1933 the total raloe of exports 
showed an increase of 161 while that of imports increased only 
by Making the balance of trade in favour of that countryi 
the unfiavourable trade balance of €A 71*6 miUion in 1929-30 
had been turned into a fairourable balance of Millions by 
1931-32.^^ This brought an laiprovtaent in the internal 
eoonoaic conditions of the country. Probably pointing to the 
sane the ts g^ue of Nations in his survey of vtorld Economic 
conditions remnrked **The exasple of Australia is one of 
far-reaching dovestic readjustoents finally helped to sucsess 
by an iMproveMnt of external conditions reflected in better 
20 export prices* ** Althoughi being an agricultural countiyi 
19* Xiokiitf *'Orisis and Readju tnent In Australia**! 
20» League of Natlonsj World Economic Survey 193 
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the vholeiaXe prioe level did not staov any aubftaotisl 
Increase, howovePf its fs^lilng tendene/ was avivsted as early 
as In Fetoruaiy 1932 ^ m it allowed a alight Iraproveaent to 80 
frod ?B in tlie preirioua aontha and remained stable at that 
level In the following aontha* As against thla the prices 
in mdla continued to deeline t i l l the end of the first 
quarter 1933* 
f he case of Sweden similarly provides an evidence of 
better eeon^Mlc conditions following the depreciation of 
currency* As we have seen in the last chapteri right trm 
the beginning of 1932 the "Sweden »s aonetary policy was 
concemed prltaarlly %nth the country's internal price 
condlticms and the state of industry not with a certain 
Sterling rate**. * They allowed their currency to depreciate 
to whatever extent it was required by the internal economic 
conditions* Thus the depreciation of the currency on the 
one hand brought an Iwprovenent in the eseport trade and at the 
saae tiiie exerted a reflatlwiary effect on the internal price 
level* As we have already pointed out the value of her 
ejcport tmde registered an Increase of while that of the 
imports declined by as a result of which the passive 
balance of Kr. allllons turned Into an active balance 
of trade worth Kr* 76 Millions, As the export trade was 
21. Vide Statist, October 1932, p. 
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of greater slgntfloanoe ifi that aountry^ the Iraprovesent In 
,eiQiort8 together with cheap aoney eoaditione gave « greet 
stiiBuliis to the tndastriel product ion and economio eotivity« 
The recovery of production vsa fairly started towards the 
QiddXe of 1931f the natlG«aX indices of production showed an 
improvement from 81 in May 1931 to 92 in February 1932. 
It is undoubtedly difficult to say whether the abote t ^ 
ejEpanslonary monetary (seaeures would have been equally effective 
and ueeftil in Indiai as the nature of our monetary mechanists 
and the powers at its disposal to conti^l the economic situat1onw^ '^ 
somewhat different from those countries. It is, however, a 
reasonable presumption that the lessons of their experience were 
of grent importnace for this country in view of the fact that the 
problems which India faced during the depression had a great 
similaz^ty with that of the abovs countries} a heavy fkll of 
wholesale prices and loss of export trade were the common 
problems of Australiai Sweden and India* Thus, had our monetary 
authorities, lilce Australia and Sweden, allowed the rupee to 
depreciate, there would have definitely come some benefit to 
our ei^ort trade in particular and economio conditions in general, 
fhis fact has also been clearly admitted by our the then 
Finance Mimber when he «ald, "I do not deny that i f Government 
was to adopt a deliberate policy of Inflation and depreciation. 
22. League of Natione i World Bconoaic Sux^ey, 1933*3 »^ p»27t 
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of 6UFreney« that aigbt sot as a temporar/ stimulaitt, for it 
vould In^oe a period of rising prices vbicti is alimirii «noourag« 
ing to trad« and will also bring about a reduotion in real 
vagoB whiclSL would benefit Qmplo^ ars of labour niaking goods for 
fhen, apart froar this direct effaot, the 
dapreoiation of rupee vould have benefitted indirectly also* 
Because, had allowed the rupee to depreciate and easy money 
conditions to develop freelyi our prices and trade could take 
full advantage of the otherwise favourable situation which had 
resulted fron going off the gold standard* 
Ceasing to the fiscal policy we have seen in the proceeding 
chapter that our budgetary operations also remained restrictive 
over the entire period of the depression. Here also the 
same attitude dominated and tho then Finance Member of India 
constantly eaphasiaed the need to keep the budget balanced at 
all costs to create confidence and also "to avoid getting into 
ok 
any sort of inflationary position*. looking back fron the 
perspective of the foregoing discussion the question arises 
whether so strong an emphasis on balanced budget even under the 
iBost difficult circumstances was a suitable trend of our policy. 
23. Cf. legislative Assttsbly Debates, 1932, Vol* XI 
WOT a detailed exasinatlon of this attitude, see **ttateQient 
of the financial Position** Annexure to Budget for 1932-33* 
p« 1* 
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Wto have already seen how a mimb&r o f othar countries deviated 
fjroa the t r a d i t i o n o f * balanced budget« and f r e e l y made s u i t a b l e 
budgetary adjustiaents to laaintaln employment and purehasing 
power o f t h e i r people. I n 3hdia, on fche contrary, a deflati<mary 
f l a c a l p o l i c y was super^iaposed on already d e f l a t i o n a r y 
conditions caused by the r e s t r i c t i v e monetary Measures.®^ As 
our Finance Heiaber hitaself pointed o u t | our Govemisent taade 
hard e f f o r t s t o balance budgets through a d r a s t i c r e d i c t t o n i n 
expenditure and increase i n taxation* I t i s needless t o point 
out that such Measures would hava i n e v i t a b l y served as a 
f u r t h e r d e f l a t i o n a r y pressure adding to the f a l l i n p r i c e s and 
economic a c t i v i t y * 
Here we do not propose any ambitious pfogranrae o f the 
nature o f a peraaanent expansion o f p u b l i c a c t i v i t y at the 
expense of the p r i v a t e s e c t o r , but simply to make c e r t a i n 
budgetary adjustments to maintain the purchasing power o f the 
people. T h i s i s what was a l s o suggested by the experts o f that 
p e r i o d and put i n p r a c t i c e by a nuaber o f c o u n t r i e s , According 
t o some estimates the scope f o r such p u b l i c works programme 
was a l l the more greater i n I n d i a i n the absence o f adeauate 
p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e . I t has been c a l c u l a t e d that i n those 
days Government was the l a r g e s t employer o f labour I n I n d i a 
25* T h i s l i n e o f a c t i o n was again p a r a l l e l to the countr lesf 
Germany and France, that were s t i l l on the gold standard. 
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and from 50 lio of mr total outlay on public %forks usod 
to go to the labour olasa. The drastio eurtallssent of such 
exponditure obviously aeant a beayy loss of purohasing power* 
thus ve oannot oonolude the whole posit{on better than in the 
following words of a conteaporary writers "Govemaent of Indie 
followed a rigid policy of budget equilibrium! but during a 
period of unexampled depression hardly any country had 
followed such a severely orthodox policy. Host countries 
made it their aim to siaintain the internal purchasing power 
at any cost, and have done so by a liberal loan expendituz^ 
on private works* Even dreat Britain has kept up her public 
works ei^endituvei but mdla has cut down such ei^enditure to 
the bone**. 
26« "India In the World Depression** by ThoMaS| 
Economic Journal ?ol. XLVI, London, 19331 
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^^pgx^gCTiB^^g mowAmmi^jai imu 
1926 Annuaa. Aver-sge 
1927 Annual Airerago 
1928 iltinttal Aireragtt 
1929 ItaTSttai Awriga 
1929 September 
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1930 Januaiy 
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March 
April 
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Jtoe 
July 
August 
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Dtoember 
1930 Annual Average 
1931 January 
February 
Maroh 
April 
May 
JUne 
July 
Auguit 
Septeaber 
October 
Noveaber 
ceoevber 
1931 Annual Average 
India Britain US, A, Japan 
(Calcutta) 
100 179 
1H8 95 170 
ik^ 'iko 98 171 
IM 137 97 167 
136 98 16Jf 
iUO 136 96 163 
137 13*^  160 160 13C 133 9h 155 
131 131 93 152 126 128 92 
125 
123 i2h 
91 1U8 
121 122 1^ 3 
116 121 137 
119 1l4 118 133 
111 116 Bh 130 
107 113 83 nh 
iOh 112 80 123 
101 109 78 122 
116 120 86 137 
98 107 77 120 
99 103 76 119 100 106 75 120 
98 106 75 11? 
97 10»f 73 116 
93 103 72 11»f 
93 101 72 116 92 100 72 115 
91 99 71 113 96 nh 70 111 
97 106 70 111 
98 106 69 11»f 
96 iCk 73 110 
Oontl 
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Contl. 
193^ Annual Average 
jxidiM Britain iSTIpan 
(XaXetifcta) 
1932 Januaiy 97 I06 67 lat 
February 97 105 66 122 
March 9*^  105 66 120 
April 92 102 66 116 
Jtey 89 t01 6W 11*^  
Jitna 86 9B ^^ 111 
July 87 98 65 112 
Augttat 91 100 65 118 
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1932 Annual Averaga 91 102 65 122 
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April m w 60 133 
May 87 99 63 13*^  
Sm» 89 102 65 136 
July 91 102 69 138 
August 89 103 70 136 
Saptarabar 88 103 71 138 
October 88 103 71 136 
Hovaabar 88 103 71 135 
Oaoambar 89 103 71 133 
1933 Annual Airar^ ga 87 101 66 136 
193**' jranuaty 90 105 72 
February 89 105 7h Iterch 88 W ?h I3»f 
Report of tba Cowtrollar of tba Currency 
for Tarioua jearof Statamant I« 
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Fall In December 1930 
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1931 January 
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79 
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73 
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faXl in !)ee«tabGr 1932 
on Ooeofflber 1931 
m 
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70 
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65 
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1 9 . 8 
115 
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110 
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Exported Import Exported I ^ o r t e d 
^rtlclfe^ itGd Art A r t l c l e t ArtleXei 
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December 193^ 27 6 12 
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